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Map 1. Kenya (St. Lawrence University GIS Program: Carol Cady, dakota Casserly, 
and Sean Gannon, 2015).
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1
Introduction
Obama and Kenya in the Classroom
In 2008 we witnessed the global flood of attention directed toward Kenya 
as the world aimed to better know and understand the complex heritage 
of Barack Obama Jr.— the Hawaiian-born son of a white woman from the 
American Midwest and a black man from East Africa. The Obama and 
Kenya connection, an important theme in the explosion of biographies 
that accompanied the election of the first African American president 
of the United States, sparked a number of debates in classrooms around 
the globe. As a wide variety of authors of varying credentials and politi-
cal stripes scrambled to write the story of the Obama family and attach 
it to American history, simplified and boldly inaccurate narratives about 
Kenya’s past and present began to proliferate. Obama and Kenya criti-
cally challenges and corrects these depictions, showing how Kenya’s past 
and present are relevant not only to African history, but to American and 
world histories. This book also provides a contemporary space for stu-
dents of history and African studies to examine how both popular and 
scholarly narratives often refract analysis of the past through the lens of 
contemporary political discourse. 
Kenyan history is certainly not something the average student or “his-
tory buff” encounters regularly on the shelves of the local bookstore or while 
flipping through documentaries on the History Channel. If one does stum-
ble upon literature or media concerning Kenya, the stories these sources tell 
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tend to range widely in tone, evidence, perspective, and bias. For instance, 
scholars note that up until Kenya’s tumultuous 2007–2008 election season, 
much of the journalistic writing on Kenya had typically characterized the 
country as “an island of peace and economic potential in a regional sea of 
stateless chaos (Somalia), genocide (Rwanda), mad dictators and child sol-
diers (Uganda), and a decades-long civil war (Sudan),”1 thereby contrasting 
Kenya with its more fractious and problematic neighbors. Other sorts of 
popular accounts drew heavily on colonial nostalgia, making Kenya out to 
be a romantic world of tented safari camps and sundowner cocktails. In both 
cases, the ever-present threat of “tribal” violence simmers below the surface 
of an otherwise idealized Kenya. As Obama and Kenya argues throughout, 
such prevailing stereotypes fit broadly with the way Africa is typically de-
picted in popular discussions about the continent’s histories, cultures, and 
politics. It shows how these stereotypical representations have driven de-
bates about Obama’s connection to the continent and about Kenya’s place 
not simply in African history, but also in world history. 
As American scholars teaching African history and world history 
courses in the United States, we regard challenging stereotypes and cor-
recting misinformation about Africa as essential parts of our pedagogy and 
as central to equipping students with key skills in historical analysis. Most 
students come to our classes with little or no exposure to African history, 
and if they have learned about Africa in high school, it has been principally 
through the lens of African American history or via the history of European 
imperialism. While they might have learned a smattering of facts, for in-
stance, that American slaves originally came from West and Central Africa 
in the 1600s or that Europeans “carved up the continent” at the Berlin Con-
ference of 1884–1885, students often complain that they have rarely, if ever, 
had the chance to examine African history from African perspectives or to 
learn about how African actors have engaged in global historical events and 
processes. Obama and Kenya provides a critical space in which to do both.
Introductory discussions in our classes about what we know about Af-
rica and how we know it stimulate rich debates about not only the legacy of 
racism and ethnocentrism in American high school curriculums but also 
the stereotypes about Africa to which American students have frequently 
been exposed through film, literature, and popular media. These discus-
sions are also useful in opening a dialogue about the politics of who writes 
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the histories we encounter both inside and outside of the classroom and 
how African voices and experiences, if presented at all, are often framed 
as only marginally important in the context of world history.2 Obama and 
Kenya uses the story of an American president and his Kenyan roots to ask 
larger questions about historical representations of Africa and the ways 
both Africans and non-Africans have drawn on a US president’s personal 
and political biographies to tell very particular stories about the world’s 
second-largest continent. For teachers and students of African and world 
history, Obama and Kenya speaks to global discourse about Africa today 
and to key themes in the continent’s history over the last one hundred 
years. In doing so, it analyzes the political work these representations have 
done and continue to do in Kenya and abroad.
Focusing on contested narratives of British colonialism in Kenya and 
the challenges of building a national identity after independence in 1963, 
we explore how the Obama family is represented in relation to histories of 
Kenya’s colonial era and the early decades of independence, paying close 
attention to how Kenyan voices have debated this relationship in oral, 
written, and digital form. With Barack Obama Jr.’s political rise taking 
place firmly in the digital age, the story of Obama and Kenya provides a 
unique opportunity to analyze how Africans debate the past in a variety of 
forums and how access to political and social discourse has changed over 
time. Primary sources, ranging from social media to political cartoons 
to tourist advertisements, are now available at the click of a mouse and 
form a key part of a growing body of digitized archival material in African 
history.3 We have compiled a number of these digitally available primary 
sources on a companion website (obamakenya.org). Obama and Kenya 
and obamakenya.org highlight these useful resources so that readers can 
scrutinize primary sources themselves, hone their own skills in histori-
cal analysis, and further grasp how Kenya’s contested histories speak to 
broader issues in Africa and world history. 
The history of Kenya over the last century offers an important case 
study in both African history and world history. Given its location in East 
Africa, Kenya’s history is often absent from the broader secondary school 
curriculum in the United States, which typically focuses on the histori-
cal geography of the Atlantic slave trade and its significance to African 
American history. However, Kenyan history from the precolonial era for-
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ward offers countless examples of transnational connections, which speak 
broadly to comparative studies of European imperialism and the global 
history of trade and cultural interaction in the Indian Ocean world. Ken-
ya’s colonial experience, in which development occurred through massive 
land grants to a small coterie of white settlers who displaced Africans from 
their homes and turned them into squatters, resonates potently with the 
histories of other settler colonies from Zimbabwe to Algeria.
Among the movements for independence from colonial rule that swept 
the continent in the mid-twentieth century, Kenya’s anticolonial struggle is 
the key exemplar of African resistance through violent insurrection. The 
Mau Mau rebellion—as Kenya’s complex anticolonial contest is known—
which motivated the British to throw the military might of their wan-
ing empire against the Kenyan rebels, the Land and Freedom Army, was 
also frequently invoked by participants in the burgeoning American civil 
rights movement.4 With the advent of independence in the 1960s, Kenya 
wrestled with the legacies of colonial rule while negotiating Cold War ten-
sions and the challenges of local development. As in many African nations 
struggling to develop after decades of colonial neglect, Kenya’s economy 
failed to take off, thus driving a new wave of migration abroad in search of 
better opportunities for work and education. Kenyan migrants of this era 
included the father of a future US president. 
Critically analyzing Kenya’s colonial experience and the challenges the 
new nation faced after independence offers students of African history 
and world history a great deal of thematic, topical, and factual information 
to bring to bear in an array of comparative contexts. While many popular 
narratives of Obama and Kenya recount a profoundly simplistic view of 
the country’s past and present, the contested histories and the politics of 
belonging in Kenya cannot be distilled into a simple, single story about the 
son of an African “goat herder.”5 Further, discussions of the diverse sym-
bolism and meaning of the Obama presidency should not be confined to 
the American history classroom, as the connection between Obama and 
Kenya provides a powerful personalized account through which students 
can debate critical issues that have shaped Africa’s place in the world for 
much of the last one hundred years.
Obama and Kenya is divided into two parts that both serve to introduce 
readers to the Obama and Kenya connection more broadly and that provide 
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more focused examples of the ways in which diverse audiences have woven 
Obama into particular African stories and themes. Part 1 begins by explor-
ing the origins of Kenya’s fascination with Obama. The authors’ personal 
accounts of conducting research in Kenya during the 2004 US elections un-
derscore the complexity of Kenya’s politics of ethnicity and how the roots 
and relevance of Obama’s connections to East Africa reveal a deeper win-
dow into representations of Kenyan history from colonial times to the pres-
ent. Chapter 2 builds on this introduction and familiarizes the reader with 
key themes that have dominated the last one hundred years of Kenyan his-
tory: colonialism, ethnicity, regionalism, migration, and electoral politics. 
We introduce the unfamiliar reader to the fractious worlds of colonial and 
postcolonial Kenya where the politics of belonging—of race, class, ethnicity, 
or other forms of social identity—often work to shape historical realities. 
In doing so, we briefly explore the dominant myths about the country and 
contrast them with the realities of Kenyans’ lived experiences. Here the goal 
is not just to narrate a series of past events, but rather to draw close attention 
to how myths and realities operate in constant tension with each other in 
reconstructions of Kenya’s contentious histories. 
Chapter 3 situates Obama in the regional history of the Luo community 
to reveal how a US political figure has fit into local Kenyan understand-
ings of the nation’s diverse social and cultural landscape. Obama’s unlikely 
rise to the top of the political order in the United States was regarded by 
many Kenyans specifically as the ascendancy of a Luo, rather than more 
generally as that of an American of Kenyan or African descent, and re-
vived specific debates about the failures of a number of Luo politicians to 
achieve similar feats in East Africa. Here Obama and Kenya returns to the 
question of the saliency of ethnicity in Kenya’s political history and exam-
ines how the framework of contemporary ethnic identities, assembled by 
specific historical actors beginning in the colonial era, has impeded the 
development of an inclusive Kenyan national identity after independence. 
Part 2 of Obama and Kenya shows how the past and the present are in-
timately connected in the ways local Kenyan and international audiences 
have debated the Obama and Kenya connection since 2004. Chapters 4 and 
5 take the story of Obama and Kenya to the United States and then back to 
Kenya to show how Obama’s political opponents in the US and his support-
ers in Kenya have made sense of the US president’s Kenya connection by 
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reinvigorating stereotypes and creating new, yet highly erroneous, narratives 
of Kenya. In doing so, we address the important issues of when and how to 
“trust” primary and secondary historical sources. Offering a nuanced look 
at the myth and reality of popular writings about Kenya, Obama and Kenya 
examines what happens to Kenya’s image abroad when the country’s history 
is used as a political commodity, and what happens to the politics of rural 
development at home when tourists imagine the Obama family’s homestead 
in Western Kenya as a global historical monument. 
In chapter 6, we return to the question of the political utility of histori-
cal representation using the lens of twenty-first-century electoral politics. 
This chapter examines global representations of Kenya’s hotly contested 
december 2007 presidential election and its violent aftermath, which 
drew upon well-worn, ahistorical clichés about ancient tribal rivalries. The 
text then turns to the presidential elections of March 2013, which again 
revived the familiar portrayal of Kenya as a nation filled with “tribal gangs” 
roaming the forests and ready to unleash the savage violence of the past. 
The chapter also addresses how the election pitted Uhuru Kenyatta, son 
of Kenya’s first president, and Raila Odinga, son of Kenya’s first vice presi-
dent, against each other in a contest many Kenyans viewed as part of a 
historic struggle of regional and dynastic family politics. As the political 
discourse clearly showed, the legacy of colonialism was a regular point 
of reference in this high-stakes political contest, where particular narra-
tives of the past were often evoked on the campaign trail and even among 
pundits abroad. Picking up where chapter 6 leaves off and focusing on 
the Obama administration’s reactions to the 2013 elections, chapter 7 ex-
plores the ways in which the administration has or has not engaged with 
Africa since 2008. Returning briefly to the continent-wide celebrations of 
Obama’s victory in 2008, the chapter asks how African expectations for 
the Obama presidency have aligned with American policy and practice. 
The epilogue focuses on Obama’s official state visit to Kenya in July 2015, 
analyzing both how the first such visit by a sitting US president was figured 
in the two countries and the issues that Obama, as the first Kenyan Amer-






Discovering Obama in Kenya 
The seeds for this book were sown in the multitude of places we visited 
and the variety of voices we encountered as eager graduate students fum-
bling through our dissertation fieldwork across Kenya’s diverse landscape 
in 2004. As we read through stacks of dusty files at the Kenya national 
Archives (KnA), conducted interviews along the rocky shores of Lake 
Victoria, and engaged in more casual debates in the bustling cafés and 
nightclubs of nairobi, Kenya’s energetic, cosmopolitan capital city, we 
never imagined that ten years later our multifaceted research experiences 
would lead us to write a book about the place of an American president in 
the history of Kenya. 
While in the last decade we have engaged in countless conversations 
about and collected many examples of the local and global significance of 
Barack Obama’s ties to Kenya, one episode at an American embassy event 
in nairobi pointed to a need for and shaped the vision of our book. Fortu-
nate to be supported by Fulbright fellowships through the US department 
of Education, we received formal invitations in the fall of 2004 to attend 
an exclusive celebration that takes place in the early morning hours only 
once every four years during the first week of november—an Election day 
breakfast held by the American embassy in nairobi. Flattered to be in-
vited to a special gathering at the posh nairobi residence of the then US 
ambassador to Kenya, William Bellamy,1 excited about whom we might 
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meet, and like all graduate students pleased by the prospect of a free meal, 
we luckily landed at what must have been the very bottom of an exclusive 
invite list that included much of Kenya’s political elite.
On the morning of november 3, with Kenya some eight hours ahead 
of eastern standard time, much of the diplomatic and expatriate American 
community in Kenya had been up all night, tracking the election returns 
in the US presidential race. Having followed the campaign all fall as we 
completed our research projects on colonial and postcolonial Kenyan his-
tory, we, too, had stayed up, bleary-eyed and eager for the results. Focused 
mainly on the presidential race between Republican incumbent George 
W. Bush and his democratic challenger, John Kerry, we had paid little at-
tention to a more minor contest in the midwestern state of Illinois that 
had already begun to overshadow the presidential race for many Kenyan 
audiences.
Unaware of the singular moment that would unfold that morning, we 
left the congested confines of nairobi’s central business district during the 
predawn hours to make our way to the ambassador’s residence in the leafy 
suburb of Muthaiga. Heading out of the city center during the ritual tussle 
of nairobi’s hectic morning commute, we escaped the brunt of the daily 
bumper-to-bumper line of packed buses, overflowing matatu (van taxis), 
and commercial traffic that Kenyans simply refer to as “the jam.” turning 
off the main highway not too far from downtown, we entered a tranquil 
suburban relic of the colonial past. now a mixed bastion home to inter-
national aid workers, diplomatic personnel, and Kenya’s political elite, the 
tony neighborhood of Muthaiga has roots dating back to the early twen-
tieth century, complete with the golf outings and colonial cocktail parties 
that made up the days of Britain’s privileged white settler class.2 Like many 
of the homes and businesses, the US ambassadorial residence still reflects 
the imposing architecture and manicured style of the British colonial past 
and is hardly visible behind the razor wire–topped walls and guarded gates 
that dot one of nairobi’s most exclusive neighborhoods. 
Arriving just before six in the morning, we waited in the long security 
line along with an array of impeccably dressed guests to be welcomed to 
the traditional American election party, already off to a lively start despite 
the hour and the fact that US media outlets more than seven thousand 
miles away had yet to finalize the tally of votes cast the day before. Clear-
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ing the armed security and entering the residence, we were struck by the 
chatter expressing the broad Kenyan interest in the US elections as well as 
the lavish spread of food and the numerous satellite televisions scattered 
across the living room, veranda, and pristine gardens of the residence 
compound that displayed real-time Cnn election results. 
Mixing in this unfamiliar world, we tentatively scanned the slew of 
guests and noticed faces familiar to us from the pages of the Kenyan press, 
including influential members of the international diplomatic corps and 
a sampling of Kenya’s political elites. Spotting figures ranging from then 
official government spokesperson Alfred Mutua to then minister for the 
environment Kalonzo Musyoka, we spent the next few hours sipping tea 
and trying to make awkward small talk with a sea of parliamentarians, 
permanent secretaries, and other government officials who operate high 
above the daily lives of the everyday Kenyans, the wananchi as they are 
known in Kiswahili, and certainly outside the sphere of the average US 
graduate student. 
In our awe of the overall gathering that day, one group of Kenyan 
politicians stood out from the rest and instantly captured our attention. 
Entering amid an entourage of supporters, the Luo leader Raila Odinga 
was clearly a visible star among this elite group of “Big Men.” Hailing 
from Siaya, the Western Kenyan county that was also the birthplace of 
Barack Obama Sr., Odinga has been a fixture in Kenyan politics at the 
national level since the 1980s. Son of Kenya’s first vice president, Oginga 
Odinga, and scion of one of Kenya’s most prominent political dynasties, 
by 2004 Raila, as he is popularly called, was known in local circles as the 
edgy political dissident and exile from the 1980s who had risen to repre-
sent nairobi’s Langata Constituency in Parliament in the 1990s and was 
easily the most recognizable politician from Kenya’s relatively small but 
politically important Luo community. That day, however, Raila was not 
flying the metaphorical flag of Kenya’s political opposition, but he was in-
stead sporting a wide American flag tie set off by a large Obama pin stuck 
prominently to the lapel of his pricey suit. His entourage was similarly, 
though less flamboyantly, kitted out in visible support for the United States 
broadly and Obama particularly.
While it was not unusual for guests to demonstrate their support for 
the American electoral process during a gathering at the US ambassador’s 
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home, we were immediately struck by how Raila exhibited fervent enthu-
siasm for a relatively unknown senatorial candidate from Illinois, Barack 
Obama. In the months leading up to the november election, Matt Carot-
enuto had fielded an increasing number of questions from Kenyans about 
this “Obama fellow” during his fieldwork near Raila’s home areas in West-
ern Kenya. Word had gotten around that the democratic candidate cam-
paigning to represent Illinois in the US Senate was in fact the son of the 
same Barack Obama Sr. who was born in the 1930s not far from Raila’s 
hometown close to Lake Victoria in the Western Kenyan county of Siaya. 
Some nine years older than Raila, Obama Sr., a onetime government em-
ployee and midlevel technocrat, had died tragically in an automobile ac-
cident in nairobi in 1982.3 Though successful in his own right, Obama Sr. 
was certainly not of the same political pedigree or elevated achievement as 
Raila, yet, in Western Kenya, a strange sense of dynasty had nonetheless 
begun to emerge around Barack Obama Jr., the US senatorial candidate 
whose ties to Kenya generally and to the history of the Luo community 
particularly had been seized upon by Luo people in the months leading up 
to the American elections. However, it was not until the lopsided victory 
of Obama Jr. over his Republican challenger in Illinois was declared that 
we began to witness the significance of this US electoral victory to inter-
national relations and to “Big Man” politics in Kenya. 
Called long before the presidential race, the senatorial victory of 
Barack Obama Jr. drew the most dramatic response from the Kenyan 
guests of any election results announced that morning. A sporting cheer 
and rounds of overwhelming applause led by Raila’s group erupted when 
Cnn declared Obama the winner.4 However, instead of simply joining 
politely in the applause celebrating the election of a junior senator with 
paternal ties to Kenya, Ambassador Bellamy made his way straight for the 
Odinga contingent and began shaking Raila’s hand boisterously as if the 
Kenyan politician’s own brother had been elected. In congratulating Raila, 
first among the cream of the Kenyan political elite present at the party, and 
doing so in such a public space, Ambassador Bellamy, who drew some 
subtle stares from various other Kenyans at the gathering, seemed to imply 
that Obama’s victory was not something to be celebrated by the wananchi 
across Kenya but something belonging more narrowly to a particular re-
gion and ethnicity; a particular victory for Western Kenya and for the Luo.
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Congratulating Raila first was a bold diplomatic move to make that 
morning during an event billed as nonpartisan—both American and 
Kenyan political temperatures were running high in 2004—and inspired 
a number of important initial questions about the significance of the 
Obama-Kenya connection in both local and global political circles. Was 
Bellamy’s hearty handshake in response to a democratic victory merely 
a nod to the democratic leanings of the party guests? The traditional, 
friendly straw poll conducted by the embassy that morning had revealed 
that attendees overwhelmingly favored democratic nominee John Kerry’s 
candidacy for president. Or was the ambassador perhaps simply trying 
to cultivate a personal relationship with one of Kenya’s most important 
political figures regardless of how alienating this may have been to those 
in the audience who resided at the opposite end of the political spectrum 
from Raila?
These questions carry weight in large part because in the interpene-
trated worlds of international affairs and global commerce, Kenya is an 
important strategic ally and trading partner of the United States and of 
many other Western nations. The country borders the “hot zones” of the 
Horn of Africa and northern Uganda and South Sudan, while its principal 
port at Mombasa serves as the economic gateway to many of the markets 
of Eastern Africa, spanning Uganda and Rwanda to Ethiopia and South 
Sudan. After the US embassy in nairobi was bombed by Al-Qaeda in 1998, 
killing 213 Kenyans and American diplomatic staff, Kenya became one 
of the American government’s chief allies in the growing “war on terror-
ism.” The United States expanded its embassy, already the largest Ameri-
can embassy in Africa and the second-largest American embassy in the 
world, into a huge fortresslike compound not far from the ambassador’s 
residence.5 nonetheless, even taking into consideration the importance 
of the US diplomatic relationship with Kenya, the ambassador’s acknowl-
edgment of Raila’s “special relationship” with Obama spoke to more than 
US-Kenya ties forged over terrorism and trade. Rather, as social historians 
of twentieth-century Kenya, we recognized that Bellamy’s gesture, and the 
awkward smiles of the other Kenyan guests that followed it, was a testa-
ment to the widely acknowledged and broadly accepted purchase of ethnic 
politics and regionalism in contemporary Kenya, formations with deep 
roots in the colonial past.
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Over the coming weeks and months, we watched closely as a steady 
stream of politicized popular discourse, occurring informally in Kenyan 
homes and workplaces and on the pages of the local press, about the con-
nection between Obama and Kenya generally, and Obama and the Luo 
particularly, began to flow. Indeed, over the weeks and months that fol-
lowed his election, Senator Barack Obama was publicly celebrated as a 
“son of the soil” of Kenya in public discourse, but in other debates at home 
and abroad, his Kenyan roots were firmly being replanted in Kenya’s west-
ern regions, casting him first and foremost as a member of the minority 
Luo community, who make up just over 10 percent of the population.6 
“Obamamania,” as Kenyans came to refer to the celebration of Obama’s 
rise, began to grip the nation in late 2004. t-shirts and commemorative 
songs written about the junior senator from Illinois began to be seen and 
heard on the streets of nairobi and in the Western Kenyan city of Kisumu 
even before Obama gained widespread national appeal in the United 
States.7 
Obamamania reached a fever pitch four years later with the next 
round of American presidential elections in 2008. Importantly, what we 
came to glean over several years of research sparked by the ambassador’s 
enthusiastic congratulations offered to Raila was how the story of Barack 
Obama Jr. and his Kenyan heritage has been used by numerous politi-
cal actors in Kenya and abroad to frame narratives of Kenya’s history 
that have both perpetuated common Western stereotypes about Africa 
and helped to reinforce the contentious politics of ethnicity rooted in 
Kenya’s colonial history. These narratives of Kenya’s past engendered by 
the Obama-Kenya connection have held world historical significance, 
contributing to the shape of contemporary electoral politics both in the 
United States and in Kenya. For political actors in both Africa and the 
United States, the Kenyan roots of an American president (read and 
complicated through the lens of identity politics in two very different 
contexts) have offered ample resources with which to envisage their own 
localized concerns and to market narratives of Africa’s past to distinct 
audiences. Further, viewed through the prisms of race and ethnicity and 
refracted through politicized understandings of Kenya’s past, the story 
of Obama and Kenya has been interpreted not simply as an American 
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political story but as an event of national political import in Kenya and 
a historical moment of global significance. For political actors and au-
diences in Kenya, the United States, and an array of places and spaces 
around the world, the targeted telling of the Obama and Kenya story has 
transformed the Kenyan past into a sort of political currency, a situation 
that, as dane Kennedy argues, “highlights the polemical power of his-
tory and the complex array of politically and morally freighted meanings 
that inform its practice.”8
As historians of Kenya, we trace the impact and meaning of these in-
terwoven histories of Kenya and the Obama family after more than a de-
cade of historical and political entrepreneurship aiming to capitalize on 
the Obama-Kenya connection. depictions of this connection, found in 
productions as diverse as best-selling political biographies and amateur 
histories, have influenced the ways in which multiple publics around 
the world conceive Kenya’s past and present, and also point to the in-
creasingly digital methods and means through which local and global 
histories are both produced and consumed. Indeed, Obama’s political 
ascendancy created a unique space in which African history was debated 
in real time by global audiences who read, wrote, blogged, chatted, and 
tweeted about the significance of the Obama family’s place in the history 
of Kenya, and the place of Africa in world history more generally.
Throughout this book we identify and break down the dominant nar-
ratives about Kenya’s colonial past and postcolonial present in order to 
dispel some of the stereotypes of and misunderstandings about Kenya’s 
history that the Obama story has rekindled and fanned. Using a variety of 
sources, from archival records and oral interviews to the popular press and 
amateur histories, we analyze how Obama’s Kenyan roots, and the histo-
ries associated with them, have been interpreted by and for a range of local 
and international audiences. From Obama’s political supporters in East 
Africa to his opponents abroad, examining the ways in which local and 
global audiences have interpreted Obama’s connection to Kenya can tell us 
not only about how Kenya’s past and present (and Africa and its place in 
the world more generally) have been represented since the early twentieth 
century, but also about the social, political, and material significance of 
these representations.
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Placing Obama and His Kin in the Contested Story of Kenya
Constructing a history of Kenya through the story of an American presi-
dent’s paternal heritage is certainly not an easy task, and it is one we take on 
with great caution and with the goals of clarification and correction. Kenya 
is a large country, bigger than France and nearly the size of texas.9 Spanning 
the equator, its landscape represents many points across the environmental 
spectrum. A thin, tropical band runs along the Indian Ocean, while vast 
savanna grasslands with variable and often unreliable rainfall patterns dom-
inate more than 70 percent of the country’s interior. Much of the northern 
region of Kenya, extending to the borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, and South 
Sudan, consists of sparsely populated terrain suitable mainly for pastoralism 
due to the semiarid climate and history of underdevelopment in the area. 
In fact, when traveling from the capital city to northern towns like Garissa, 
Wajir, Marsabit, or Lodwar, one is often greeted with the wry question “How 
is Kenya?”—a query reflecting both the sharp physical divide between the 
dry, sparsely peopled north and the more fertile, more densely populated 
regions of the country, and the historical divide in development created by 
policies dating back to the colonial era that have favored the rest of the coun-
try to the expense of the north.10 
Over much of the last century, the southern-central and western re-
gions of Kenya have been most intensely marked by colonialism and its 
legacies and have dominated colonial and postcolonial politics. From 
Mombasa to Kisumu, the stories of the Obama family and Kenya span 
these regions, revealing the broader history of Kenya’s colonial past and 
illustrating the postcolonial political and socioeconomic challenges that 
have shaped Kenya since it gained independence from Britain in 1963. Ris-
ing to an average of more than five thousand feet in many places, the tem-
perate and densely populated regions of Central Kenya form the economic 
engine of the country’s largely agriculturally based economy, in which tea, 
coffee, sugarcane, and other cash crops are grown alongside subsistence 
staples like maize and wheat throughout rural areas. Cutting a swath 
through the center of the country is the Great Rift Valley, flanked by mag-
nificent escarpments, volcanic massifs, and the snowcapped highest peaks 
of Africa, Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro. to the west, the country 
is bounded by the craggy beaches of Lake Victoria, the source of the nile 
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River and the historical home of Kenya’s Luo-speaking populations and of 
Obama’s kin and ancestors.11 
While the flora and fauna of Kenya’s countryside have long fascinated 
visitors, the demographic history of Kenya reflects dramatic changes simi-
lar to those of neighboring countries in regard to migration patterns and to 
the related economic prospects of the wananchi. With a population of just 
over eight million in 1960, by 2013 Kenya had swelled to more than forty 
million citizens, a quarter of whom now reside in urban environments.12 
In fact, the Kenyan government projects that by 2030 its population will 
exceed sixty million, with more than half of the wananchi making the 
move from the countryside to the city.13 Even the casual visitor to nairobi 
cannot miss the effects of this change as a construction boom involving 
large-scale infrastructure projects dominates both the high-rise cityscape 
of downtown nairobi and the sprawling suburbs of the greater capital’s 
three million–plus residents. 
Figure 1.1. Famed Kenyan critique of Obamamania from renowned East African 
cartoonist GAdO (Godfrey Mwampembwa). Daily Nation, June 10, 2008. 
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Just as the map of Kenya reflects a great deal of environmental and 
demographic variability, its cultural landscape is equally diverse. With a 
fast-growing population speaking more than forty different languages, no 
one linguistic or cultural group represents a majority of the population.14 
Like most African countries, Kenya’s history as a nation-state does not start 
with the founding of an ancient African kingdom or empire, but instead 
begins with the story of how late nineteenth-century British imperialism 
and African resistance to it carved out the borders of the Kenya Colony 
from among people whose cultures, connections, and histories extended 
far beyond colonial boundaries. Even a casual observer cannot help but 
notice evidence of Kenya’s long-standing global connections residing side 
by side with the vestiges of colonial rule from the saltwater shores of the 
Indian Ocean to the freshwater beaches of Lake Victoria.
For example, visiting Mombasa, Kenya’s second-largest city and an 
urban center of note for more than a millennium, one is struck by the 
muezzin’s call to prayer, so familiar in the predominantly Muslim, Kiswa-
hili-speaking areas of Kenya’s coast, echoing over the fortified walls of 
Fort Jesus, erected by the Portuguese in the late 1400s, and across a port 
where international cargo vessels and dhows, a type of lateen-sail vessel 
used in the region for a thousand years, both ply the waters. Unsurpris-
ingly given the region’s deep cosmopolitan connections, inhabitants of the 
Kenyan coast, both past and present, have imagined their distinct “Swa-
hili” religio-cultural identity as intimately linked with the experiences of 
other Indian Ocean communities from the Middle East to Indonesia.15 Yet, 
the Swahili Coast is not the only region of Kenya where identity has been 
imagined through webs of cultural and linguistic connections constituted 
by long-standing patterns of migration and trade. 
Heading west to the freshwater coast of Lake Victoria, where Kenya 
borders tanzania and Uganda, one arrives in the port city of Kisumu. In 
the home of Kenya’s Luo community, the paternal kin of Barack Obama, 
one encounters traders from around the Lake Victoria basin mingling 
on the beaches, wolfing down grilled tilapia and ugali, a thick maize meal 
porridge, at long picnic tables while chatting in a mixed lingua franca of 
English, Kiswahili, and Luo as Swahili hip-hop from tanzania competes 
with Congolese Lingala and local Benga and Ohangla beats. In this re-
gion, too, connectivity and a sense of distinct linguistic-cultural identity 
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stretch deep beyond present-day commerce, back centuries to the mi-
grations of people from along the nile up to northern Uganda and down 
to South Sudan who belonged to groups related in language and prac-
tice to Kenya’s Luo community. Here in Barack Obama’s ancestral home, 
colloquially called “Luoland,” many Luo signal as much affinity for other 
nilotic-speaking groups as they do for their fellow Kenyans nation-
wide.16 
In sum, the vignettes presented above point to the book’s key themes—
the complex narratives that make up Kenya’s history and how the poli-
tics of belonging create sometimes competing notions between national 
and local identities. As Obama and Kenya shows, there is no one story 
of what it means to be Kenyan. Rather, identities are historical, flexible, 
multilayered, and crosscutting. As such, any claim to the existence of a 
definitive “Kenyan” identity or to a singular Kenyan history is fraught 
with inaccuracy and bias. Here we also want to caution readers about the 
politics of language broadly used in the debate about Obama and Kenya 
and direct them to pay close attention to the politics of one loaded term, 
“tribe,” which can have disparaging connotations, but is also widely em-
ployed by Africans themselves. In Western discourse, “tribe,” “tribal,” and 
“tribalism” have often been used to dismiss Africans as primitive, primor-
dial. Such usage does not reflect how African communities figure their 
own identities along tribal lines.
As much as this book is about unpacking the contested histories that 
Obama’s East African roots underscore, it is also an exploration into the 
local politics of belonging in Kenya. Many popular outside accounts frame 
the complex history of ethnic identity in Kenya with simplistic and static 
terms like “tribe” and use pejorative adjectives like tribal and tribalism to 
describe everything from cultural beliefs to political conflict. Like many 
students in our classes, we, too, agree that these words carry political 
weight in contemporary discourse that perpetuates understandings of Af-
rican identities as “uncivilized,” “primitive,” and “timeless.” As the term 
“tribe” fails to capture the ways Kenyans have historically debated eth-
nicity as constantly changing, contingent, and negotiated, we reject the 
term in our own analysis and treat the Obama and Kenya connection as 
much more complicated than a simple story about the son of a “Luo tribes-
man” from Kenya hewing to his “tribal” heritage.17
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Given Kenya’s fascinating environmental and cultural diversity, it is 
not surprising that the country and its people have inspired the produc-
tion of numerous historical narratives. However, these works often delib-
erately fail to embrace Kenya’s complexity, instead simplifying or skewing 
Kenya’s multifaceted past to fit with particular social and political agendas. 
Since the earliest days of British imperial expansion in the late nineteenth 
century, Western audiences have been bombarded by scenes of majestic 
wild landscapes where heroic beasts are pitted against noble yet “savage” 
Africans. Further, literary and cinematic representations of a glamorous 
colonial life of sundowner cocktails and lion hunts abound, and films like 
the Oscar-winning Out of Africa have long helped to perpetuate roman-
ticized images of the colonial period with the civilizing zeal of the “white 
man’s burden” lurking as a dangerous subtext. 
While contemporary representations are perhaps more subtle than 
the popular accounts of the colonial era, Kenya’s past has long been nar-
rated as the history of a wild environment brought into the “developed” 
world through colonial expansion targeted to serve European interests. 
For instance, when Frederick Lugard, a famous British colonial official 
and architect of imperial policy across much of the continent, wrote about 
The Rise of Our East African Empire, he cited the Earl of Rosebery’s now 
famous speech, delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute in 1893, which 
argued that the British were “engaged in ‘pegging out claims for the future.’ 
. . . We have to consider what countries must be developed either by our-
selves or some other nation and we have to remember that it is part of our 
responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, as far as it can be 
moulded by us, shall receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character.”18 
Written in an era of colonial expansion and violent repression of Af-
rican resistance across the continent, Lugard’s book argued that colonial 
policy in East Africa should keep with the nineteenth-century paternal 
logic of social darwinism and scientific racism wherein African subjects 
would be expected to adopt the “three C’s”: Christianity, civilization, and 
commerce. Lugard argued:
The essential point in dealing with Africans is to establish a respect 
for the European. Upon this—the prestige of the white man—de-
pends his influence, often his very existence, in Africa. If he shows 
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by his surroundings, by his assumption of superiority, that he is 
far above the native, he will be respected, and his influence will be 
proportionate to the superiority he assumes and bears out by his 
higher accomplishments and mode of life. In my opinion—at any 
rate with reference to Africa—it is the greatest possible mistake to 
suppose that a European can acquire a greater influence by adopt-
ing the mode of life of the natives. In effect, it is to lower himself to 
their plane, instead of elevating them to his. The sacrifice involved is 
wholly unappreciated, and the motive would be held by the savage 
to be poverty and lack of social status in his own country. The whole 
influence of the European in Africa is gained by this assertion of a 
superiority which commands the respect and excites the emulation 
of the savage.19 
Throughout the colonial period, this racist and ethnocentric view of Euro- 
African relations dominated how the story of Kenya was told, and his-
torians have noted how these early, popular narratives have clouded the 
more complex story of Kenya’s colonial past and postcolonial present. For 
instance, david Anderson, in his seminal work on the anticolonial Mau 
Mau rebellion of the 1950s that ultimately led to Kenya’s independence 
in the early 1960s, notes that the rhetoric of popular, colonial accounts of 
the Mau Mau period differed little from the racist language of nineteenth-
century writers like Lugard. Citing a 1955 best-selling novel about the well-
known Mau Mau rebellion, Anderson highlights American author Robert 
Ruark’s warning to readers: “to understand Africa you must understand 
the basic impulsive savagery that is greater than anything we civilized 
people have encountered in two centuries.”20
Remaining largely unchallenged and even promoted by popular ac-
counts produced throughout the colonial period, such stereotypical rep-
resentations, as many African authors and scholars have long complained, 
have continued to be firmly perpetuated in print and on film long after the 
end of colonial rule. Painting Africans as marginal players in world his-
torical events, these enduring stereotypes have long shaped the way many 
outside audiences have been introduced to and encouraged to think about 
Africa’s past. For instance, Kenyan author Binyavanga Wainana quipped in 
his 2005 satirical instructional essay, “How to Write about Africa,” that to 
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sell books in the contemporary global market, authors needed to treat the 
continent “as if it were one country. It is hot and dusty with rolling grass-
lands and huge herds of animals and tall, thin people who are starving. 
Or it is hot and steamy with very short people who eat primates. don’t get 
bogged down with precise descriptions.”21 
Boiling down complex historical events like Kenya’s Mau Mau rebel-
lion into simplistic accounts of savage violence or racial conflict is part 
of what nigerian author Chimamanda Adichie argues is the “danger of 
a Single Story” of Africa.22 While such stories are most typically found in 
popular literature, Africanist scholars have had to combat similar Euro-
centric and stereotypical readings of the past—sometimes even coming 
from the academy—since professional, scholarly study of Africa took off 
in the 1960s. For example, scholars have challenged the views of world- 
renowned Oxford historian Hugh trevor-Roper, who argued throughout 
much of the 1960s that the only issues worth exploring on the African 
continent were those that pertained to “the history of Europe in Africa,” 
dismissing the rest as “the unedifying gyrations of barbarous tribes in pic-
turesque but irrelevant corners of the globe.”23
Such blatant stereotyping and biased accounts cannot be ignored when 
analyzing how the political rise of Barack Obama has been depicted and 
the broader ways a global audience has interpreted his connections to 
Kenya. For many of his political opponents in the United States, Obama’s 
Kenyan heritage has provided key fodder with which to attack his politi-
cal legitimacy through marketing stereotypical readings of African history 
and politics, renewed with the aim of linking Obama’s American political 
identity to erroneous accounts of “tribal” violence and anticolonial insur-
rection. However misplaced these analyses may be, they nonetheless have 
been crystallized in best-selling books and through documentary films 
since 2004 that have shaped global interpretations of both presidential 
elections in the US and contemporary Kenyan politics and history.24 
An attention to the political uses of history also returns us to the 
congratulatory scenes we witnessed at the US ambassador’s residence in 
2004. Here African political actors like Raila Odinga were actively try-
ing to claim Obama as their own and market personal ties to his paternal 
heritage for their own political gain. In keeping with a long past of local 
patriotic history writing that often distills complex genealogies and local 
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histories into simple narratives for political gain, Raila and others per-
formed their historical commemoration that day with the celebrations of 
Obama’s Kenyan and Luo heritage. Shortly after, similar representations 
began to appear on the shelves of nairobi’s bookstores and on the pages of 
Kenya’s popular press. 
Scholars argue that such narratives of Kenyan history belong to a deep 
genealogy of regional ethnography and hagiography by way of which Afri-
can “entrepreneurs [have] sifted through history and summoned political 
communities into being” by focusing on heroic and often uncritical narra-
tives of the past.25 For instance, combing the publications and memoirs of 
Africans from the colonial period, one can often find histories of linguistic 
communities framed as mythical celebrations of romanticized traditions 
from a static and unchanging precolonial past. These texts were often au-
thored by African colonial elites who sometimes elevated the role of im-
portant men, demonized all Europeans, and failed to critically examine 
the internal conflicts over gender, class, and generation that long predated 
the arrival of British colonial rule in the region.26 
Thus, in endeavoring to claim Obama as their own, Raila and the Luo 
politicians by his side in 2004 treated the moment of the election party 
as an opportunity to display a certain version of the Kenyan past so as to 
promote the political significance of the Luo community and to demon-
strate how the importance of this local ethnic identity—“Luoness”—tran-
scended the boundaries of Kenya. It was of no concern to Raila or others 
that Obama himself did not identify as Kenyan or Luo, because they read 
his background through a distinctly Kenyan lens and not through the 
matrix of the mixed African American heritage that Barack Obama had 
spoken of so widely in his career as a US politician.27 Raila and his sup-
porters were simply drawing upon strategies long used by African actors 
across the continent to reshape and market ethnic or regional identities 
for a variety of social, economic, and political reasons. These actions have 
consistently challenged notions that African ethnicities are static “tribal” 
identities rooted in the distant past. Indeed, scholars and Africans alike 
now regard ethnicity in Africa as a much more fluid category, one that can 
even act like corporate identity with a brand/image that is carefully man-
aged, reimagined, and constantly marketed by both elite and local actors.28 
For his part, Ambassador Bellamy may have also fallen into a trap of pro-
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moting a different stereotypical version of Kenya’s politics of belonging. By 
congratulating Raila, he was publicly confirming the victory for the Luo 
community and displaying an interpretation of Kenyan politics in a way 
that many Western journalists and other commentators might simply and 
uncritically dismiss as “tribalism” by another name.
Obama and Contemporary Kenyan Histories
Obama and Kenya is very much a Kenyan story, where the actual actions, 
feelings, and statements of the American president, while not insignifi-
cant, play only a minor role in structuring the debate about ethnic identity 
and the complex politics of belonging. Obama’s political ascendancy in the 
United States has stirred up various controversies about Kenya’s past from 
the colonial era to the present day, and provides a critical space in which 
to examine how representations of African history have been constructed 
and politicized throughout much of the twentieth century and how these 
representations have done important “work.” In popular sources about the 
president and in the explosion of Obama biographies, Kenya’s past and 
politics are sometimes treated as peripheral or are typically very much dis-
torted to fit within the publication’s political bent. Few scholars have yet to 
take up the intertwined discourses about Obama, Kenya, and history, and 
until now no book-length study—scholarly or otherwise—has examined 
how Obama’s ascendancy to the “highest office in the land” has shaped the 
telling of Kenyan or African histories in a global context.29 
Unlike those Africans living in the era of the late nineteenth-century 
colonial administrator Sir Frederick Lugard, Africans in the twenty-first 
century have channels at their disposal to fight back against politicized 
readings of their own histories and to generate real-time input to the 
contemporary twenty-four-hour media cycle of political commentary 
and historical debate. Thus, as much as Obama and Kenya is grounded 
in traditional sources—archival documents, oral interviews, and mate-
rial culture—the book aims to examine the ways in which historians of 
contemporary Africa can add digital resources and other nontraditional 
source material to their analytical tool kits.30 While the United States Li-
brary of Congress has begun archiving blogs and tweets, and our own 
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students debate complex issues with friends daily through social media 
forums and in other digital venues, we privilege the increasing number 
of African voices in the digital world who participate in debates about the 
Obama and Kenya connection in real time.31 We also pay close attention 
to how African voices in the digital age are consumed abroad, as global 
debates about Obama since 2004 have cited African news media and even 
transcripts of debates on the floors of Kenya’s Parliament now freely avail-
able online. In evaluating these new sources, it is important to ask how 
the digitized data we consume are produced and if the phenomenon is 
promoting greater equality in global discourse or simply providing new 
media to perpetuate long-standing inequality. 
to fully understand the Obama and Kenya connection, we must take a 
broad historical look at Kenyan history and its representation in a variety 
of media. This history predates the 2004 election and even the 1961 Ha-
waiian birth of Barack Obama Jr. It begins in the colonial past and weaves 
its way through the story of Luo migrations from the colonial period and 
histories of how members of the Obama family and other Kenyans expe-
rienced the challenges of life under British colonial rule. The story also 
extends into the turbulent period of decolonization and independence 
and examines how different political actors have narrated this contested 
period to corrupt and claim ownership over Kenya’s struggle for indepen-





Figure 2.1. Theodore Roosevelt, Three-Quarter Length Portrait, Standing Next to 
Dead Elephant, Holding Gun, Probably in Africa. Photo by Edward Van Altena, 
1909, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002709191/. 
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Barack Obama was not the first president of the United States whose con-
nections to Kenya shined an international spotlight on the country. A cen-
tury before the inauguration of the first African American president, one 
of Obama’s predecessors was busy making plans for an extended tour of 
East Africa. Just three weeks after leaving office in 1909, teddy Roosevelt 
set sail for an expedition in British East Africa cosponsored by the Smith-
sonian Institution.1 An avid hunter and naturalist who as president had 
established five national parks, Roosevelt, together with his son Kermit, 
felled game to be mounted for exhibitions at the Smithsonian in Washing-
ton, dC, and the Museum of natural History in new York. The expedition 
carried home hundreds of hunting trophies (including nine lions, thirteen 
rhinoceroses, and twenty zebras) and romantic tales of a rugged yet opu-
lent life on safari, introducing American households to people, places, and 
things with which they were almost wholly unfamiliar.2
Arriving in the ancient port city of Mombasa on Kenya’s Swahili Coast 
in late April after almost a month at sea, Roosevelt’s extravagantly out-
fitted party—their entourage included 250 porters, and Roosevelt’s tent 
had a bathtub—set off on an extensive safari, making a circuit through 
Kenya, Uganda, Congo, and into Sudan that took nearly a year to com-
plete. The expedition was widely covered in the press, and Roosevelt had 
been commissioned by Scribner’s magazine beforehand to document his 
travels for the princely sum of $50,000 (an amount equivalent to roughly 
1.3 million in 2014 US dollars).3 His serialized accounts of the expedi-
tion were later compiled and published as African Game Trails. A best 
seller by all standards, the book provides an important window into how 
Kenya was popularly marketed to American and international audiences 
more than a century ago. 
Most directly, Roosevelt’s expedition stimulated interest in big game 
hunting and helped to designate Kenya as the premier site for a safari. As 
Edward Steinhart writes, “Even after the construction of the Uganda rail-
road, travel to and within East Africa remained both arduous and expen-
sive. Only the wealthiest European and American aristocrats could make 
the excursion for the purpose of shooting big game.”4 Such travelers, he 
points out, “laid the basis for the growth of Kenya’s modern tourist in-
dustry.”5 We would add that the safari experiences recounted in print by 
travelers like Roosevelt, complete with luxurious trappings and outdoor 
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adventure, have contributed strongly to the elite character of tourism in 
Kenya that continues to center on the recreation of the interpenetrated 
worlds of the white hunter and the colonial settler.6
More abstractly, set against backdrops of dramatic natural beauty, 
Roosevelt’s descriptions of the flora, fauna, and people that he encoun-
tered on safari offer insights into the roots of enduring, exoticized ste-
reotypes about Africa and the lasting effects of such representations on 
Kenya. The foreword to African Game Trails reflects the triumphant zeal 
of an explorer, the scientific curiosity of a naturalist, and the latent racism 
of the early twentieth-century American. Focusing on what he saw as the 
untamed nature of both African landscapes and Africans, Roosevelt re-
counts:
In these greatest of the world’s great hunting-grounds there are 
mountain peaks whose snows are dazzling under the equatorial 
sun; swamps where the slime oozes and bubbles and festers in the 
steaming heat; lakes like seas; skies that burn above deserts where 
the iron desolation is shrouded from view by the wavering mockery 
of the mirage; vast grassy plains where palms and thorn-trees fringe 
the dwindling streams; mighty rivers rushing out of the heart of the 
continent through the sadness of endless marshes; forests of gor-
geous beauty, where death broods in the dark and silent depths. . . .  
The dark-skinned races that live in the land vary widely. Some are 
warlike, cattle-owning nomads; some till the soil and live in thatched 
huts shaped like beehives; some are fisher-folk; some are ape-like 
naked savages, who dwell in the woods and prey on creatures not 
much wilder or lower than themselves.7
Coming a quarter century after the “Scramble for Africa,” during which 
the European powers carved up Africa following the Berlin Conference, 
Roosevelt’s expedition took place as the mysterious “dark continent” was 
becoming increasingly knowable through the processes of colonization 
and when discourses about the imperial nations’ “civilizing mission” in 
Africa were in full flower. Accordingly, Roosevelt’s prose, bolstered by his 
authority as a former president, helped cement images of Kenya as an ex-
otic locale inhabited first by spectacular flora and fauna and populated 
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second by “dark skinned races” whose “primitive” lifestyles rendered them 
stuck in almost primeval time. 
Roosevelt was not alone in depictions of the landscapes and lifestyle 
he found in Kenya as both exotic and static. Rather, African Game Trails 
was typical of its genre; travelers’ accounts of the period rarely acknowl-
edge the sweeping political, social, and economic changes wrought by 
colonialism (and African engagement with them) or the violence (and 
African resistance to it) that accompanied the imposition of British 
rule. Such incomplete representations of Kenyan culture and history 
invite the following questions: What might have Kenyans thought of 
the ways in which their experiences were described in works like Afri-
can Game Trails? How has outsiders’ “ownership” of history and control 
over representations affected Kenya’s social, economic, and political tra-
jectories from the early twentieth century forward? In what ways and in 
what contexts have Kenyans narrated their own stories and represented 
themselves? What have these competing histories accomplished?
With these questions in mind, this chapter focuses on the complex-
ities of the colonial experience, the myths surrounding it, and the work 
that competing discourses about Kenya’s colonial past continue to perform 
into the present day—not simply in Kenya, but globally as well. Indeed, 
writing about his long discussions with a local historian in Western Kenya 
during his 1988 visit, Obama recalls being admonished, “The worst thing 
that colonialism did was to cloud our view of our past.”8 Accordingly, a pri-
mary goal of this chapter is to sharpen understandings of Kenya’s colonial 
past and its relationship to the present. We turn next to one of the most 
enduring and powerful tropes, or common themes, about Kenya—Kenya 
as a “white man’s country.”9 
Creating the Colonial Landscape: The (Un)Happy Valley of the 
“White Man’s Country”
By the time Roosevelt made his journey, the colonization of Kenya10 figured 
as the domain not just of the “white hunter” but of the white settler. In the 
swath of fertile land that extended from the slopes of Mount Kenya to es-
carpments hugging the Great Rift, with its volcanic lakes, to the plains of 
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Laikipia that composed the White Highlands (so called because they were 
lands alienated, or officially given over to white settlement and ownership), 
Africans were progressively turned off the lands they had inhabited and 
worked for generations. They were expelled to “native reserves,” islands of 
agriculturally poor lands demarcated along tribal lines, or they were allowed 
for a time to “squat” on white farms, exchanging their labor for the right to 
reside on settler lands and to retain a small fraction of the crops they pro-
duced. 
This realization of Kenya as a “white man’s country” had its deep 
roots in an African adventure undertaken a little more than a decade 
before Roosevelt’s epic safari by another young man of prominent family 
and considerable means, Hugh Cholmondeley, Lord delamere.11 In 1896, 
accompanied by an entourage that included teams of Somali bearers, a 
professional photographer, and two hundred camels, delamere, who re-
putedly coined the term “white hunter,” embarked on a far-ranging safari 
that led him more than one thousand miles throughout Somaliland and 
concluded ultimately in Central Kenya.12 The lush landscape captured 
delamere’s imagination, and a few years later, shortly before British East 
Africa became the Kenya Colony and Protectorate in 1905, he returned 
as a settler, taking up a ninety-nine-year lease on one hundred thousand 
acres near the Mau Plateau that he pledged to spend £5,000 developing 
over a period of five years.13 
Working from his vast Equator Ranch and as a chief figure in the set-
tler lobby in nairobi, delamere threw his energy into the development of 
Kenya as a “white man’s country.” Chairing an official land commission in 
1905, delamere advocated that the initial development of the highlands be 
undertaken by wealthy, elite émigrés with large land grants. He was able to 
entice an array of his aristocratic contemporaries to emigrate from Britain, 
and in what became known as the “Happy Valley”14 of the White High-
lands, they created a microcosmic world of privilege and decadence that 
has endured in romanticized, popular imagination as being “authentically 
Kenyan.” This was a world seemingly composed of “sundowner” cocktails, 
usually gin and tonic, taken outdoors every evening as the equatorial sun 
dropped out of the sky; of vast farmhouses dripping with bougainvillea 
and staffed by black servants in white kanzu (long robes); of months spent 
on safari and of regular black-tie balls at the tony Muthaiga Club or nor-
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folk Hotel in nairobi. Yet, the reality of the Happy Valley included seedier 
elements of widespread substance abuse—the visiting Prince of Wales was 
notoriously offered cocaine at a dinner party—and scandalous adultery: 
“Are you married or do you live in Kenya?” was a popular joke in interwar 
Britain.15 
The world of the Happy Valley endured in popular imagination not 
only after many of its denizens succumbed to dissolution, bankruptcy, 
and scandal, but even after the end of British rule in 1963. The area was 
chronicled at the time by white settlers, most notably Baroness Karen von 
Blixen-Finecke. Known by the nom de plume Isak dinesen, her famous 
memoir, Out of Africa, begins with the lilting line, “I had a farm in Africa 
at the foot of the ngong Hills.”16 nostalgia for the dramatic and glamorous 
aspects of this colonial milieu was reinvigorated in the mid-1980s with 
the release of the film version of Out of Africa, based on Blixen’s mem-
oir and starring Meryl Streep and Robert Redford, which in turn stimu-
lated a spate of books and media productions romanticizing the settler 
lifestyle.17 This nostalgia for a romanticized British colonial past and its 
vast marketability even inspired a new Ralph Lauren fragrance, Safari, 
its print campaign mirroring the aesthetics of Out of Africa and making 
India Hicks, granddaughter of the last viceroy of India, its primary face.18 
Yet, notably absent from these scenes set in Kenya’s upcountry “islands 
of white” are black Kenyans and their experiences of British colonialism. 
Missing, too, are any indications of conflict between the colonizers and 
the colonized or of the inherent violence of the colonial project overall.19 
It is to these topics that the remaining sections of this chapter turn.
Colonial Rule: Conquest, Bureaucracy, and  
“Tribal” Imaginaries
Popular representations of the White Highlands would seem to suggest 
that the British arrived in Kenya and immediately took control of the 
country and its people without incident. But the reality of the coming of 
colonialism and the imposition of British rule was much more compli-
cated—and violent. The first British boots on the ground in Kenya were 
not those of “great white hunters” or settlers like delamere, but rather 
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those of explorers and missionaries who traversed East Africa in the Vic-
torian era.20 They were followed by members of the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (IBEAC). As we noted above, the British had come into 
possession of Kenya through the “Scramble for Africa.” Indeed, a popu-
lar anecdote of the late Victorian era highlighting the arbitrary nature of 
the scramble held that Queen Victoria ceded Mount Kilimanjaro, thereby 
shifting the border between British East Africa and German East Africa, 
to her grandson, the future Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, because she 
had two mountains—Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro—and he had 
none.21
At the Berlin Conference of the mid-1880s, the imperial powers agreed 
that in order for one country’s claim to an African territory to be recog-
nized by the others, the claiming country had to show that it had “effec-
tively occupied” the territory, that is, set up some form of rudimentary 
administration that would facilitate free trade and free transit in the ter-
ritory. By the late 1880s, the British government had set up the IBEAC, 
the concessionary company “chartered to occupy Britain’s sphere of influ-
ence,” that is, to see to economic and administrative development of the 
British East African territories.22 By the late 1880s, the IBEAC was sending 
ivory caravans from the Swahili Coast through Kenya to Uganda, and by 
the 1890s had begun the violence-ridden process of conquering and sub-
duing the area’s African populations. British officials often referred to this 
process as “pacification,” which resulted in “punitive” expeditions against 
any active resistance. For instance, in the nandi-speaking regions of West-
ern Kenya, British “pacification” from 1890 to 1906 resulted in the deaths 
of thousands of nandi warriors as well as cattle seizures that decimated 
the pastoralist community’s herds.23 However, at the same moment the 
IBEAC was cementing itself militarily with such punitive missions, its eco-
nomic power was waning. The Foreign Office took over direct control of 
Kenya, establishing the East Africa Protectorate in 1895 and taking charge 
of building a railway from the coast to Lake Victoria, while many of the 
“company men” stayed on as the first British administrators.24
In ruling Kenya, the British were confronted with two central, interre-
lated problems: their numerical inferiority vis-à-vis African populations 
and the incredible diversity of African communities, or “tribes” as they 
called them. The system of governance known as “indirect rule” addressed 
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both of these problems. developed by Lord Frederick Lugard, chief British 
administrator in nigeria, indirect rule was a co-optive model of admin-
istration based on African institutions and managed by African leaders 
under the oversight and authority of British administrators.25 Outsourcing 
day-to-day administration to specially designated African functionaries 
dealt with the inability of the slim ranks of British officials to be every-
where at once in the districts under their authority, and indirect rule 
had the added advantage of being cheap. to borrow Sara Berry’s famous 
phrase, indirect rule was meant to enable “hegemony on a shoestring” and 
institutionalize a political, racial, and social hierarchy.26 
Implementing indirect rule required the work of imagination and in-
vention. British authorities had a “mental map” in which Kenya’s diverse 
and numerous ethnic groups were neatly divided into easily discernible 
“tribes,” with particular expectations attached to them. “tribes,” as Brett 
Shadle points out, “were in the colonial imagination discrete collections of 
people attached to unique cultural, political, and societal norms, ruled by 
strong chiefs.”27 Even if African communities did not assert “tribal” iden-
tities, Shadle’s statement brings us to the second layer of invention—the 
creation of African institutions and offices where none had existed before 
or had been present in significantly different forms. In many instances, the 
British introduced hierarchical political organization into ethnic groups 
that were acephalous, or “without a head,” or which located and exercised 
authority through councils typically composed of elders. As one 1909 ad-
ministrative report neatly summed up, “The prestige of the chiefs is in 
the process of being created in most cases.”28 The introduction of indi-
rect rule and the tribal imaginings that accompanied it had far-reaching 
consequences in East Africa. Images of the British administrator in a pith 
helmet and the loyal, submissive African chief in “tribal dress” emerged, 
like those of the white hunter and the settler baron, as avatars of colonial 
rule.29 Indirect rule was also part of the politics of “divide and conquer,” 
as British policy and practice hardened flexible webs of ethnic affiliation 
and affinity into distinct, cemented “tribal” categories, and subsequently 
parceled out power and privilege to favored “tribes” whom they deemed 
more “advanced” or “evolved.” This (re)imagining of fluid ethnicities into 
fixed tribes mobilized Victorian views of European history and contem-
porary notions of scientific racism. As John Iliffe explains, British officials 
  |  Obama and Kenya
believed that “every African belonged to a tribe, just as every European be-
longed to a nation. The idea doubtless owed much to the Old testament, to 
tacitus and Caesar, to academic distinction between tribal societies based 
on status and modern societies based on contract, and to postwar anthro-
pologists who preferred ‘tribal’ to the more pejorative word ‘savage.’ ”30
This view of the African as inherently “tribal” not only shaped colo-
nial policy and practice, but also transformed the ways in which Africans 
reckoned their own identities and conceived of “self ” and “other,” “us” and 
“them.” While the ethnic boundaries of many communities were ossified 
through this process of “inventing” tribes out of ethnicities, entirely new 
“umbrella” groups, such as Kalenjin, Abaluhya, and Mijikenda, were also 
formed out of amalgamations of smaller groups and imagined as discrete 
cultural communities for the first time.31 Overall, from the top down, Brit-
ish policies “invented tribes,” but Africans worked to shape and manage 
these identities throughout the colonial period.
Local politics, upended by a model of colonial rule that introduced 
new offices and often filled them with young men who would have been 
on the outside of conventional precolonial power structures, came to be 
deeply inflected by “tribal” identifications and interests. As amply illus-
trated by the Luo embrace of Obama that forms the core of this book, 
ethnic affinities continue to drive Kenyan politics, while “tribalism” has re-
mained the central trope used in characterizing politics in Kenya from the 
colonial era into the present day.32 The effects of indirect rule and “tribal 
imaginaries” were not confined to the social and political arenas, but also 
profoundly reshaped economic life in Kenya. The next section turns to 
living and laboring and law in colonial Kenya and the myth of the “dutiful 
native.” 
Creating Markets and Compelling Labor: Settler Violence and 
the Myth of the “Dutiful Native”
The alienation of African lands to white settlement was carried out 
through a series of laws that created two side-by-side systems of landhold-
ing in Kenya. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 solved the problem of 
who “owned” land in Kenya, rendering all land not “physically occupied 
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by local people” free for white settlement. The 1915 Crown Lands Ordi-
nance further alienated land for whites only. Acquiring massive estates, 
settlers were quick to enhance their prestige as landed colonial aristocrats, 
with Africans realizing that many settlers had little desire to increase pro-
ductivity. By 1920, more than three million acres of Central and Western 
Kenya’s best farmland was owned by European settlers, with just 5.6 per-
cent of this land under cultivation.33 As settler and author Elspeth Huxley 
summed up in her biography of Lord delamere, “The government had a 
certain obligation to the European farmer. They had deliberately invited 
him into the country to sink his capital and make his home there. . . . They 
had, therefore, an obligation to help him obtain native workers.”34 Further, 
an important element of the colonial project was the integration of com-
modities produced on settler farms—especially precious arabica coffee—
into world markets, and the wide-scale plantation agriculture necessarily 
demanded vast numbers of laborers.
The introduction of a colonial cash economy, together with the im-
plementation of a colonial tax system and land alienation, compelled 
Africans to enter wage labor markets. For example, the native Hut and 
Poll tax Ordinance (no. 2) of 1910 taxed individuals and their dwellings, 
putting an unfair tax burden on polygynous African families. Each wife 
was required to have her own home, which the British pejoratively labled 
a “hut.” Africans’ efforts to resist this tax resulted in lifestyle changes that 
forced societies to break long-standing cultural taboos in order to avoid 
the punitive tax system. An administrative report from the early twenti-
eth century noted a decline in tax revenues “owing to the fact that people 
have broken up their huts and placed more than one wife in a hut.”35 Such 
heavy annual tax demands payable only in cash drove black Kenyans to 
the colonial labor market, forcing them off the reserves and onto settler 
farms and into emerging urban centers to labor for wages. In turn, pass 
laws regulating the registration of African males were introduced in 1920. 
The kipande, or pass, permitted black Kenyan men to leave the reserves 
for employment and served to regulate the quality, quantity, and flow of 
the African workforce.36 Following the model of another settler colony—
South Africa—Kenya was spatially segregated along racial lines, particu-
larly in urban areas. White settlers and officials regarded Africans at best 
as temporary instruments of labor that could be removed from white areas 
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when they were no longer needed, and as sources of dangerous dissolution 
at worst. For example, a 1926 report produced by Kenya’s native Affairs 
department quoted the 1921 South African native Affairs Commission: “A 
town is a European area in which there is no place for the redundant native 
who neither works nor serves his people but forms the class from which 
professional agitators, slum landlords, liquor sellers, prostitutes and other 
undesirable classes spring. The exclusion of these redundant natives is in 
the interests of Europeans and natives alike.”37
Once African laborers were employed at low wages and in generally 
poor conditions on settler farms or in urban centers, their employers 
were free to treat them as they saw fit. Settlers saw transforming Kenyans, 
whom they regarded as shiftless and work-shy, into “dutiful natives” as 
both economically necessary and central to their “civilizing mission.” “Ev-
idence given to the native Labor Commission of 1912–1913,” Shadle writes, 
“revealed that many settlers believed violence to be integral to labor rela-
tions,” and noted that white settlers could mete out corporal punishment 
to their laborers with virtual impunity.38 Propagandist British discourse, in 
contrast, portrayed African servants and laborers as simple, obedient, and 
docile subjects; grateful for the benevolent paternalistic embrace of their 
colonial masters.39
Coercion was not confined to settler enterprises. While taxation created 
much-needed revenue for the colonial state, programs of forced labor—pre-
sented under the guise of “communal” labor—compelled Kenyans to work 
without wages on light infrastructure-development projects. These pro-
grams had a secondary objective of drawing Kenyans out of the reserves 
and into the greater colonial labor pool. In some instances, colonial officials 
went so far as to coercively procure “communal” labor to serve the needs of 
individual settlers.40
Settler violence and colonial coercion were in many cases met by Af-
rican resistance. Kenyans used “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, 
false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance,” the well-known “weap-
ons of the weak,” to counter burdensome and violent compulsions to 
colonial labor.41 They also countered the violent discipline of colonial 
economic order through supernatural and spiritual means. For example, 
the colonial administration was forced to acknowledge that the consis-
tent brutality of a white settler toward his Kenyan workers had been a 
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factor in the outbreak of a prophetic possession movement that had se-
verely impeded the collection of tax and the procurement of labor in 
the region southeast of nairobi. A King’s African Rifles (KAR) patrol 
dispatched from the capital was eventually able to exert a “quieting ef-
fect” over the area.42 By the 1920s such politically inflected outbreaks of 
prophetic or spiritualist activity were hardly unusual. Relatedly, decades 
of missionary activity had led to the establishment of various African 
churches that interpreted and translated the Christian message in ac-
cordance with local belief structures, often clashing with European con-
ceptions of morality and of scriptural and doctrinal interpretations. The 
leaders of these new African churches mobilized the “politics of the pul-
pit” to contest colonial rule. Colonial administrators were quick to in-
terpret (and dismiss) supernaturally based forms of political expression 
in racist and ethnocentric ways. For instance, in 1929, a district commis-
sioner (dC) reporting on the nomiya Luo Mission, and independent 
Africans churches more generally, explained:
 This class of thing is met with throughout Africa, where mission 
influence has been at work for some time. to my mind it is but a 
clear indication that the natives are unable to embrace the Christian 
religion as presented to them. As long as they are under the immedi-
ate influence of the European Missionary they are stimulated but as 
soon as they became so numerous or scattered that the influence can 
be but a shadow they search about and work out for themselves some 
of the Bastard Christianity more suited to their mental and social 
development. . . . My experience in South Africa taught me that it 
is a mistake to think these movements will die out. I am inclined to 
think this one is no exception and is on the increase.43
The dC’s comments both reflected the discriminatory character of white 
minority rule and foreshadowed the rise of African resistance. As Kenyans 
increasingly mobilized not only supernatural but also political strategies 
to contest the power of the colonial state in the 1930s and 1940s, religion 
and ethnicity provided key spaces in which black Kenyans debated socio-
political life under colonial rule as African resistance began to segue into 
desires and demands for independence. The next section of this chapter 
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turns to Kenya political movements, the anticolonial Mau Mau rebellion, 
and the (ethnic) dilemmas of rule in independent Kenya.
Politics and Revolution in Colonial Kenya: From Migration to 
Mau Mau to Nationhood
The reshaping of identities and economies that accompanied colonial rule si-
multaneously brought about significant social and political transformations 
in the lives of many Kenyans. In Central Kenya, for example, land alienation 
did not simply displace Kikuyu people but severely disrupted a complex sys-
tem of tenancy called githaka, which allocated land and organized landhold-
ing along clan and generational lines as well as importantly providing for the 
integration of outsiders into Kikuyu communities.44 In Western Kenya, Luo 
people, far from the settler farms of the White Highlands, were compelled 
to migrate in search of wage labor. As in Kikuyu areas, this economically 
driven displacement challenged notions of property and belonging that re-
volved around the dala, or Luo homestead.45 These ruptures around land 
and labor, and the social transformations that accompanied them, together 
with the emergence of coteries of mission-educated Kenyans, drove African 
politicization that was skewed along regional and “tribal” lines. By the 1920s, 
Kikuyu- and Luo-speaking communities had established political organi-
zations—the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) and the Young Kavirondo 
Association (YKA)—concerned with the promotion of their respective ma-
terial interests and the articulation of what it meant to be “Kikuyu” or “Luo” 
in rapidly shifting colonial landscapes.46 
Yet, even as African politicization continued to expand and accel-
erate over the next two decades, whites settlers and many colonial ad-
ministrators still clung to the idea that they were enacting a “civilizing 
mission” for the benefit of Africans mired in “tribal” primitivity and that 
governance should remain exclusively the domain of whites. These rac-
ist and paternalistic ideologies were well entrenched by the 1940s, and 
many colonialists in Kenya and in Britain believed that diverse “tribes” 
would never be capable of uniting under any banner of Kenyan nation-
alism. For example, a 1943 Colonial Office memorandum on political 
affairs in Kenya reiterated the dominant view:
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These tribes speak different languages and have entirely different 
social customs. Many of them are in a very primitive state and it 
is not possible to envisage the time when they will become suffi-
ciently united as a whole, speaking a common language and having 
trust in elected leaders from their own tribe or still less of another 
tribe. It would be very much easier to make a united Europe under 
the domination of Germany than to make a united Kenya under 
the domination of the Maasai. The conception of a central self-gov-
ernment elected by these primitive tribes is simply not within prac-
tical politics.47 
Five years later, marginalized Kikuyu had begun a campaign of violent 
rural action—including labor strikes, arson, and maiming of farm animals. 
By the early 1950s, such violence was steadily rising and increasingly polit-
icized, organized through a network of oathing. This movement emerged 
into a full-scale rebellion known as Mau Mau, which gave rise to an endur-
ing representation of Kenya as a space in which tribal atavism and savage 
violence always simmered below the surface of social and political life.48 
Colonial political propaganda and the Western media portrayed the re-
bellion as a race war that pitted families of peaceful white farmers against 
African “terrorists,” as a contest of primitive African “savagery” versus 
white, modern “civilization,” and overlooked the brutality of the colonial 
and complex violence of decolonization in settler colonies like Kenya.
The rebellion took the shape of an insurgency carried out by the Land 
and Freedom Army, a disparate guerrilla force of landless Kikuyu sup-
ported in varying degrees by Kikuyu who pledged (on pain of death and 
not always voluntarily) to simply keep silent or to actively assist the fighters 
with intelligence and supplies. As Mau Mau action escalated and violence 
intensified, the colonial governor declared Kenya in 1952 to be under a 
state of emergency, which lasted nearly a decade. While it retained its anti-
colonial character and targets, Mau Mau further developed into a civil war 
between supporters of the guerrillas and those Kikuyu who had benefited 
from indirect rule—namely Kikuyu chiefs and headmen—and other Ki-
kuyu loyalists or “home guards.”49 In the protracted course of the rebellion, 
the British effectively dehumanized individual Kikuyu, interning a sub-
stantial proportion of the adult male Kikuyu population (and thousands 
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of women) in interrogation camps that were often established on settler 
lands and run with wide-ranging brutality, sometimes by settlers depu-
tized by the colonial state. In the end, as david Anderson notes, only thirty 
white settlers died during Mau Mau, while at least 20,000 Kikuyu were 
killed, with an additional 150,000 imprisioned in internment camps.50 
While political leaders of various “tribes”—most notably the Kikuyu 
politician Jomo Kenyatta—were accused of organizing the rebellion, 
convicted in kangaroo courts, and sentenced to long terms of imprison-
ment, Kenya, outside of nairobi and the White Highlands, was largely 
untouched by the violence of the rebellion.51 In Kikuyu areas, however, 
the British threw their military might at the insurgency, bombarding the 
forests around Mount Kenya with fighter planes, calling in regiments from 
Britain, and importing counterinsurgency experts from other parts of 
their empire. They also set in motion a potent propaganda machine that 
militarized the “civilizing mission,” portraying the colonial forces as de-
fenders of law and order and the Kikuyu as “terrorists” who had lost their 
collective sensibility and veneer of civilization.52 This characterization 
and image was picked up by international press organizations, including 
the New York Times, and quickly imported into Western popular culture 
through Mau Mau–era films such as Simba, which opens with a white set-
tler being hacked to death by a Kikuyu with a panga (machete); and Safari, 
which follows the exploits of a great white hunter as he tracks a Mau Mau 
“terrorist.”53 Ultimately the British were able to put down the rebellion, but 
the protracted and bloody nature of Mau Mau showed them that Kenya 
had become ungovernable. Kenya’s independence was negotiated at a se-
ries of talks in London, and Kenya became independent in 1963, with Jomo 
Kenyatta as president and Oginga Odinga, the foremost Luo cultural and 
political leader, as vice president.54 
 The experience of Kenya in the years immediately following indepen-
dence was that in some ways, rule can be harder than revolution. In the new 
world order of the Cold War, Kenya positioned itself as the solid capitalist 
bulwark in Eastern Africa and Kenyatta as the foil to its socialist coun-
terpart, President Julius nyerere of tanzania. Its domestic politics were 
quickly riven along “tribal” lines, as within a decade the authoritarianism 
of colonialism was superseded by a single-party state dominated by Ken-
yatta’s Kenya African national Union (KAnU) party at the expense of any 
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political opposition. As tom Mboya, a leading Luo politician, lamented 
explicitly of Kenya and implicitly of the Luo experience a few months be-
fore his assassination in 1969, “In less than a decade of independence our 
enemies have too often been given the opportunity to point a finger at our 
tragedies; our friends have sadly drawn attention to our shortcomings and 
we ourselves must feel frustrated at the non-realisation of our dreams and 
aspirations. We have found ourselves in a critical and hostile world which 
insists on perfection where Africa is concerned—despite the fact that none 
of the older nations have themselves achieved such perfection.”55 
Using the history of the Obama family as a lens, the following chapters 
of this book attend to Mboya’s lament, showing how the complex realities 
of nationhood and the complicated work of representation have shaped 
Kenya’s trajectory over the last fifty years. The vestiges of settler society 
and the racial and class hierarchies of colonial rule are still visible in con-
temporary Kenya. Indeed, many wananchi (Kenyan citizens) wondered to 
what extent settler impunity had actually dissipated after tom Cholmon-
deley, the great-grandson of Lord delamere, was not prosecuted for shoot-
ing an undercover black game ranger on the delamere ranch in 2005 and 
found guilty only of manslaughter for shooting an alleged poacher on his 
property the next year.56
The colonial legacy of Mau Mau, settler society, and violence has 
loomed large over both popular and scholarly representations of Kenya. 
For instance, the scope and scale of the torture and abuse carried out 
against suspected Mau Mau supporters has become clear only as archival 
documents have been released and scholars have interviewed survivors.57 
Claims that Obama’s paternal grandfather, Hussein Onyango Obama, had 
been interned and tortured as a Mau Mau rebel spiked American and Brit-
ish interest in the rebellion.58 Most pointedly, however, in the summer of 
2013, the British foreign secretary acknowledged and apologized for the 
torture of Kikuyu during the Mau Mau and announced that elderly Ki-
kuyu survivors who brought suit against the British government for abuses 
committed against them during the rebellion would receive several mil-
lion pounds in reparations.59 
The presidency of Jomo Kenyatta from 1963 to 1978, and the 2013 elec-
tion of his son, Uhuru Kenyatta, to Kenya’s highest office, has continued 
to fuel a long-standing attention to the histories of Central Kenya and the 
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Kikuyu community. Shaped in many cases by popular accounts of the 
glamour of the White Highlands and the savagery of Mau Mau, political 
and social accounts of Central Kenya dominate depictions of the country 
as a whole. In contrast, by focusing on Luo people, places, and things—in-
cluding the heritage of the first African American president of the United 
States and representations of his background—we challenge the dominant 
nationalist narrative of Kenya’s sociopolitical history, popular myths of the 
country’s past, and depictions of its political present. Using the history of 
the Obama family as a lens, the coming chapters offer a critical inquiry 
into the representations of and work done by ethnicity and by related no-




Ethnicity and the Politics of Belonging in Kenya
There’s your ordinary house in nairobi. And then there’s your house 
in the country, where your people come from. Your ancestral home. 
Even the biggest minister or businessman thinks this way. He may 
have a mansion in nairobi and build only a small hut on his land in 
the country. He may go there only once or twice a year. But if you ask 
him where he is from, he will tell you that that hut is his true home. 
So, when we were at school and wanted to tell somebody we were 
going to Alego, it was home twice over, you see. Home Squared. . . . 
For you, Barack, we can call it “Home Cubed.” 
—Barack Obama, Dreams from My Father1
Barack Obama’s visits to his extended family at their rural homesteads in 
Western Kenya during his first trip to Kenya in 1988 offer an important 
avenue into the history of ethnicity and the related politics of belonging in 
Kenya. traveling via the railway line laid down by the British at the opening 
of the colonial era that we learned about in the last chapter, Obama shared 
this important overnight journey with Kenyans returning “home” from 
nairobi to their hereditary “homelands.”2 The sojourn from a “house” in an 
urban, ethnically mixed milieu to a “home” in a more ethnically uniform 
province, undertaken regularly by millions of Kenyans across the country, 
speaks to the historical forces at work around the malleable categories of 
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“tribe” and “ethnicity.”3 A Luo at the end of such a journey exchanges the 
nyumba, or “house,” in the lingua franca of Swahili, which he inhabits in 
the city, for the dala, or homestead, where he belongs in Western Kenya— 
“home squared.” Such was the journey Obama’s family understood him as 
taking, simply with a twice-removed point of origin in the United States. 
training a lens on the Obama family, this chapter examines how the 
idea of a Luo identity, of “Luoness,” came to be and traces the social and 
political work that Luoness has done from the colonial era into the present 
day. We further challenge the notion that “tribe” was either an uncompli-
cated primordial artifact or a wholly colonial construction. Rather, we will 
show how Africans—whether recognized intellectuals like Barack Obama 
Sr. or more ordinary wananchi (citizens) like Hussein Onyanga Obama—
have shaped the meanings and uses of Luoness over time in dialogue with 
a preserved past and contemporary politics. An array of historical sources 
shows that Luoness has been constituted through origin myths and oral 
traditions, through histories written by Luo members of the academy and 
amateur scholars of the “tin trunk history” guild, and through the political 
projects and partisan maneuverings of Luo political actors.4 This chapter 
points to how ethnicity has become the narrative fulcrum on which repre-
sentations of postcolonial Kenyan politics turn. 
Luoland: Dala and Diaspora
Tera adhi aba Kisumu  take me on a tour of Kisumu
Dala gi mama yooo  The home of my mother
Dala gi baba yooo    The home of my father.5
Having arrived in Kisumu, Obama made his way to the bus depot, 
“crowded with buses and matatus honking and jockeying for space in the 
dusty open-air lot,” and crowded onto public transport for the next leg of 
the journey to his family’s home in Kogelo.6 Kisumu, which has grown 
from a sleepy market into Kenya’s third-largest city, has been the center 
of Luo sociopolitical life from the colonial era forward.7 Memorialized 
as the diasporic hometown of Luos worldwide by the popular Suzanna 
Owiyo song quoted above, the city has long been the locus of Luo politi-
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cal activity. Beginning in the colonial era, groups such as the Luo Union 
promoted cultural-political platforms built around the notion of a discrete 
Luo identity, and politicians such as Oginga Odinga launched themselves 
into the anticolonial movement in the 1950s.
The city’s crumbling infrastructure and defunct lakeshore port point 
back to the 1960s, the decade that saw both a Luo, Oginga Odinga, as vice 
president in Kenya’s first independent government, and the beginning of 
thirty years of Luo exile in the “political wilderness” as Jomo Kenyatta’s Ki-
kuyu cohort and daniel arap Moi’s Kalenjin contingent took center stage.8 
This experience of rapid ascent and steady marginalization over more 
than thirty years helps us to understand why by 2004 Luo people reached 
beyond the shores of Lake Victoria and into the diaspora in search of a 
powerful political patron whom they regarded as “belonging” to them—
Barack Obama Jr. Analyses of how Luoness has been historically consti-
tuted through the experience of diaspora helps to illuminate how Obama, 
who first set foot in Kenya at the age of twenty-six, could be claimed by 
Luo as a “son of the soil” of Western Kenya. 
Kisumu, while important from the late nineteenth century forward, 
was not the place where notions of “Luoness” first emerged. Present-day 
Luo speakers offer an array of responses about what constitutes “Luoness” 
and where Luo people originated. Their accounts, which weave together 
historical memory and myth, formal and local historical knowledge, con-
temporary political problems, and even biblical narratives, all emphasize 
migration and then subsequent material and emotional “belonging” to a 
particular landscape as key elements of what it means to be Luo. Over a 
decade of asking Luo people, from elders in Western Kenya to migrants 
in East Africa’s major cities, what it means to be Luo, we were informed 
by nearly all our respondents that the Luo did not originate in Kenya, 
but rather that a founding ancestor, Ramogi, led a group of settlers from 
what is today South Sudan to an area on the present border of Kenya and 
Uganda sometime in the later fifteenth or early sixteenth century. Slowly 
and continuously until they were checked by the establishment of British 
and German colonial rule, waves of Luo-speaking migrants followed on 
Ramogi’s heels.9 Indeed, the British administrator and amateur ethnogra-
pher Charles W. Hobley recorded a version of the Ramogi story in the early 
1900s, noting that “his [Ramogi’s] offspring founded the Ja-luo race.”10 
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discussions of Ramogi’s role retained their purchase in political dis-
course throughout the colonial period and into the present. For example, 
the Luo-language newspaper called Ramogi, founded in the 1940s, was a 
key site for debates about Luo politics and culture. during the 1950s Og-
inga Odinga, the foremost Luo politician, was also vested with the po-
litico-cultural honorific Jaramogi, or “person of Ramogi.” More recently, 
discussing the presidential campaigns and his preferred candidate in nai-
robi in 2007, James Okoth, a Luo resident of nairobi, quipped, “Just as 
Ramogi guided the Luo to Kenya, I know Raila (Odinga) can guide them 
to the statehouse.”11 
The Ramogi story does not just occupy a space in Luo historical imag-
ination, but rather is a material (and commercial) site of memory as well. 
The popular radio station Ramogi FM promotes Luo vernacular music 
on the Kenyan airwaves, and “Ramogi night” has become a regular Luo 
cultural event at the popular nairobi nightclub Carnivore. Many of our 
informants even directed us to visit Ramogi Hill, where community-based 
tourism efforts are under way to commemorate the place believed to be 
the homestead of this mythical founding ancestor. 
Weaving together linguistic, archaeological, oral, and documentary 
sources, most scholarship agrees that Kenya’s Luo population, speakers of 
the dholuo language who call themselves Jaluo, belongs to a wider, dias-
poric group of nilotic-Lwo speakers across East Africa, which includes, 
for example, Acholi-, Lango-, and Padhola-speakers in Uganda and which 
is even related distantly to dinka and nuer populations in South Sudan.12 
The Luo of Kenya arrived in the latter of two waves of Lwo-speaking mi-
grants, who had left South Sudan due to mounting environmental changes 
and competition over resources, beginning in the fifteenth century. Pasto-
ralists and mixed farmers, the Luo found the verdant shores of Lake Vic-
toria well suited to their needs and reminiscent of the lush nile valley.13 
Overall, as migrating Lwo-speakers traversed East Africa, they blended 
with the various groups they encountered, taking on distinct practices that 
would distinguish Lwo-speaking groups from a cultural as well as a lin-
guistic standpoint.14 
Oral traditions do not reflect a conceptualization of a shared Luo iden-
tity across Lwo-speaking groups, nor do they evidence political organiza-
tion beyond the local level in the precolonial era. Rather, populations were 
The Obama Family  |  
organized in terms of family or kin: dala (one’s immediate homestead); 
keyo (one’s extended patrilineage); gweng’ (a collection of lineages bound 
by marriage or defensive alliances); and piny or oganda (multiclan, territo-
rial conglomerates).15 By the mid-nineteenth century, there were approxi-
mately thirteen oganda or piny representing localities that would become 
important population centers in the colonial and postcolonial eras: 
Kisumu, Siaya, and Homa Bay Counties. Luo people identified primarily 
with their home locations; for instance, a Luo from Alego, the Obamas’ 
home location, would have likely called himself a Ja-Alego, or “Alego per-
son,” while a person from Gem would have called himself a Ja-Gem, and 
so on.16 nonetheless, as david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo 
explain, “These small ethnic units were eighteenth and nineteenth century 
rehearsals for the broadly inclusive ethnic unit of the Luo recognized in 
the colonial and post-colonial periods.”17 
Creating the Luo Community in Colonial Kenya
Our elders had good ethics and moral codes, which helped them to 
guide their communities. These were good customs that aided the 
Luo during their migrations, in the course of their daily work and 
discussion. no nation can prosper by adopting foreign cultures and 
ignoring its customs and practices.18 
The implementation of indirect rule, as we learned in the previous chapter, 
was central to the colonial imagining of clearly defined “tribes” and the 
hardening of boundaries around preexisting ethnic affinities. At the same 
time, colonial land and economic policies both restricted black Kenyans 
to “tribal” reserves and drove them to work in the mixed-ethnic milieus of 
the colony’s developing cities and settler plantations. From the early twen-
tieth century, these developments steadily transformed the areas around 
Lake Victoria in Western Kenya to a labor reserve supplying both the co-
lonial state and white settlers. A diaspora of Luo speakers from Western 
Kenya fanned out across the region and to the colonial cities throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century. Barack Obama’s grandfather, Hus-
sein Onyango Obama, who left Luoland to work as a domestic in a white 
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household in nairobi and served in the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in 
both World Wars, was typical of Luo migrants who worked as domestic 
servants in settler households; agricultural laborers on Kenya’s tea, coffee, 
and sisal plantations; as dockhands in Mombasa and dar es Salaam; and 
in various capacities for the railway.19 
For Luo people, steeped in oral traditions about a history born out of 
migration, relocation was not necessarily an utter rupture. Conditions of 
labor and life, particularly in urban areas, were particularly trying, how-
ever. For example, one nairobi official noted with dismay in the 1940s that 
with explosive population growth in the city, “it was common” to see “Af-
ricans sleeping under the verandahs on River Road, in noisome shacks 
in the swamps, in buses parked by the road and fourteen to a room in 
Pumwani, two to a bed and the rest on the floor.”20 Labor migrants, par-
ticularly in urban areas, were also forced to endure the coercive tactics 
and generalized contempt of colonial authorities who regarded them as 
“delinquents” or “vagrants” operating dangerously outside the control of 
rural “tribal” discipline.21 
Indeed, the problem posed by the “detribalized native” was a primary 
trope in colonial and anthropological discourse from the 1930s onward.22 
In much the same way that colonial authorities in the late 1950s focused 
on “tribal atavism” instead of valid economic and political concerns as the 
driving force behind Mau Mau, their predecessors and contemporaries 
argued that labor migrants engaged in “undesirable” activities like theft 
and prostitution because they were “detribalized.” This ideology rendered 
ethnicity as a romanticized and rural variety of patriarchal control and 
argued that Africans who were separated “from family, clan and tribal au-
thority as well as from social codes of behavior, discipline, custom and 
perhaps religion[,] which originally guided their thoughts and actions,” 
were operating dangerously outside of customary and colonial legal sys-
tems.23 Providing an easy alternative to dealing with the real structural 
problems of racial inequality, “detribalization” discourse helped squelch 
concerns about the squalid, precarious conditions of life and work that 
characterized urban African environments.
Luo people were deeply troubled not merely by the material hardships 
of migrant life, but also by the upending of sociocultural life and the ab-
sence of community. The twinned questions of how to survive in an urban 
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setting and what it meant to be Luo outside of Western Kenya were an-
swered through intellectual projects and politico-cultural organizations. 
These intellectual works and political labors built on shared linguistic ca-
pacities, cultural affinities, geographic origins, and economic needs that 
were much deeper and more complex than the blunt colonial category 
“tribe.” 
Intellectual projects undertaken by Luo from the mid-1930s onward 
were shaped by a confluence of internal forces and external influences. 
Luo identity—taking in concerns ranging from religious conversion to 
gendered social morality to civic virtue—was contested by a number of 
historical actors throughout East Africa’s urban centers. In the cities, under 
the disciplinary gaze of colonial authorities and in the comparative view 
of black Kenyans from other ethnic groups, “Luo men knew themselves 
to be under examination,” derek Peterson writes. “They conceived of East 
Africa’s urban environment as a competitive theatre in which men and 
women alike were obliged to behave with credible decorum.”24 Exclusive 
of these external influences, Luo struggled with how to reconcile notions 
of cultural comportment rooted in nyanza with the demands of life in an 
environment that was constantly in flux. Luo intellectuals developed his-
torical projects that addressed where the Luo had come from and where 
they were going; what had made “Luoness” over time.25
The text cited at the beginning of this section, Paul Mboya’s Luo: Kitgi 
gi tembegi (Luo: Customs and traditions), effectively constituted a ver-
nacular textbook for Luo identity and provided the foundation for future 
intellectual projects. Through a series of topical chapters—for example, 
“Law about War,” “Matters on Marriage,” “A Polygamous Man and His 
Home”—the text charts the cultural responsibilities and acceptable limits 
of “Luoness” with encyclopedic authority. Written at the apex of the colo-
nial era, the book endeavors to answer many of the pressing sociocultural 
questions of the day through reflections on the preservation of the Luo 
past and to offer a set of principles by which every proper Luo speaker 
should abide.
Luo-language newspapers, most notably Ramogi, were another discur-
sive space in which the intellectual project came to terms with urban life 
and its implicit demands to define and perform proper cultural comport-
ment in circumstances that were very different from those of “home.” The 
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newspaper’s editors, writers, and readers engaged in debates that aimed to 
define the responsibilities and limits attached to “Luoness.” Some articles 
and letters called for Luo to invest in Western Kenya. Others debated the 
“immoral” lifestyle and habits of those living outside of Western Kenya. 
Articles often spoke of the need for greater social restraint and discipline 
in order to maintain Luo respectability in gendered ways. For example, a 
1948 editorial labeled independent Luo women in towns as “prostitutes” 
and argued, “They should be watched by the Luo Union and any relative 
found allowing these girls to be prostitutes should be punished.”26 
While Ramogi often reinforced patriarchal notions of Luo identity, 
African women occasionally wrote forceful critiques of male attitudes. 
Connecting debates about the immorality of town life with the social re-
sponsibilities of rural familial ties, one woman admonished Luo migrant 
laborers, who, she explained, “cannot do without women and begin keep-
ing prostitutes with the results that all the money they earn is spent on 
them and perpetual drinking, where as their wives and children are suf-
fering in the reserves without any help or information through correspon-
dence.”27 Overall, the newspaper provided a central arena in which migrant 
Luo connected and communicated with one another. As a Luo-speaking 
writer living in Ethiopia poignantly declared in a 1947 editorial, “Ramogi 
is the only connection I have with my people.”28 It served also to stimulate 
“belonging” to a shared Luo lineage. Indeed, authors frequently signed 
their articles with an emphatic phrase: “An nyakwar Ramogi,” or “I am a 
descendant of Ramogi.”29
More materially, urban ethnic associations, in the Luo case the Luo 
Union, were formed in the 1930s to counter the alienating effects of urban 
life and to foster social and economic ties between the city and “home.”30 
These associations, which would ultimately give rise to political organiza-
tions built around ethnic lines, were endorsed by the colonial authorities, 
who saw them as “the best answer to the detribalizing influences of town 
life,” perhaps because they relieved colonial authorities of having to im-
prove the conditions of urban life for their African subjects.31
The Luo Union had its roots in earlier clan societies that provided so-
cial welfare benefits for Luo-speaking migrants from particular locations 
in Western Kenya. As many Luo speakers believed that a person’s soul 
could not rest until his or her body was buried at “home” (dala), that is, the 
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place in Western Kenya where the person was born and where his or her 
placenta (biero) was subsequently buried, these early organizations func-
tioned in part as burial cooperatives.32 As one elderly Luo man recalled, 
clan associations often raised large amounts of money to ship the bodies 
of Luo-speaking workers from as far as Ethiopia, Uganda, and coastal tan-
ganyika to Western Kenya.33 Further, these associations were instrumental 
in raising funds for development projects in the rural areas, especially in 
the realm of education.
Acting as a parent organization to the multiple clan societies, from the 
moment of its inception the Luo Union fostered educational opportunities 
for Luo-speaking youth, promoted economic and cultural investment in 
Western Kenya, and set about creating a new history written in the ver-
nacular that codified the mythical shared past of the Luo-speaking com-
munity.34 As colonial officials correctly understood, a central part of the 
Luo Union’s work was “to examine and to choose the new customs which 
should be followed and bad ones which should be suppressed.”35 The orga-
nization’s own 1945 constitution had the more expansive goals of promot-
ing “mutual understanding and unity” among all Luo speakers while also 
shaping the cultural obligations of a growing ethnic constituency.36 The 
promotion of “unity” was the principal aim of various constitutions, mis-
sion statements, and other documents produced by the Luo Union in the 
1940s and 1950s, signifying both the organization’s sociopolitical impetus 
and the fact that “Luo” was a contested and disparate identity. Under the 
banner “Riwruok e teko” (Unity is strength), Luo Union officials attempted 
to corral a diverse and increasingly diasporic linguistic community under 
a single ethnic banner. 
The leadership of the Luo Union—mission-educated elites like Paul 
Mboya, Walter Odede, Oginga Odinga, and Achieng Oneko—also served 
in important intermediary positions. For instance, Mboya was a colonial 
chief in South nyanza, Odinga taught at the illustrious Church Missionary 
Society (CMS) school at Maseno, and Oneko was a municipal councillor 
in nairobi.37 These positions imbued them with status, savvy, and expe-
rience in negotiating the colonial bureaucracy and earned them respect 
from colonial authorities and Africans alike. As the colonial era wore on, 
they were able to use their knowledge and influence to grow the scope and 
scale of the organization. For instance, in the mid-1940s, Odinga started 
  |  Obama and Kenya
the Luo Thrift and trading Company (LUtAtCO), a highly success-
ful sister organization that promoted migrants’ reinvestment in nyanza 
and aimed to promote, in Odinga’s words, “unity, common purpose and 
achievement” among the Luo-speaking community throughout Eastern 
Africa.38 Ultimately, the union leadership mobilized its political capital to 
become significant players in anticolonial politics and in the first indepen-
dent government.
By the early 1950s, the Luo Union had thousands of paid members in 
its sixty-plus branches throughout Kenya, tanzania, and Uganda, and of-
fered members of the Luo-speaking diaspora significant avenues for socia-
bility and education organized along ethnolinguistic lines. The relational 
opportunities that union meetings provided—to speak Luo, to swap news 
of “home,” to forge friendships in the dance hall or on the football pitch—
transcended clan ties as dholuo-speaking labor migrants from across East 
Africa developed a shared sense of “belonging” as fellow “Luos.”39 By the 
early 1950s, the intertwined intellectual and politico-cultural projects of 
negotiating labor environments far from Luoland and fostering Luoness 
outside Western Kenya were well under way. By the end of the decade, Mau 
Mau, the central event of Kenya’s colonial history, demanded new answers 
to the question of what it meant to be Luo and propelled Luo politico- 
cultural leaders of political prominence onto the nationalist stage.
The Forest Conflict: Luo Loyalty and Subversive Politics
1. Generally speaking, within the Province itself, Mau Mau infiltra-
tion into nyanza tribes has been negligible since May 1954. There 
is however evidence to show that some nyanza tribesmen have 
been contaminated through contact with Kikuyu, Embu, and 
Meru tribesmen while outside the Province. 
2. during 1953 and 1954 at least 1,000 nyanza tribesmen were be-
lieved to have taken a Mau Mau oath in nairobi City.40 
As we learned in chapter 2, Mau Mau was an overwhelmingly Kikuyu af-
fair, and given the negligible nature of Luo involvement, it is far from plau-
sible that Hussein Onyango Obama was a Mau Mau adherent, let alone a 
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fighter.41 When the rebellion commenced in the early 1950s, ordinary Luo 
readily denounced Mau Mau in the pages of Ramogi. For example, criti-
cizing the character of Mau Mau and the disruptions it caused to poten-
tial social welfare projects, one Luo Union supporter wrote, “We remain 
unhappy because of the activities of Mau Mau and are shocked at the evil 
crimes committed. . . . People have asked for more pay, better trade, im-
proved housing and better education, but everything is held up until Mau 
Mau is crushed. . . . We should seek means by which all can help stamp out 
Mau Mau and return to our former peaceful way of living.”42 Luo Union 
branches across Kenya consistently distanced themselves from the mount-
ing violence and turmoil, insisting on numerous occasions, “The Union 
is purely social and has nothing to do with politics.”43 At the same time, 
Oginga Odinga was made ker, or cultural leader of the Luo, and took on 
the honorific title Jaramogi, reinforcing both the notion of a shared Luo 
identity that had been emerging since the 1930s and the cultural bent of 
the union.44 
Anti–Mau Mau sentiments among the Luo community were particu-
larly fueled by the murder of nairobi city councillor and Luo Union offi-
cial Ambrose Ofafa in november 1953. Ofafa had by the early 1950s grown 
to be a prominent figure in the African community in nairobi and was 
also well liked by colonial officials. The African Affairs department report 
of 1952 even referred to Ofafa as a “leading light of moderation in break-
ing Mau Mau tensions in nairobi.”45 His tragic and brutal death in 1953 
was pinned to Mau Mau fighters, and dholuo speakers responded to this 
event: his funeral procession in nyanza had several thousand attendees. 
Ogot has shown that Ofafa spoke strongly against Luo retribution from his 
deathbed, even as the colonial state tried to use the event to convince the 
Luo community to actively resist Mau Mau.46
Even with Ofafa’s request, Luo Union members and officials used his 
death to increase their public denouncement of Mau Mau and gain favor 
with the state as 1954 rose to be a pivotal year in the organizations history. 
Odinga traveled throughout Kenya during the early months of 1954 to 
publicly denounce the movement at various Luo Union meetings, declar-
ing, “The Luo as a tribe must be loyal to Government and any political ad-
vancement which the Luo sought must be done by constitutional means.”47 
The year 1954 was also marked by widespread active repression of the 
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Kikuyu community in Central Kenya. From April to May a raid by British 
forces, named “Operation Anvil,” in nairobi and other settler-dominated 
communities detained more than fifty thousand suspected Mau Mau sup-
porters without trial. The roundup included an estimated 50 percent of the 
Kikuyu population of nairobi, whose linguistic/ethnic identity made them 
guilty until proved innocent in the eyes of the state.48 Although most were 
innocent migrant laborers, the sudden exodus of thousands of workers 
from nairobi created a void in the workforce. due to the colonial state’s 
increasingly favorable view of the Luo community, many of the vacant jobs 
opened by Operation Anvil were filled by Luo workers. The district com-
missioner of Luo-dominated Central nyanza noted that almost immedi-
ately, “Operation Anvil restored confidence, resulting in a heavy outflow 
of Luo families in search of ready employment and high wages in towns 
Figure 3.1. The first delegates conference of the new Luo Union (East Africa), 1953. 
Photo courtesy of the family of former Luo Union ker Adala Otuko.
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and plantations.”49 This trend continued throughout the 1950s as reports in 
nairobi specifically noted that “it would appear that the Luo are taking the 
place of the bulk of the Kikuyu detained during the Emergency.”50 
Looking for African loyalty wherever they could find it, the colonial 
state and the settler community were willing to laud the Luo as a “loyal 
tribe.” The file cited at the beginning of this section evidences a breathless 
relief about the lack of Mau Mau “contamination” among the Luo.51 Luo 
attitudes and actions also drew praise from the settler paper, the Sunday 
Post. An editorial titled “The Strength of Luo Loyalty” noted that the set-
tler community was “encouraged by the recent pronouncements of loyalty 
by the Luo Union. . . . tribal discipline is still strong and elders and middle 
age Luo spend much of their time correcting and lecturing the young men 
of the tribe.”52 And settlers and officials were willing to regard the Luo 
Union as an apolitical, primarily cultural organization whose ethnicized 
membership squared nicely with colonial notions of “tribe” and whose 
promotion of Protestant-seeming values—thrift, education, gerontocracy, 
and patriarchy—soothed colonial fears about the dangers of “detribaliza-
tion” and Mau Mau.
In 1954, as Kenya’s struggle for independence began to crest, union 
officials also published a five-year plan, which sought to solidify the lead-
ership’s role as a leading voice among the Luo. The first order of busi-
ness the association envisioned was to take a census of dholuo speakers 
throughout East Africa as a way of defining the strength and limits of their 
community. They then planned to erect buildings in nairobi, Kampala, 
and dar es Salaam to function as an embassy in these cities by hosting 
social events as well as interacting with colonial governments. Finally, Luo 
Union members and officials even discussed building a Luo museum in 
Kisumu as a way of promoting a unified cultural heritage.53 Clearly, union 
members and officials saw themselves as the leaders of the burgeoning 
Luo nation, which needed cultural and political symbols to construct the 
public image of Luo identity. 
While many of the goals of the 1955 five-year plan were in actuality 
lofty aspirations that failed to materialize, the Luo Union’s cultural- 
intellectual projects nonetheless positioned the organization as a central 
guardian of cultural heritage and as the political leaders of the broader Luo 
community. One tangible success of the association in the Mau Mau era 
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was the fund-raising campaign for the erection of the Ofafa Memorial Hall 
in Kisumu. The hall represented an effort to honor Ambrose Ofafa, who 
was a colonial moderate and rising Luo political figure in nairobi during 
the early 1950s and who became an early Luo martyr of Mau Mau–inspired 
political violence. 
From 1954 to 1961, fund-raising for a social hall and new Luo Union 
headquarters was a staple of Luo Union meetings, dances, and sporting 
events.54 Over these seven years the association managed to raise a large 
sum of money and complete the construction of the social hall in Kisumu. 
The Ofafa Memorial Hall was officially opened by Odinga and his then 
political ally Jomo Kenyatta in 1961, and the event marked an important 
moment of transition for the Luo Union from being a primarily cultur-
ally oriented organization to serving as an important locus of Luo politi-
cal power.55 Beginning in the emergency period, as the political climate 
became increasingly fraught, the Luo Union moved from stressing its 
cultural role to engaging increasingly in political action. The imprison-
ment of Jomo Kenyatta and other leaders of the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru 
Association (GEMA) had created a political space that actors from other 
communities, including the Luo, were eager to seize. Also, despite their 
denunciations of Mau Mau and the generally favorable colonial attitude 
toward the Luo, the Luo Union had seen two of its key leaders imprisoned. 
Achieng Oneko was one of the “Kapenguria Six” arrested with Jomo Ken-
yatta and accused of helping him to foment Mau Mau.56 Walter Odede 
was an early leader of the Luo Union who took over as acting head of 
the prominent political organization KAU (Kenya African Union) after 
Kenyatta’s arrest. Odede himself was arrested for being “in touch with the 
Mau Mau movement and attempt[ing] to spread their violent methods 
into nyanza.”57 
In the mid-1950s, the bloody, complicated, and consuming nature of 
Mau Mau, together with intensifying demands for formal African politi-
cal participation in Kenya but also on the other side of the continent in 
Britain’s Gold Coast Colony, which became Ghana after independence, 
motivated Kenya’s government to ease restrictions on African political 
organizations and to open a token number of seats for African represen-
tatives on the colony’s settler-dominated Legislative Council in 1957. With 
GEMA politicians largely barred from these elections, Luo leaders suc-
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cessfully contested available seats. Most notably, Odinga resigned as head 
of the Luo Union to represent Central nyanza, and tom Mboya, a popular 
trade unionist and child of the labor migrations who was born on a sisal 
plantation in Thika, carried nairobi, defeating another Luo candidate, Ar-
wings Kodhek.58 The results of these elections also showed the growing 
political power of ethnicity in late colonial Kenya. Beyond the Luo com-
munity, elected leaders such as Ronald ngala (Coast) and Masinde Muliro 
(north nyanza) benefited from the political work done by ethnic associa-
tions in their home areas as well. Like the Luo Union, the Mijikenda Union 
of the coast and the Abaluhya Association in Western Kenya capitalized 
on shared interests in soccer, rural development initiatives, and cultural 
issues in order to help build ethnic political communities in the 1950s.59
By the late 1950s, it was clear that the end of British colonial rule 
was inevitable. With independence on the horizon, leaders like Mboya 
sought support and standing abroad.60 Particularly urgent was the need 
to quickly grow the number of Africans who had access to higher educa-
tion and would thus be prepared to work in the administration of inde-
pendent Kenya. In 1959, Mboya undertook a high-profile American tour, 
speaking at universities across the country, appearing on Meet the Press, 
and developing relationships with Senator John F. Kennedy and Afri-
can American celebrity activists such as baseball great Jackie Robinson, 
singer Harry Belafonte, and movie star Sidney Poitier.61 With public and 
private funding raised through the African American Students Foun-
dation, they secured scholarships that were billed as an investment in 
Africa’s future for nearly eight hundred East Africans to attend colleges 
and universities in the United States from 1959 to 1963. Among the elite 
students of this era, who had to pledge to return to Kenya upon gradua-
tion, were future nobel laureate Wangari Maathai, and the future father 
of an American president, Barack Hussein Obama.62 Barack Obama Sr.’s 
early life would not necessarily have suggested that he would be part 
of this select group of young wananchi groomed to be leaders of the 
nation. Although he attended the prestigious CMS secondary school at 
Maseno like Odinga and Oneko before him, he was dismissed in 1953 
before graduation for defying school rules. With his prospects dimmed, 
Obama Sr. followed in the footsteps of thousands of earlier Luo labor 
migrants, including his father, by finding employment in Mombasa and 
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nairobi, and likely benefiting from the Mau Mau–driven repression 
of the GEMA community.Settling in Kaloleni, one of nairobi’s Luo- 
dominated middle-class neighborhoods, Obama Sr. had plenty of oc-
casions to engage with fellow Luo migrants in between clerking at an 
Indian law firm and working on a literacy campaign run by an American 
woman.63 The neighborhood’s popular social hall was a space to seek 
out Luo sociability and a regular meeting place of the Luo Union and 
other ethnic associations. Built in the postwar era of colonial welfare and 
development, social halls were important sites of urban recreation, espe-
cially during the tense year of Mau Mau. As the state sponsored sites to 
hold cultural events aimed at promoting “tribal discipline,” nairobi’s Af-
rican affairs officer noted that even during the State of Emergency, “every 
weekend all the available halls were booked for tribal society functions, 
dances and general meetings.”64 While state officials often lauded these 
disciplined cultural activities, social halls also provided a rare public 
space to gather and debate politics. As Mau Mau wore on, cultural de-
bates about “Luoness” at the hall took on an increasingly political tone.65 
Figure 3.2. Ofafa Memorial Hall, Kisumu. Photo by author.
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Having established tom Mboya as a mentor and having petitioned in 
Ramogi for additional support for his studies abroad, Obama Sr. was well 
placed when he left for university in Hawaii in 1959, the same year that 
the State of Emergency, which shaped Kenyan affairs from 1952 onward, 
was lifted.66 In the five years that Obama Sr. spent at Hawaii and Harvard, 
Kenya was politically transformed. A series of constitutional conferences 
began in London in 1961, the year of Barack Obama Jr.’s birth in Hawaii. 
The political negotiations in Kenya resulted in Kenyatta’s release that same 
year and in Kenya’s independence in 1963. Kenyatta emerged from years in 
detention as a martyr to the Mau Mau cause and resumed his place at the 
apex of Kenya politics as leader of the new Kenya African national Union 
(KAnU) party with widespread support, including that of Odinga and 
Mboya.67 In 1963 Kenyatta was elected president; Odinga served as vice 
president, and Mboya served as a cabinet minister. By the time Obama Jr. 
visited his Kenyan family twenty-five years later, the optimism that was 
palpable in the early days of Kenya’s independence had evaporated as au-
thoritarianism, corruption, and often-violent politics held sway. In this 
environment Luo found themselves especially marginalized, and by 2004 
Luo people were ready to reach into the diaspora that had spilled beyond 
East Africa and around the world to find a powerful patron.
The Rise and Fall of the Luo Community in  
Postcolonial Politics
What is even sadder is that each time a Luo, is about to achieve 
greater things, for a country, he is sabotaged by their own people 
in cahoots, with detractors. And in doing so, the whole nation is 
robbed of advancement, and great leaders.68 
Political developments after Kenya’s independence in 1963 added new lay-
ers to Luoness. during the 1960s and 1970s the relationship between the 
Luo community and the Kenyan state shifted. Throughout decolonization 
and the early days of the republic, Luo speakers had relatively cordial re-
lationships with the colonial and national governments, and leaders like 
Odinga and Mboya rose to influential national positions. However, before 
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a decade of independence elapsed, Western Kenya became linked to po-
litical opposition due to Luo attempts to claim positions of power and the 
efforts of the increasingly Kikuyu- and then Kalenjin-dominated state to 
push them aside. The progressively more patrimonial and ethnicized land-
scape of the country’s national politics and Luos’ diminishment within it 
simultaneously enhanced Luos’ notion of their broadly constituted ethnic 
identity—to be Luo was to be an outsider, an Other—and stimulated a 
profound desire for a powerful Big Man who could promote their interests 
and bring them back from the “political wilderness.”69 
By the time of independence, a shared sense of Luo identity—established 
by history and in diaspora, and also confirmed through ongoing cultural 
and material ties to nyanza—had been cultivated through the intellectual 
and political projects discussed above and through political participation 
on the national stage as the colonial era ended. But as Kenya’s political 
landscape became more complex, so did the content of Luoness. The cases 
of Oginga Odinga and tom Mboya, the foremost Luo politicians of the 
early1960s, point to the new layers of postcolonial Luoness as well as to the 
Luo Union’s unfinished and contested project of ethnic “unity.” Odinga, 
the elder of the pair, exemplified the more standard variety of Luoness; 
he relied on his elevated cultural status as Jaramogi and on the support 
of the Luo Union, and he drew his constituents from dholuo speakers 
across nyanza. Mboya, in contrast, imbued Luoness with a cosmopolitan 
character that was different from its diasporic one; nairobi was his parlia-
mentary constituency, and, as noted above, he had attained an impressive 
international profile, even landing a Time magazine cover in 1960.70 His 
international profile made him competitive for high office. Starting out as 
a trade unionist, he became the minister for Economic Planning and de-
velopment and had even been touted as a potential presidential challenger 
to Kenyatta. 
As part of the cosmopolitan “airlift” cohort, Barack Obama Sr. was 
able to secure a highly sought after civil servant position as a planning 
officer in the Ministry of Economic Planning upon returning to Kenya in 
1964.71 Working in nairobi under his mentor Mboya, Obama Sr. would 
have been immersed in the heated politics of the early independence era 
as Kenya struggled to find its place in the global landscape of the Cold 
War. Looking for the best “deal” between the two superpowers, leaders like 
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Odinga flirted with socialist ideologies and courted the Soviet Union and 
the United States, both of which were eager to move newly independent 
nations into their spheres of influence. Scant years earlier, the superpow-
ers had jockeyed to bring newly independent Congo into their respective 
camps; the US and its allies referring to the left-leaning prime minister 
Patrice Lumumba, who was ultimately killed by secessionist Congolese 
and CIA operatives as a Communist.72 British Intelligence reports that 
referred to Odinga as “an enigma . . . a contact man with the USSR and 
China,” both recalled the language applied to Lumumba and foreshadowed 
the rhetoric that the American political Right applied to Barack Obama Jr. 
four decades later.73
Odinga’s inclinations and the criticisms of them reflected not only 
Cold War geopolitics, but also an emerging ideological divide among Ken-
ya’s postcolonial leadership over the appropriate paths for development 
and in global affairs, and the ethnic tensions simmering below the surface 
of postcolonial politics.74 As noted earlier, in the culmination of an appar-
ent Kikuyu-Luo alliance, Odinga had become vice president in Kenyatta’s 
administration, signaling to many that it was time for the Luo to take their 
share of the political cake. However, Odinga’s political ambitions, socialist 
ideology, and connections to the Soviet Union did not mesh with the aims 
of Kenyatta, who was molding himself into a strong friend of the West 
and his administration into an ethnicized and patrimonial enterprise that 
failed to create a unified sense of Kenyan nationalism.75 In a move that 
began the long period in which state development in nyanza was largely 
abandoned and split the ruling party, Odinga broke away in 1966, forming 
an opposition party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU).76
 
The split between Odinga and the Kenyatta government also split Luo 
between supporters of Odinga and those of Mboya who had remained 
within the ruling party. Mboya’s star rose even higher with Odinga’s mar-
ginalization, so much so that he was even floated as a potential successor 
to the elderly Kenyatta. Yet, while the cosmopolitan Mboya had cultivated 
support across ethnic lines, the increasingly ethnicized political model re-
inforced the importance of “tribe.” Mboya’s Luo roots were regarded by 
many Kikuyu as a threat to the primacy of Kikuyu political power. 
By the late 1960s, Obama Sr. was caught in the middle of the struggle 
between the Kenyatta administration and the Luo opposition. Perhaps 
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seeking advice on negotiating this complex environment, Obama Sr. 
met with his mentor, Mboya, in nairobi’s central business district on a 
Saturday afternoon in July 1969. Shortly after the men exchanged greet-
ings, Mboya was shot to death outside a pharmacy on Government 
Road. He died within minutes. Mboya’s assassination, which was widely 
linked to the Kenyatta regime, both added another layer to Luo political 
marginalization and helped to renew the sense of shared Luo identity 
(and interests) that had been troubled by the split between Odinga and 
Mboya.77 Indeed, when Kenyatta held a public rally in Kisumu to open 
a new Soviet-funded hospital a few months after Mboya’s death, his en-
tourage was pelted with stones while security forces opened fire. Eleven 
deaths resulted from the violence. The KPU was immediately banned 
by the state, and its leaders were imprisoned and stripped of their seats 
in Parliament.78 In the tumult of postcolonial politics, the Luo Union 
had continued its intellectual projects to foster Luoness and to work on 
shaping what it meant to be Luo in the new era. On the eve of inde-
pendence, the Luo Union held a four-day conference in Kisumu on Luo 
history that brought together many professional and amateur histori-
ans. As derek Peterson writes, “Historical research was a consequen-
tial endeavor in nyanza, a work for which dedicated people sacrificed 
time and money.”79 during this period, renowned Luo historian Bethwell 
Ogot was conducting fieldwork for his classic 1967 text, History of the 
Southern Luo, a definitive scholarly study of Luo oral traditions stretch-
ing back to the diaspora from Sudan and the advent of Ramogi. Using 
Luo Union elders as principal informants, Ogot gave the Luo community 
a codified written history based on scholarly research and continued the 
colonial tradition of oral and written historical narrative showing the 
Luo as a distinct social and political identity.80 Ogot’s pioneering role in 
the Kenyan academy is mirrored by that of other leading Luo academics 
such as Simeon Ominde and david Wasawo.81 While the Luo community 
professed that Luo were banished to the political “wilderness,” they were 
nevertheless able to exert their influence in academe.
Politically, the Luo Union had also aimed to play a conciliatory role 
after the rupture between Odinga and Kenyatta, and had worked to re-
unify the Luo after Mboya’s death.82 At a general meeting held in a Kaloleni 
social hall shortly after Mboya died and attended by thousands of Luo 
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speakers, the sitting ker (president) of the Luo Union, Paul Mboya, began 
with a call for general unity. In turn, Achieng Oneko remarked that in 
death, tom Mboya was returning “home” to the community he had aban-
doned to his cosmopolitanism. In a direct reference to the union’s origins 
as a burial society, he called for the Luo community to raise funds to bury 
Mboya in triumphal style in Rusinga Island, noting, “now he is back with 
us.”83 Luo efforts to reclaim their cosmopolitan kin prefigured Luo efforts 
forty years later to assert that a young politician from Illinois “belonged” 
to them. 
A by-election in 1969 made Kenya a defacto one-party state and 
served as an indicator of the growing political factions that plagued the 
Luo Union throughout the rest of its official history.84 More than a dozen 
new members of Parliament (MPs) were elected to replace Odinga and 
the other KPU exiles, which represented the rise of a new anti-Odinga 
KAnU faction in Luo political circles. Even as the Luo Union’s soccer club 
brought home international accolades, the association was embroiled in 
economic controversy during the waning years of the Kenyatta era. As it 
sponsored several harambee (fund-raisers) to develop the Ramogi Insti-
tute of Advanced technology (RIAt) outside of Kisumu, allegations of 
misuse of funds further damaged the union’s public image and hindered 
its activities.85
during the 1970s, Kenyatta ruled Kenya as a dictatorial patriarchal 
leader referred to simply with the honorific title Mzee (wise old man). Luo 
Union meetings during this time were sometimes denied government per-
mission, as the political climate for dholuo speakers allied to Odinga and 
the Luo Union worsened. For instance, when a group of students at the 
University of nairobi attempted to form a Luo student league in 1970, the 
government denied them registration, stating: “It appears to the registrar 
that in the interests of peace, welfare, or good order in Kenya would be 
likely to suffer prejudice by reason of your registration as a society.”86 
Throughout the later years of Kenyatta’s rule, union relations with the 
state grew increasingly distant and suspicious, and the association came 
into direct conflict with the KAnU government. to attempt to control 
the Odinga opposition groups in Western Kenya, Kenyatta appointed Isa-
iah Cheluget as the new provincial commissioner (PC) of nyanza in 1969. 
Originally from the Rift Valley borderlands of nyanza, Cheluget was not a 
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Luo cultural insider, and he clashed with the union leaders. For instance, 
Cheluget campaigned that local Luo traditions of large public burials were 
too expensive and also a health threat if the individual had died from a 
highly communicable disease such as cholera.87 Union members and offi-
cials vehemently opposed any cultural meddling by the Kenyatta appoin-
tee, arguing that it was their duty to regulate customary affairs free from 
government interference. A running battle ensued in the local press, with 
Cheluget and Luo Union officials accusing each other of neglecting the 
social welfare of the Luo community. Ker Paul Mboya summed up the 
view of union membership in 1978 by simply stating, “Just as I will not 
interfere in Mr. Cheluget’s work, I like to ask him to keep his hands off of 
Luo Union affairs.”88 
Cultural interference by the state also spilled over into the political 
arena, as the KAnU government aimed to draw Luo voters from Odinga 
through the same channels he used to build grassroots support. On many 
occasions following independence, union officials had adamantly tried to 
keep their nonpolitical image from the colonial period intact. However, 
by the mid-1970s, public opinion and political actions blurred the line be-
tween the social welfare and political activities of the Luo Union and other 
ethnic associations. Politicians became more publicly associated with the 
activities of state welfare associations such as the Luo Union, the new 
Akamba Union, and the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA) 
from Central Kenya. This active involvement by prominent politicians 
enshrouded the welfare activities of ethnic associations in political con-
troversy.89 By the late 1970s, union members were widely seen as staunch 
supporters of Oginga Odinga. While Odinga had been forced from gov-
ernment in 1969, he still garnered significant support from rural nyanza, 
as union members had been his political supporters since the 1950s. The 
new KAnU MPs, who had been elected to fill the void of exiled KPU lead-
ers, had trouble garnering popular support for their positions even by the 
late 1970s. Some looked to the Luo Union as the answer to their political 
problems. 
In January 1978, reports surfaced in the local press that the Luo Union 
was launching a campaign to raise nearly twenty million Kenyan shillings 
(KSH) to fund direct political campaigns. Their efforts were argued to be 
aimed at restoring ex-KPU officials such as Oginga Odinga and Achieng 
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Oneko in elected government positions during the 1979 general elections. 
Luo Union officials fervently protested any involvement and dismissed the 
reports. However, new Luo MPs still within the KAnU government and 
opposed to Odinga, namely, Isaac Omolo Okero and William Odongo 
Omamo, called for a change in Luo Union leadership. From 1978 to 1980, 
Omamo took forceful control of union affairs and, backed by the KAnU 
government, ran the organization through a caretaker committee. Paul 
Mboya’s position as ker was then moot in the eyes of the state, and for the 
next two years political struggles within the Luo community ensued over 
the issue of controlling the Luo Union.90 While 1978 symbolized the begin-
ning of a chaotic period late in the organization’s history, it also marked a 
time of political transition for Kenya itself that would result in the official 
end to ethnic welfare associations. 
Kenyatta’s death from natural causes in 1978 did not improve Luo po-
litical fortunes. daniel arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta as president, and 
the political establishment expected that he would protect the interests 
of Kenya’s close associates even though he came from the Kalenjin ethnic 
group, which had opposed the alliance between the Kikuyu and the Luo at 
independence. In keeping with the ever-increasing ethnicization of poli-
tics, Moi elevated many Kalenjin to key positions and continued Kenyatta’s 
program of confining Luo to the “political wilderness.”91 For example, less 
than two years into his presidency, Moi called for the “winding up of all 
associations whose purposes and objectives are to serve as pressure groups 
in the interests of a single or multiple tribal, clan, race, conveniences or 
communities.”92 The result of this informal decree was that the Luo Union 
and other, similar ethnic associations were effectively banned, thus limit-
ing their power to organize opposition at the grassroots level.93 
By the 1980s, “tribalism” was widely used to explain divisive politi-
cal policies, and as such this move initially had significant public support. 
However, voices in the Kenyan press asserted the social welfare benefits 
provided by ethnic organizations like the Luo Union and argued that ban-
ning them was not the way to remedy ethnic politics. For example, James 
Ger of Kisumu wrote in a 1980 editorial, “It was tribal consciousness which 
supplied the first weapon against colonialism. And KAU, the first national 
political party, was a union of ethnic organizations such as the Kavirondo 
societies and the Kikuyu Central Association [KCA]. tribal consciousness 
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can only be supplemented by a very strong national spirit which has been 
lacking in Kenya because of the predominance of ‘the ruling class tribal-
ism,’ not by dissolving welfare associations formed to cater for the social 
cultural and economic needs of their members.”94 
While organizations like the Luo Union disappeared from public view 
during the 1980s, their social and cultural work continued.95 For instance, 
the popular Luo Union and Abaluhya football clubs simply renamed 
themselves Reunion and AFC Leopards after the ban on ethnic associ-
ations in 1980. The more popular Luo Union football team Gor Mahia 
was apparently immune to this ban because it drew its name from a Luo 
folk hero and did not have an ethnic distinction. Among the most popular 
teams in the current Kenyan professional league, Gor Mahia and the AFC 
Leopards still draw the majority of their support from ethnic constituen-
cies. For instance, when Gor fans march toward the nairobi city stadium 
on game day, it is typical to hear chants and songs in Luo recalling the 
community’s migratory origins in South Sudan, with fans proudly display-
ing tilapia from Lake Victoria as a symbol of ethnic cuisine.96 As one life-
long supporter noted, the success of Gor Mahia has long been a “symbol 
of Luo strength.”97
From the late 1960s onward, the political fate of the Luo overall was 
tied increasingly to the fate of the Odingas. In keeping with broader trends 
in Kenyan politics, Luo engagement in “Big Man Politics” reflects the belief 
held across ethnic groups that patrimonial patronage along ethnic lines is 
essential to getting a slice of the political cake, or, more simply, the notion 
that “if we can just get our man into office, it will be our time to eat.”98 The 
perilousness of being a popular Luo politician and the significance of the 
Odinga family were reinforced in 1990 with the assassination of Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko.99 Like Mboya, Ouko was well respected 
abroad and regarded as a potential challenger to the sitting president. 
Speaking in the mid-2000s, informants drew parallels between the two 
assassinations and read both as specific attacks on the Luo body politic as a 
whole. In both instances, Luo rallied around the Odingas. One informant 
reflecting on the assassinations noted, “If it was not for Jaramogi [Oginga 
Odinga], the Luos would have been finished.”100
Until his death in 1994, Oginga Odinga was a stalwart spokesman for 
the Luo community in Kenya and a key figure in the political opposition. 
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Upon his death, supporters in the Luo community still referred to Odinga 
through his former ceremonial title, Ker of the Luo Union, lamenting, “Ker 
Jaramogi is dead. now who shall lead my people?”101 Given Odinga’s almost 
fifty-year career as a political leader, it is not surprising that the Odinga 
name and family remained powerful into the 1990s. The elder Odinga son, 
Oburu, took over his father’s parliamentary seat in Bondo, nyanza Province, 
while the younger Raila, who had been detained by the Moi regime in the 
1980s, won a parliamentary seat in nairobi in the first multiparty elections 
in 1992, took over the politico-cultural reins of the Luo community after his 
father’s death, and ran for president in 1997, 2007, and 2013.102 Many of his 
Luo supporters have regarded an investment in Raila’s political success as an 
investment in the material success of Luo people overall, particularly those 
in underserved and underdeveloped Western Kenya. As one supporter 
speculated in 2007, “If only Raila can make it [as president], the problems of 
development in nyanza will be solved.”103
The investment in Raila Odinga’s political success speaks not only to 
the history of the Odinga family, but also to Luo organizations’ support 
for powerful political patrons. The Luo Council of Elders (LCE), formed 
in the 1990s and composed almost entirely of former Luo Union mem-
bers and supporters, promotes investment in Western Kenyan and cultural 
solidarity across Luo-speaking communities in East Africa. Indeed, upon 
being installed as LCE chairman in 2004, Meshack Riaga Ogallo voiced his 
desire to visit with all the Luos across East Africa (and beyond) in order 
to promote “unity and investment at home.”104 These aims were echoed by 
other LCE members interviewed between 2004 and 2009 as they wove 
together conceptions of “Luoness” in terms of opposition politics and eco-
nomic uplift while highlighting their cultural and political attachments to 
a far-ranging Luo diaspora. When talk turned to contemporary politics, 
LCE members were quick to introduce two figures whom they regarded as 
Luo Big Men—Raila Odinga and Barack Obama Jr.105 
Finding a New Hero Abroad: dala (Home) or Diaspora?
In 1988, nearly six years after the death of his father in an alcohol-fueled 
automobile accident in nairobi, Barack Obama Jr. stepped into the com-
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plicated history of his paternal family and the fractured world of Kenyan 
politics for the first time. Obama Sr.’s life in Kenya had been characterized 
by personal and professional upheavals. On the personal level, Obama Sr.’s 
relationships with romantic partners and his children and extended family 
were unstable. Professionally, he experienced setbacks and challenges that 
were in part attributable to his habits, but which also reflected the pro-
found loss of his mentor, Mboya, and the difficulties of being a Luo “in the 
wilderness.”106 
On trips from nairobi to his family’s “home” in rural Western Kenya, 
Barack Jr. would have experienced the material results of the long- 
standing conflict between Luo and the central government. The tooth- 
rattling journey along the potholed road from nairobi to Kogelo was 
quite different from the smooth tarmac paving the way from the capital 
to President Moi’s home district of Baringo. Moi’s Kalenjin areas had ex-
perienced significant infusions of resources and infrastructure develop-
ment, in part financed by funds deliberately diverted from languishing 
Western Kenya. In returning to “home [cubed]” in Siaya district, Barack 
Jr., like Luo migrants before him and like other young people of Luo 
heritage, was establishing a sense of “belonging” in Luoland. Such visits 
point to the realization of the priorities of the Luo Union and the LCE—
cultivating a shared sense of “Luoness” throughout the diaspora and 
diasporic reinvestment in Western Kenya. Overall, returning “home,” 
whether it is twenty times a year from nairobi or every two years from 
Ohio or London or dubai, has been a primary way in which contempo-
rary dholuo speakers have established emotional and symbolic stakes 
in their rural roots in Luoland and have helped to stimulate material 
investment in the region’s development.
However, as the diaspora continues to expand and the mounting de-
mands of maintaining a “house” away from Luoland trump the periodic 
visits “home,” many young Luo have begun to ask if one’s sense of “belong-
ing” as a Luo can be renewed without treading the soils of rural Western 
Kenya. For example, david Otieno, a young Luo living in cosmopolitan 
nairobi, commented ruefully, “I am one of those ‘dot-com’ Luos; the ones 
who go home once a year at best.”107 For the dot-com generation, many 
with ties to Kenya as loose as those of Obama Jr., “belonging” does not 
necessarily require a presence on the shores of Lake Victoria, but instead 
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involves channeling increasingly globalized flows of capital to Western 
Kenya and using social media to debate what it means to be Luo in much 
the same way that their forebears hashed out the shape of Luoness in the 
pages of Ramogi.108 
Even in cyberspace, popular political narratives about the Odingas 
and other prominent Luo politicians have shaped the ways Luo speakers 
at home and throughout the diaspora critique and comment upon the 
Kenyan state and Kenya’s place in the world. By the era of Obama’s ascen-
dancy, the story of the Luo community’s political rise and fall was firmly 
entrenched in political discourse in Kenya. The martyrdoms of Mboya and 
Ouko, and the political marginalization of Jaramogi and Raila Odinga, 
were mobilized in chat rooms and message boards like jalou.com and set 
the stage for Kenyans in general and Luo in particular to read political 
developments in the United States concerning a “Luo” politician through 
the lens of their own national and ethnic histories.
The experiences of the Luo community of Kenya show that ethnic 
identity is not a primordial artifact. Rather, “Luoness” emerged from de-
termined efforts by formal associations like the Luo Union and the LCE 
and everyday Luo intellectuals to cultivate a shared way of being-in-the-
world among dholuo speakers in Kenya and across East Africa more 
generally. Yet, these endeavors did not occur in a vacuum. The migratory 
experiences of the colonial era, the political demands of the transition to 
independence, and the patrimonial politics of the late 1960s forward have 
all shaped ideas about what it means to be Luo, who gets to “belong” as a 
Luo, and what Luo people see as their obligations to their fellows and to 
nyanza. This profound intellectual, cultural, and political history under-
pins the Luo embrace of Barack Obama Jr. in 2004 and again in 2008 and 
2012. As the next chapters will show, it also became fodder for Obama’s 
opponents abroad to contest the authenticity of his American “belonging” 
and to cast him as a “son of the soil” of Western Kenya.

Part II





The Politics of Condemnation
The American Right’s Reactions to Obama’s Roots in Kenya
He was sired by a Kenyan father, born to a mother attracted to men 
of the Third World and reared by grandparents in Hawaii, a paradise 
far from the American mainstream.
—Wesley Pruden, Washington Times1
With Barack Obama’s victory in the US presidential election of 2008, Af-
ricans across the continent rejoiced that one of “their own” had ascended 
to the most powerful political office in the world. In Kenya, the wananchi 
(citizens) interpreted the Obama story through their experiences with co-
lonialism and identity politics, embracing and celebrating Obama’s Afri-
can background. However, in the United States, and to a certain extent in 
Britain, from the 2008 presidential campaign through much of Obama’s 
first term his political opponents took a very different approach to Obama’s 
Kenyan heritage, using his African roots to cast him as foreign, and thus 
untrustworthy and perhaps even uncivilized. These critiques, emanating 
from the “Far Right”2 of the American political spectrum and packaged 
neatly in political “best sellers” or messily disseminated throughout the 
blogosphere, offer the only substantive engagement that many Americans 
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have had with Kenya’s past and present. Subsequently, these critiques have 
had ongoing effects on the ways the wider American public has viewed 
the Kenyan heritage of the first African American president of the United 
States and Kenya’s past and present more generally.
This chapter examines a variety of high-profile texts and media, generated 
by Obama’s political opponents from 2008 forward, which aim to condemn 
Obama as a “son of the soil” of Western Kenya.3 As many of these works ex-
hibit pretenses to academic or journalistic authority, this chapter addresses a 
question central to historical practice: How does the historian assess the trust-
worthiness of a source? It draws the reader’s attention to the importance of 
(1) identifying tropes, or familiar, stereotyped themes, in a source and among 
groups of sources; (2) discerning the agenda of the source’s author and the 
perspective of its intended audience; (3) reading a source in context, that is, 
with a critical attention to the other sources surrounding it; and (4) consid-
ering a source in historical context, or as being situated within and produced 
by a particular social, political, economic, and cultural environment. Here we 
pay close attention to how online debates and “sources” can be easily divorced 
from the historical contexts in which they were produced. With Obama’s po-
litical ascendancy occurring squarely in the digital age, professional pundits 
and amateur historians alike often turned primarily, if not exclusively, to Goo-
gle for basic questions about Kenya’s past and present, often tripping over and 
then uncritically embracing revisionist histories produced by the Right. 
Overall, the chapter shows how written sources and media have drawn 
on familiar stereotypes about “tribalism” and “terrorism,” renewed con-
cerns about “Marxism,” and introduced the “threat” posed by Islam to 
address contemporary politics and key moments in postcolonial Kenyan 
history. deconstructing how members of the American Far Right have 
(mis)interpreted Kenya’s past and present in their efforts to discredit 
Obama highlights how history can be rewritten to serve political ends, 
how the politics of “belonging” are figured in the United States, and how 
Africa is popularly imagined in the West.4 The beginning of the Ameri-
can Right’s revision of Kenyan history can be traced to Birthers, the group 
arguing that Obama’s “actual location of birth is of great concern” and as-
serting the existence of a Kenyan birth certificate. This group has wielded 
notions of “belonging” most crudely, claiming that Obama was literally 
not “born from the soil” of the United States.5 
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The billboard pictured in the figure above was part of a campaign spon-
sored by media site Wnd.com, linked to Jerome Corsi, whose anti- 
Obama oeuvre is discussed in this chapter. CBS news reported in 2009 
that Wnd.com had raised more than $75,000 for the billboards in a num-
ber of different US states.6
Often dismissed and disdained in mainstream discourse as a (crackpot) 
“theory in search of facts,” the ideology of the Birther movement has in-
fluenced public opinion and helped package Obama’s familial connection 
to East Africa as a political liability.7 Resonating with conspiracy theorists 
 Public condemnations of the Obama and Kenya  
connection in the U.S.
Figure 4.1. Gun Rally Birthers Tell 
Fascist Communist Obama to Go 
Back to Africa. (Fibonacci Blue, St. 
Cloud, Minnesota, February 23, 2013; 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/
fibonacciblue/8502463974/.)
Figure 4.2. Where’s the Birth Certificate? (Victor Victoria, South Gate, California, 
november 12, 2010; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Billboard_Challenging_the_
validity_of_Barack_Obama%27s_Birth_Certificate.JPG.)
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and fraught with racial overtones, the Birther movement found traction 
in the United States during the 2008 campaign. taking off from rumors 
spread initially by supporters of Obama’s democratic primary challenger, 
Hillary Clinton, the Birther movement resonated most intensely with tea 
Party members and fringe elements of the Republican Party. Asserting that 
Obama had been born in Kenya and that it was immaterial to his electoral 
eligibility that his mother was undisputedly an American citizen at the 
time of his birth, Birthers commenced a spurious “debate” as to whether or 
not a child born abroad to an American citizen qualified as a “natural born 
citizen.” For the purposes of presidential eligibility; the Birthers’ position 
is no, and for constitutional scholars, the position is yes.8 
Even more significantly, Birthers operationalized Obama’s connec-
tion to East Africa to cast his politics and identity as dangerously out-
side of “mainstream” American values.9 For instance, two writers quoted 
in a study of online comments made in reply to more than a hundred 
Birther-related articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal suc-
cinctly sum up Birtherist attitudes:
If Obama didn’t act like an alien, nobody would question his birth 
place. But he is so unAmerican in words and actions, people look for 
an explanation. The Birthers are just one group of questioners. . . .
It is clear that Obama does not meet the “spirit” of the require-
ment that a president be a natural born citizen. Hawaii is pretty far 
from mainland US, Kenya is farther still and Indonesia still further.10 
Such overt, racialized coding of Obama’s cosmopolitan background 
could easily lead the critical reader to dismiss such comments as mere 
“fringe” discourse. However, coverage of the Birthers in the mainstream, 
national press tacitly lent the movement legitimacy and ultimately com-
pelled Obama’s campaign to release his Hawaiian birth certificate in 2008 
and again in 2011. Even with this evidence made public and bona fide by 
the Republican governor of Hawaii, claims about Obama’s Kenyan birth 
continued to be evoked by high-profile conservative politicians and ce-
lebrities, from Mike Huckabee to donald trump, and to occupy signifi-
cant space in the blogosphere. As late as April 2011, a CBS News/New York 
Times poll found that 25 percent of Americans believed that Obama was 
The Politics of Condemnation  |  
born outside the United States, with 45 percent of Republicans asserting 
his foreign birth.11 And in a simple Google search for the phrase “Obama 
and Kenya,” the majority of search results are websites devoted to claims 
about Obama’s Kenyan birth as a means to attack his political legitimacy.12 
With Google search rankings based more on popularity than credibility, 
the Internet is rife with amateur researchers promoting dubious evidence 
based more on political than objective scrutiny.
The proliferation of online rumors and revisionist histories related 
to Obama and Kenya fits into a deeper American history of conspiracy 
theories. From the famous Salem witch hunts of the seventeenth century 
to the 9/11 “truthers” movement, conspiracy theorists often emerge in 
response to perceived threats to conservative notions of morality or in 
response to what scholars have sometimes called the “paranoid style in 
American politics.”13 In this way, Birthers belong to a strain of American 
political discourse and amateur patriotic histories that also claim Presi-
dent Kennedy’s assassination, the 1969 Apollo 11 lunar landing, and even 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks are part of some grand government cover-up.14 In 
the digital world of Obama’s political ascendancy, online message boards, 
blogs, and fringe media outlets provided new platforms for dissemination 
and allowed amateur researchers and “conspiracy buffs” to hunt for “facts” 
to support sometimes outlandish ideas. 
World Net Daily (WND), an epicenter of online Birther debates, often 
appropriates Kenyan discourse for political gain and dismisses the so-
cial and political context in which it was produced. For example, WND 
is among several web-based media outlets that, in an effort to advance 
their Birtherist assertions, have seized upon a 2004 Associated Press story 
that noted an article by the Kenyan daily the Standard had been errone-
ously titled “Kenyan-Born Obama All Set for US Senate.”15 transforming 
typos and moments of misspeak into convenient “facts,” pundits in search 
of “evidence” of Obama’s Kenyan birth have even combed Kenyan parlia-
mentary debates, recently made available via books.google.com. For in-
stance, reports in 2010 cited an offhand remark recorded in the transcript 
of a parliamentary debate about ethnicity, exclusion, and the devolution 
of political power in Kenya. debating the implications of instituting a fed-
eralized system of government similar to the US model, then minister for 
lands James Orengo suggested, “If America was living in a situation where 
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they feared ethnicity . . . how could a young man born here in Kenya, who 
is not even a native American, become president of America?”16 taken 
in context, it is clear that in drawing a comparison between the freedom 
and fluidity of the American system and the political stagnation of Kenya, 
Orengo is arguing that the Kenyan governance is so hobbled by ethnic 
politics that a member of the “wrong” ethnicity, let alone a true outsider, 
could never become president. Reading deliberately out of context across 
the Atlantic, Obama’s American opponents asserted that the member of 
Parliament’s comment had confirmed Obama’s Kenyan citizenship. Such 
assertions speak to the dangers of “research” in the digital age, where dis-
course is easily removed from the historical context in which it was pro-
duced and subsequently manipulated for political gain. 
Beyond the overt claims questioning Obama’s citizenship, members 
of the Far Right have drawn on more subtle emotional and philosophical 
aspects of “belonging” to contest Obama’s legitimacy. Even if Obama is 
a “son of the soil” in the literal sense, so the argument goes, his identity 
and loyalties are too closely wrapped up in the Kenyan context, that is, 
with the culture, history, and politics of Kenya, for him to be authentically 
American.17 Accordingly, the Far Right has employed a selective reading 
of the last six decades of Kenya’s history in order to stake claims about 
Obama’s “belonging,” focusing on critical topics such as Mau Mau and the 
administration of Kenya’s postindependence governments.18 In this chap-
ter, guided by our core question—How does a historian assess the trust-
worthiness of a source?—we apply critical attention to tropes, to authorial 
agenda and audience perspective, to context and to historical context in 
the two most commercially successful monographs to treat the Obama-
Kenya connection from a Far Right perspective, and in the narratives of a 
minor event that the Far Right presented widely as irrefutable evidence of 
Obama’s inherited, historical loyalties to Kenya. In doing so, we compare 
and contrast Far Right claims about Kenya’s history with the established 
historical record and historiography.
Jerome Corsi’s 2008 book, The Obama Nation, offers a prime example 
of the potent brew of emotional appeal and revisionist history produced 
by the Far Right.19 Put forward as a combination of political rhetoric and 
African history, The Obama Nation reached #1 on the New York Times 
best-seller list in August 2008 and remained near the top throughout the 
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campaign season.20 Aimed at a US audience possessing limited familiar-
ity with Kenya’s complex history, Corsi’s use of language and evidence, 
together with “Jerome R. Corsi, Ph.d.” boldly emblazoned on the book’s 
cover, serve to credential The Obama Nation as a scholarly work of “objec-
tive” truth. Such “knowledge” about Kenya’s histories (among others) not 
only sells books, but also does political work, as evidenced by Corsi’s 2004 
political “biography” of presidential candidate John Kerry. 
In Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out against John 
Kerry, Corsi attacks John Kerry’s service in Vietnam to create a “rhetori-
cally powerful indictment” of the presumptive democratic challenger to 
George W. Bush.21 Engaging in revisionist and decontextualized readings 
of Kerry’s own words and statements about his military service, Swift Boat 
Veterans casts aspersions on Kerry’s ability to be “commander and chief,” 
even though his military service record far excelled that of his opponent. 
Part of a tradition of using biographies to both support and condemn aspi-
rants for national office in the United States, Kenyan history is thus seam-
lessly adopted into an American genre of popular political biography and 
memoir.22 
In The Obama Nation, Kenya looms large in Corsi’s political takedown 
of the then democratic nominee. In chapter 1, Corsi spends consider-
able time explaining Obama’s Kenyan roots by exposing the “tall tales” of 
Obama’s memoir Dreams from My Father. In doing so, Corsi repackages 
the biography of Obama Sr. by not simply describing him as a goat herder 
from rural Kenya but through inflammatory subtitles such as “Obama’s 
Father, an Alcoholic Polygamist.”23 He then returns to Kenya in chapter 
4, the title of which is replete with political buzzwords: “Kenya, Odinga, 
Communism, and Islam.” In retelling Kenya’s history, The Obama Nation 
draws on tropes about Africa common in American popular imagination: 
primordial tribalism, irrational violence, and postcolonial dystopia.24 It 
also discusses Kenya’s history within America’s own contemporary idioms 
of crisis: Islam and terrorism. 
In Corsi’s analysis, the historical context and contemporary environ-
ment to which Obama truly belongs is soaked in tribalism. Corsi notes, 
“tribal battles . . . have dominated Kenya’s politics for centuries,” and fo-
cuses on a primordial “tribalist” drama between the Kikuyu and the Luo.25 
Such an assertion, as we have shown in previous chapters, is not supported 
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by the established, historical evidence. Yet, however inaccurate, Corsi’s ar-
gument that “tribal battles” were a defining feature of Kenyan politics over 
hundreds of years helps him make important claims about Obama’s “be-
longing” and Africa’s place in the “modern” world. First, in linking Obama 
to a political environment that evokes violent primordial affinities, Corsi 
further distances Obama from an authentically American identity based 
on political rationality. This argument also helps to establish Obama as 
part of a politicized Luo ethnicity where “tribal” affiliation acts as the 
default explanation of political action and sets the stage to read political 
violence in Kenya as rooted in centuries-old “tribal” rivalries rather than 
in vote rigging or corruption driven by the deep dysfunction of Kenya’s 
loosely veiled authoritarian politics and tremendous economic stratifica-
tion, issues that we’ll discuss in detail in chapter 6.
Corsi’s main goal in analyzing contemporary politics is to bind Obama 
to Raila Odinga. In describing the relationship between the two men, 
Corsi repeatedly calls Raila “a fellow Luo tribesman” and asserts that at 
the time of Obama’s 2006 official visit to Kenya, Raila “was running for 
president of Kenya as a Muslim sympathizer.”26 Corsi’s characterization 
of Raila, well known to be a lifelong practicing Anglican, as a “Muslim 
sympathizer” occurs at the level of the personal and the political. The sin-
cerity of the Obama family’s Christian identity is frequently challenged by 
critics on the Far Right; Corsi casts doubt on the authenticity of Odinga’s 
Christian identity as well. For example, writing on Raila’s father, Oginga 
Odinga, (whom he erroneously refers to as Odinga Odinga), Corsi asserts, 
“It should be noted that Odinga Odinga was a Christian who saw that his 
son, Raila Odinga, was also baptized a Christian.” transforming his mis-
spelling of the name of Kenya’s first vice president into a historical argu-
ment, he asserts, “Odinga Odinga went by the double name to emphasize 
how completely he rejected his Christian name. Odinga Odinga also re-
fused to allow his children to be baptized with European Christian names. 
Raila Odinga today professes to be an Anglican.”27 
Rhetorically, Corsi raises the subject of the Odingas’ Christian faith 
in order to tacitly dismiss it. This analysis disregards the historical con-
text of the Pan-Africanist movement with its assertive pride in African 
cultures and histories, from which nationalist leaders like Oginga Odinga 
and Jomo Kenyatta sprang. It depicts Oginga Odinga as somehow excep-
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tional in using his Luo name and choosing Luo names for his children. 
It neglects to note, for example, that when launching his political career, 
Kenyatta refrained from using his baptismal name, Johnstone, in favor of 
Jomo (Kikuyu for “burning spear”), and later named his son and political 
heir Uhuru, the Swahili word for freedom/independence.28
On the political level, Corsi’s characterization of Raila as a “Muslim 
sympathizer” is based on a false version of the memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) between Raila’s Orange democratic Movement (OdM) 
and the national Muslim Leaders Forum (nAMLEF) before the 2007 
Kenya elections. Corsi cites an online version of this memorandum posted 
on the website of the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya. In doing so, he largely 
dismisses the document’s historical and sociopolitical environment that 
shaped its production. While noting that “there is concern in Kenya that 
the document posted on the Internet by the Evangelical Alliance might 
not be the authentic MOU,” Corsi nonetheless proceeds to engage in a de-
tailed explanation of the posted memo.29 In the same vein as his Birtherist 
colleagues at WND who consistently suggest that Obama is not merely 
foreign but also Muslim, he notes, for example, its claim that as president 
Raila would revise the constitution to make sharia, Islamic law, the law of 
the land in Kenya’s Muslim majority regions.30 Corsi does not acknowledge 
that nAMLEF responded to the posted memorandum. The organization’s 
deputy chairman commented drily (and evidenced a clear understanding 
of historical context) in the widely read Kenya daily newspaper the Stan-
dard, “We are not such fools to draft such an MoU demanding the intro-
duction of Sharia law and other unthinkable demands.”31
Corsi’s treatment of the MOU episode, framed by his goal of tying 
both Raila and Obama to radical Islam, overlooks two central elements of 
historical context. First, Islamic law has existed constitutionally in Kenya 
since colonial times, with kadhi courts having jurisdiction over a limited 
number of civil matters and applying only to Muslims who volunteer to 
have their cases heard by these courts.32 Second, Mwai Kibaki, elected 
president in 2002 and 2007, whom Corsi casts as a stalwart Christian in 
stark opposition to Raila’s suspicious religious status, actively sought Mus-
lim support; Muslims constitute a significant minority, especially along 
the Kenyan coast.33 Ultimately, Corsi acknowledges that a “much less in-
flammatory” version of the memorandum, “different in form and content 
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from the document posted by the Evangelical Alliance,” had been shown 
up close on Kenyan television and discussed point by point by the chair-
man of nAMLEF, whose signature, together with Raila’s, appeared on this 
second, moderate memorandum.34 
Corsi opens his chapter on Kenya with a discussion of the meanings 
behind an AP photo of Obama donning Somali dress in northern Kenya 
during his 2006 official visit to Africa. In the photo, the senator from Illi-
nois wears a white turban and a futa, or cloth wrap, as he is anointed as a 
Somali elder during his visit to Wajir. This ceremony is a common means 
through which visiting dignitaries are honored and welcomed by the com-
munity, and is recognized as such in both Kenyan and diplomatic circles. 
Indeed, commenting on the photo, the US ambassador to Kenya noted, 
“Wherever I travel I get dressed up in same way, out of consideration for 
the hosts.”35
Though the photo was shot in August 2006, it went viral during the 
early months of 2008 (it was rumored to have been supplied to the Drudge 
Report by one of Hillary Clinton’s staffers) and was widely reprinted during 
the primary season.36 Recognizing that the photo would be interpreted by 
Obama’s opponents through the lens of post-9/11 fears about radical Islam 
and terrorism in order to appeal to a base deeply concerned about “Mus-
lim terrorists,” Obama’s campaign manager described the photo’s dissem-
ination as “the most shameful, offensive fear-mongering we’ve seen from 
either party in this election.”37
Writing in WND in the same vein as many other right-wing pundits, 
Corsi took up the photo in a piece titled “‘Muslim’ Photo Raises Obama 
Connection,” reading Obama’s donning of Somali garb and his recognition 
as an “elder” not as an expression of diplomatically suitable cultural sensi-
tivity on the senator’s part or as a standard gesture of respectful welcome by 
the Wajir community, but rather as evidence of candidate Obama’s Muslim 
sympathies and affinities.38 Interestingly, in none of his writing does Corsi 
note, for instance, that President Kibaki sported a kofia (cap) and a kanzu 
(robe)—traditional clothing worn by Muslims on the Swahili Coast—when 
attending celebrations in Mombasa to mark the end of Ramadan in 2007.39 
Overall, strategically stripped from its historical and cultural context, the 
Wajir photo operated as a powerful vehicle for politicized innuendo about 
Obama’s alleged “Muslim” sensibilities and affiliations.
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The historical inaccuracies, deliberate misreadings of evidence, and 
purposeful omissions of central context in Corsi’s writings could easily 
lead scholars of Kenyan history and politics to dismiss his brand of po-
litical commentary as the mere ravings of a disaffected right-winger. 
However, The Obama Nation and similar texts, such as dinesh d’Souza’s 
discussed below, are best sellers, and websites such as wnd.com have a 
vast readership. As such, they have political valence and do political work. 
In many instances, these sources are the only space in which millions of 
Americans encounter narratives of Kenya’s past and present, some even 
focusing the country’s history in the decade before Barack Obama Jr. was 
born. The next section turns to how Far Right misreadings of Kenyan co-
lonial history aim to link Obama to an earlier group of “terrorists”—Mau 
Mau rebels. 
Mau Maus of the (American Far Right) Mind
A great part of America now understands that this president’s sense 
of identification lies elsewhere, and is in profound ways unlike theirs. 
—dorothy Rabinowitz, Wall Street Journal40
A further array of Far Right blogs, broadcasts, and books have worked to 
insert Obama into the narrative of Kenyan history in places and at depths 
where he does not belong. Most significantly, Far Right discourses have 
interpreted the character of the Obama administration’s relationship with 
Britain and the administration’s economic approaches as functions of 
Obama’s historical relation to the Mau Mau rebellion.41 More generally, 
Far Right readings of Mau Mau and the Obama family’s relation to it hint 
that the president maintains an affinity for “terrorists.” 
Mau Mau persists as a central concern in the history and historiog-
raphy of Kenya and in the nation’s popular imagination and political dis-
course. As noted historian of Kenya John Lonsdale has argued, different 
images of Mau Mau have developed among groups with varying proxim-
ities and attachments to it. He writes of Mau Mau, “It has lived in British 
imagination as a symbol of African savagery, and modern Kenyans are 
divided by its images, militant nationalism or tribal thuggery.”42 to the 
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mind-sets identified by Lonsdale, we can add the Mau Maus of the Amer-
ican Far Right, which read Obama as the symbolic and literal inheritor of 
an anticolonial, anti-British, and even antiwhite and anticapitalist legacy 
rooted in the bitterness of Mau Mau. 
While Obama’s autobiography, Dreams from My Father, states that his 
paternal grandfather, Hussein Onyango Obama, had been interned by 
the British during Mau Mau, the earliest press reports to link the Obama 
family to Mau Mau emanated from the Right-leaning media in Britain and 
were quickly co-opted by their counterparts in the United States.43 In late 
2008, the Daily Mail published a lengthy exposé detailing how Onyango 
Obama had been interned and tortured by the British for his alleged par-
ticipation in Mau Mau.44 While we have shown that this assertion does not 
rest easily with the substantiated history of Luo participation in Mau Mau, 
subsequently, bloggers and broadcasters alike have seized upon this point 
to reinforce Barack Obama’s purported loyalties as a son of the Kenyan soil 
and to interpret the administration’s engagement with Britain. 
The Mau Maus of the Right offer messily overlapping views of the 
rebellion. They suggest that British atrocities against known and sus-
pected Mau Mau adherents were so extreme as to stimulate among black 
Kenyans—at home and in the diaspora—a literally inheritable hatred 
of Britain capable of crossing both international borders and genera-
tional boundaries. At the same moment, Far Right readings of Mau Mau 
highlight the racialized brutality of Mau Mau “terrorists.” Such readings 
wield a trope potent in the context of post-9/11 American politics to tac-
itly deny any legitimacy to the Mau Mau cause. They willfully combine 
“anticolonial” with “antiwhite” and “anticapitalist” through language 
suggesting that a rejection of colonial rule like Mau Mau is equivalent to 
rejecting “the West” and its capitalist values. Both suggest that Obama 
inherited the malignant genes of Mau Mau through his father’s family, 
in turn mutating his relationship to Britain and to the capitalist “values” 
of the (white) West.
Mau Mau was first introduced into the American Far Right’s discur-
sive toolbox in the course of a kerfuffle initiated by the Right-leaning 
press and members of the diplomatic community in Britain over the 
Obama administration’s return of a bust of Winston Churchill, which 
had been loaned to George W. Bush by tony Blair, and its replacement 
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with a bust of Abraham Lincoln. In early 2009, the Daily Telegraph pub-
lished a story placing the return of the Churchill bronze within the con-
text of Obama’s connections to Mau Mau, asserting that “Churchill has 
less happy connotations for Mr. Obama than those American politicians 
who celebrate his wartime leadership. It was during Churchill’s second 
premiership that Britain suppressed Kenya’s Mau Mau rebellion. Among 
Kenyans allegedly tortured by the colonial regime included one Hussein 
Onyango Obama, the President’s grandfather.”45 The article further noted 
that British diplomats were “nervously reading the runes” in an effort to 
determine whether the “special relationship” between the United States 
and Britain would be damaged by Obama’s supposed special relationship 
with Mau Mau. Ultimately, the article acknowledged the British embas-
sy’s official statement that the bust had been “uniquely loaned” to George 
W. Bush and that as president, Obama had “decided not to continue the 
loan.” The bust was to instead be displayed at the British ambassador’s 
residence in Washington, dC.46 
The controversy, however, was not completely extinguished. In spring 
2010, a House of Commons select committee called for a “reassessment” 
of Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States in light of Obama’s 
Kenyan roots, which, according to comments that former ambassador to 
the United States Sir david Manning made before the committee, ren-
dered the president “less sentimental” about long-standing ties between 
Britain and the US. Manning, who had served as ambassador for four 
years, spanning both of George W. Bush’s terms in office, added, “We now 
have a democrat who is not familiar with us.”47
As early as the spring of 2009, members of the American Far Right 
quickly seized upon the spiraling diplomatic row over the bust’s return 
and its replacement with a bronze of Lincoln, asserting that the two 
actions were mutually reinforcing and demonstrated both Obama’s fa-
voring of his black, African identity and his detestation of the former 
colonial masters of Kenya. They willfully misread the content and char-
acter of the Mau Mau rebellion, often echoing British propaganda of the 
1950s that established the “myth of Mau Mau” discussed in chapter 2.48 
to refresh, British propaganda, taken up as fact by major media outlets 
in the United States, deliberately ignored the historical context of the re-
bellion—long-standing political and economic grievances of the Kikuyu 
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throughout the colonial era. Instead, it cast Mau Mau as a form of con-
tagious, collective madness; a return to pagan primitiveness expressed 
through brutality and brought about by the inability of the Kikuyu to 
cope psychologically, emotionally, and intellectually with “modernity.” 
For example, a 1952 article in the New York Times contended that Mau 
Mau violence resulted from “the frustrations of a savage people neither 
mentally nor economically able to adjust itself to the swift pace of civil-
isation.”49 This story was part of a larger series that the New York Times 
and other US-based news sources ran throughout the mid-1950s, which 
read Mau Mau through the lens of terrorism.50 
In recent US political discourse, members of the Far Right in the 
United States have eagerly grabbed the “myth of Mau Mau” and used its 
themes in a variety of ways. Most egregiously, a Newsmax article treat-
ing the Churchill bust’s return asserted, “Perhaps Obama, the son of a 
Kenyan, took umbrage at Prime Minister Churchill’s actions in 1953 of 
wiping out the Mau-Mau, the Kenyan terrorists who made a specialty 
of slitting throats of sleeping white and Black Kenyans.”51 In addition 
to clearly echoing the theme of “terrorism,” this reading inaccurately 
compresses the historical time line of Mau Mau. In 1953, the rebellion 
was far from being “wiped out,” but rather its perceived threat was such 
that the colonial state launched a wide-scale, anti–Mau Mau crackdown 
dubbed “Operation Anvil” across nairobi in the spring of 1954. The State 
of Emergency was not lifted until 1959, during the tenure of Harold Mac-
millan, British prime minister for the bulk of the Mau Mau era.52 And, 
importantly, as Mau Mau narratives of the Obama presidency continued 
to be reproduced in 2011, david Anderson, renowned historian of Kenya, 
spelled out,
to portray the Obama family as being part of Mau Mau is stir-fry 
crazy. Let me explain why: The Obama family come from western 
Kenya, which is about as different from nairobi and the Kikuyu area 
as Utah is from new York City. And it’s almost as far away. They 
come from an area where there was no rebellion, there was no Mau 
Mau. So while his father and his grandmother may well have been 
nationalists—I’m sure they were—they weren’t directly involved in 
the Mau Mau rebellion.53
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Overall, in order to do the political work of demonstrating that the malig-
nant, anti-British gene of Mau Mau has found expression in Barack Obama 
Jr., sources like those discussed here rely equally on their audiences’ igno-
rance of Kenyan political history and their facility with the theme of ter-
rorism, which is an intensely popular trope in American political speech 
in the post-9/11 era. 
Dreaming of Marx and Morel—in Luo
Barack Obama, Sr., became an important figure in the Kenyan in-
dependence movement, but his greatest influence was not in Kenya. 
Rather, through incredible osmosis he was able to transmit his leg-
acy to his son living in America. 
 —dinesh d’Souza, The Roots of Obama’s Rage54
The Far Right’s imperative to merge indictments of Obama’s politics, par-
entage, and patrimony was inaugurated during the first year of Obama’s 
presidency by popular media personalities Glenn Beck and Rush Lim-
baugh, who planted seeds in the minds of their millions of tea Party–
supporting listeners that indictments centered on Obama’s imagined 
engagements with British colonialism—and anticolonial movements—
mattered to the present-day politics of the United States.55 dinesh d’Souza 
built most extensively on this foundation, first in a Forbes article lavishly 
praised by newt Gingrich as offering a “stunning insight” into President 
Obama’s “Kenyan anti-colonial behavior” and for its value as “the most 
accurate, predictive model for his behavior.”56 With the publication of this 
article and with the backing of former Speaker of the House newt Gin-
grich, who ironically has a Phd in African history (his armchair disser-
tation lauds the benefits of Belgian colonial rule in the Congo), d’Souza, 
then president of the King’s College in new York, found credibility and 
fame as a political pundit in 2010.57
Given d’Souza’s propensity for politically inflected cherry-picking, it 
is tempting for scholars to dismiss him as a propagandist. However, like 
that of Corsi, his work has had tremendous popular success—The Roots of 
Obama’s Rage spent nearly two months on the New York Times best-seller 
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list, and the film 2016: Obama’s America grossed over $33 million at the box 
office.58 Here again in d’Souza’s work, a vast swath of the American public 
encounters erroneous depictions of Kenya’s past and present, which likely 
form the entirety of their knowledge of the country. As such, d’Souza’s 
work demands deconstruction.
In his book The Roots of Obama’s Rage, d’Souza further develops his 
thesis that Barack Obama Jr. “took to heart” his father’s “anti-colonial ide-
ology,” and that as a result, “the U.S. is being ruled according to the dreams 
of a Luo tribesman of the 1950s.”59 His 2012 film, 2016: Obama’s America, 
expands his revisionist approach by plunking ideologies from 1950s Kenya 
down on the Obama administration’s policy platform. As the trailer for 
this popular conservative documentary notes, “Obama has a dream. A 
dream from his father, that the sins of colonialism be set right.”60 Both in 
print and on film, d’Souza aims to train a revealing lens on the “antico-
lonial” worldview of Barack Obama Sr. and treats his 1965 journal article, 
“Problems Facing Our Socialism,”61 as a strident example of this mentality. 
Yet, a critical examination of d’Souza’s analyses illustrates that his read-
ings of anticolonialism, of Kenya’s political and economic history, and of 
the journal article falter dangerously on both theoretical and historical 
grounds. These misapprehensions are in turn supported by an underlying 
neocolonial narrative. 
Though it constitutes the bedrock of his arguments about Obama’s 
worldview, d’Souza misunderstands and misplaces anticolonialism. 
He writes, “Anticolonialsim was the rallying cry of Third World politics 
for much of the second half of the 20th century. Anticolonialism is the 
doctrine that rich countries of the West got rich by invading, occupying 
and looting poor countries of Asia, Africa and South America.”62 In re-
ality, anticolonialism refers not to a “doctrine” predominant in the “sec-
ond half of the 20th century,” but to globalized, sociopolitical movements, 
which peaked in the 1950s and 1960s and took in colonized people’s so-
cial, economic, and political struggles against the ravages of colonial rule 
like those noted by d’Souza.63 Indeed, at the 1945 Pan-African Congress 
in Manchester, together with twenty-four other delegates from Africa, 
Kwame nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, whom d’Souza derides as 
the avatar of socialism in Africa, and Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of 
Kenya, whom d’Souza cheers as the vanguard of the free market on the 
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continent, rubbed shoulders in support of the common causes of freeing 
African colonies from colonial oppression and of improving basic condi-
tions on the continent and among people of African descent worldwide.64
Economic restructuring was a key issue that postcolonial African gov-
ernments struggled with throughout the 1960s. Upon independence in 
1963, Kenya found itself wrestling with economic policies, practices, and 
structures that, as we learned in chapters 2 and 3, had been imposed by 
the colonial government in order to develop an extractive, export-driven 
economy that concentrated land and wealth in the hands of white settlers 
while commerce was controlled largely by the small Asian community. 
William Ochieng’ neatly summarizes the economic situation in early post-
colonial Kenya, writing how the nation displayed characteristics typical 
of an underdeveloped economy at the periphery: the preponderance of 
foreign capital, the dominance of agriculture, the limited development of 
industry and the imports of capital and manufactured consumer goods. 
This underdeveloped state of the economy meant that independent Kenya 
would have to formulate policies that would not only arrest Kenya’s mount-
ing urban and rural poverty and decay, but would also put the economy 
into the hands of indigenous people.65 
Given this situation, a primary question confronting President Jomo 
Kenyatta’s government was how to indigenize the economy. In order to 
spell out its aims and strategies for the economy, in 1965 the government 
produced Sessional Paper no. 10, titled “African Socialism and Its Ap-
plication to Planning.” tom Mboya, minister of Planning and Economic 
development, wrote the paper with the input of Mwai Kibaki, then an 
assistant minister. Kenyatta contributed the preface to this paper, whereas, 
Ochieng’ notes, the new president underscored how “the economic ap-
proach of the government would be ‘dominated’ by the desire to ensure the 
Africanization of the economy and public service.”66 
This paper was produced, as david William Cohen describes, within 
a particular historical context of “roiling debates in Kenya during the first 
half of 1965, especially from mid-April to early June, regarding the path 
that the Kenya government should pursue in regard to economic devel-
opment and the path that it should pursue amidst east-west tensions and 
alignment pressures affecting newly independent African governments.”67 
It was subject to various critiques, including the article “Problems Facing 
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Our Socialism,” by Barack Obama Sr., which ran in the July 1965 issue of 
the influential East Africa Journal.68 Obama Sr.’s stated goal regarding Ses-
sional Paper no. 10 was to “follow step by step what has been included in 
the paper and analyze each point sequentially.”69
to the limited extent that d’Souza engages these two complementary 
texts contextually and reads them within the complex historical environ-
ment that produced them, his analyses waver on a variety of grounds and 
lead to significant historical inaccuracies. d’Souza presents Obama’s ar-
ticle as a freestanding document, not as a response to Sessional Paper no. 
10, thereby tacitly suggesting that African socialism is Obama Sr.’s personal 
invention.70 For example, he takes one of Obama Sr.’s statements, “We need 
to eliminate power structures that have been built through excessive accu-
mulation so that not only a few individuals shall control a vast magnitude 
of the resources as is the case now,” as evidence of a radical “anticolonial” 
mentality. In fact, this statement both describes the socioeconomic situa-
tion of early 1960s Kenya and reflects the Kenyatta government’s priority, 
stated in Sessional Paper no. 10, of economic indigenization in order to 
rectify the colonial situation in which the “people of Kenya had no voice 
in government; the nation’s resources were organized and developed pri-
marily for the benefit of non-Africans.”71 
Further, by omitting these various levels of documentary and histori-
cal context, d’Souza is able to present Obama Sr.’s responsive critiques 
as independent policy prescriptions. For example, d’Souza writes, “The 
senior Obama proposed that the state confiscate private land.”72 The es-
tablished historical record, however, clearly shows that African land ten-
ure had been of particular concern throughout the late colonial period in 
Kenya, and through a series of laws and the Swynnerton Plan, the colonial 
government aimed to consolidate and institutionalize individual African 
landholding and reward those loyal to the colonial state.73 decolonization, 
particularly the deracialization of the White Highlands and the lifting of 
restrictions on the crops that African farmers could produce, rendered 
land tenure an even more urgent issue in the 1960s. 
Unsurprisingly, Sessional Paper no. 10 offers proposals for dealing 
with land distribution and ownership. Rather than prescribing blanket 
confiscation of private land as d’Souza suggests, Obama’s article responds 
to Sessional Paper no.10, asking if the government could achieve consol-
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idation more rapidly through “clan co-operatives” rather than through 
individual holdings. He added, “If the government should, however, feel 
that individual ownership is the best policy to take in order to bring devel-
opment, then it should restrict the size of the farms that can be owned by 
one individual throughout the country and this should apply to everybody 
from the President to the ordinary man.”74 In light of the extent to which 
land ultimately became consolidated in holdings belonging to members of 
the Kenyatta regime and their families and friends, Obama Sr.’s suggestion 
today reads as prescient.75 
d’Souza also writes that the senior Obama “proposed” that the gov-
ernment “raise taxes with no upper limit” and that he had “insisted that 
‘theoretically there is nothing that can stop the government from taxing 
100% of income so long as the people get benefits from the government 
commensurate with their income which is taxed.’ ”76 Rather than offering 
a prescription, Obama Sr. was writing both within the historical context 
of Kenya’s deep economic inequality and in the documentary context of 
Sessional Paper no. 10, a text that highlights “progressive taxation to nar-
row the gap between rich and poor” as a key tenet of African socialism, 
but also favors individual savings as a means to accumulate domestic capi-
tal.77 noting that the vast majority of Kenyans had “such a low per capita 
income that it is almost impossible for them to save,” Obama Sr. highlights 
taxation as a means of domestic capital accumulation, and in turn as a 
means to cut reliance on foreign aid.78 In writing that “theoretically there 
is nothing that can stop the government from taxing 100% of income,” 
Obama Sr. plays devil’s advocate to the sessional paper’s tentativeness 
about taxation, highlighting the need for accountability and for local tax 
benefits, both of which were absent in the colonial era.79 
Finally, in ripping Obama Sr.’s article away from its socioeconomic, 
political, and historical and documentary contexts, d’Souza fails to ac-
knowledge how the article, and indeed also the sessional paper to which 
it replied, were part of broad, continent-wide debates about African so-
cialism.80 These debates were particularly relevant in Kenya as Oginga 
Odinga, the country’s vice president, had avowed socialist leanings. For 
example, at a moment when the White Highlands were being expropriated 
to the black Kenyan elite, Odinga mused the value of precolonial Luo land 
tenure systems based on communalism.81 Further, the economy of Kenya’s 
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close neighbor tanzania was being reoriented to a model of African so-
cialism called ujamaa (familyhood/community) that was developed by 
Julius nyerere, tanzania’s first president.82
In The Roots of Obama’s Rage, d’Souza again turns to Obama Sr.’s ar-
ticle, revisiting the topics and themes addressed above, this time reading 
them through a tribalist lens. Acknowledging in the book that Obama Sr.’s 
article was “examining the premises of Mboya’s paper,” d’Souza depicts 
Sessional Paper no. 10 as Mboya’s personal production rather than as an 
official statement by Kenyatta’s administration. d’Souza locates the pro-
duction of the sessional paper and Obama Sr.’s article within a “tribalist” 
history in which Luo socialism is placed next to “the free-market capital-
ism” of the Kikuyu, and Mboya’s benign “African” socialism is offered as 
the lesser of the two Luo evils, a counterpoint to Oginga Odinga’s “Soviet- 
style socialism.” 
The bluntness with which d’Souza handles African socialism and the 
ahistorical way he treats anticolonialism come together in his musings on co-
lonialism. He writes, “Colonialism today is a dead issue. no one cares about 
it except the man in the White House.”83 However, it is clear that d’Souza 
himself cares very much about colonialism, as his book offers a loosely veiled 
apologia for it. The development of a story in which “anticolonialism” is the 
driving force behind the “dreams” and actions of Obama is supported by 
an underlying narrative suggesting that colonialism is the natural, normal 
order of things and, ergo, that anticolonialism is the pathological condition. 
He writes, “Empire is nothing new in world history.”84 Borrowing (without 
crediting) the title of early twentieth-century activist Edmund Morel’s ex-
posé of the atrocities in King Leopold’s Belgian Congo, d’Souza titles one of 
his chapters “The Black Man’s Burden.”85 Yet, his analysis of empire is more 
in the tradition of Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem “The White Man’s Bur-
den,” complete with heroic, outnumbered British soldiers protecting (white) 
settlers from “new caught sullen peoples, half devil, half child.”86 
This attitude emerges especially strongly in d’Souza’s analysis of a 
key moment of Kenyan history—Mau Mau. Offering his own riff on the 
return of the Churchill bust, d’Souza does not gloss over the atrocities 
of Mau Mau. Rather, he offers a justification for British brutality, noting 
that the reason for the scope and scale of British violence is “obvious.” He 
writes, “By the end of the nineteenth century, the small island of England 
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controlled a worldwide empire. It had to maintain this empire through a 
very small distribution of soldiers and settlers living abroad, in every case 
outnumbered by the natives.”87 Continuing to normalize colonial violence, 
d’Souza adds that the British response to Mau Mau was not unusual “be-
cause colonial powers have used their powers to crush such revolts,” and 
offers as an example the 1857 Sepoy rebellion in his native India, during 
which the British put down a revolt by their crack Indian troops.88 The 
British colonial state’s use of internment camps during the Anglo-Boer 
War in early twentieth-century South Africa and during the anticolonial 
insurgency in Malaya that preceded Mau Mau by a few years provides 
much more apt historical parallels.
Finally, d’Souza dismisses the rebellion from Kenyan popular con-
sciousness, noting that “though Kenya became independent in 1963, few 
people remember the Mau Mau rebellion today.”89 This statement is not 
only historically inaccurate but deeply ironic, given that in building a his-
tory of Mau Mau he relies heavily on recent books by david Anderson and 
Caroline Elkins, works whose interview data demonstrate that many Ken-
yans remember Mau Mau all too well and that the Mau Mau reparations 
case we addressed in chapter 2 was already under way at the time d’Souza 
was writing. 
This interpretation reinforces the pathological nature of Obama’s pro-
posed second-generation obsession with Mau Mau and the supposed “an-
ticolonial” mind-set that this fixation has allegedly stimulated. It locates 
the historical significance of Kenya’s experience with colonialism not in 
the ravages of colonial rule or in the achievement of independence, but in 
the benefits brought by colonial rule. d’Souza explains, “Even using the 
colonial model, one could say that former colonies that have democratic 
governments have them because of the example impressed on them by 
the former colonial powers; there is no other reason why Kenya should 
have a parliamentary system of government and judges who wear white 
wigs.”90 In d’Souza’s estimation, rather than lending support to Obama’s 
contention that “when we seek to impose democracy with the barrel of 
a gun” we are “setting ourselves up for failure,” the Kenyan experience of 
colonialism—Mau Mau and all—contradicts it.91 
For their part, Kenyans at home and in the diaspora have evidenced 
little patience either with Far Right narratives of their history or with the 
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politics of such revisionist interpretations of Kenya’s past. In fact, when 
Corsi descended upon nairobi in October 2008 to launch the Obama Na-
tion book tour, he was quickly arrested and subsequently deported for at-
tempting to publicize his book without a work permit.92 Articulating the 
sentiment underpinning the wananchi’s broad support for the deportation, 
one Kenyan commentator explained, “If you must insult black people, do 
not try to do it in the black people’s own homestead.”93 More lightly, but still 
pointedly, shortly after a spring 2010 tea Party rally at the Capitol during 
which protesters challenging Obama’s American “belonging” carried signs 
emblazoned with slogans like “Somewhere in Kenya a Village is Missing 
its Idiot!” and “Go Back to Kenya!” the Embassy of Kenya threw its own 
“tea Party,” hosted by then deputy prime minister Uhuru Kenyatta, with 
the dual purposes of promoting the country’s status as the world’s largest 
tea exporter and of giving Washingtonians an opportunity to “experience 
a proper Kenyan tea party on Capitol Hill.”94 
In sum, books like The Obama Nation and The Roots of Obama’s Rage, 
and media like those examined here, offer not simply examples of the Amer-
ican Far Right’s approaches to Obama and Kenya in particular and Africa 
more generally, but also of how history can be manipulated for political 
ends when the sources used to write it are severed from context and when 
it is framed according to “hot-button” tropes that resonate with an audience 
largely ignorant of the historical topics and trajectories under consideration. 
despite the inaccuracy and extremism of their claims—they actually fall in 
the middle of a conservative spectrum that has conspiracy theory sites like 
wnd.com and InfoWars.com at the farthest right end. However, as noted 
above, Corsi’s and d’Souza’s productions and similar media have evidenced 
too much commercial success to be dismissed out of hand as the mistaken 
rantings of ultimately marginal figures. In dialogue with one another, these 
books and films help to shape an Internet echo chamber in which rumors 
and misreadings take on the appearance of “fact.” For example, WND’s re-
view of d’Souza’s film ran under the headline “does Obama Really Hate 
America?” and suggested that “if d’Souza is right that Obama has concealed 
a raging anti-colonialist worldview in a false cloak of Ivy-league liberalism, 
then many of the Internet’s wildest rumors could prove legitimate.”95 Overall, 
however problematic these texts may be for scholars, they signal the broader 
trend toward the commodification of history and identity.96 
The Politics of Condemnation  |  
The Far Right’s colonial visions of Kenyan history and Obama’s place 
in it invite the questions of what long-term effects politically interested 
revisionism will have on popular understandings of Kenya’s past and pres-
ent and what work such understandings will do ultimately. In the next 
chapter we turn away from the US politics of condemnation and back to 
the Kenyan politics of celebration to capture another brand of historical 
entrepreneurship, albeit with a very different political tone and substance. 
These Kenyan histories—which also situate the Obama family in places 
and spaces to which they do not belong to serve local and national politi-
cal ends—likewise demand scrutiny.
96
5
The Politics of Celebration
Ethnic Grandeur and Obama’s Heroic Embrace
In April 2004, Walter Gor looked up from his cup of tea in the small West-
ern Kenya village of Lela and asked, “Who is this American boy we are 
hearing about whose father is from Siaya?”1 At the end of a two-hour-long 
discussion about Kenya’s colonial history and the origins of the Luo Union, 
this seemed like an odd and misplaced question. Sensing the confusion, 
Gor, a member of the Luo Council of Elders (LCE), elaborated, “Yes, you 
know, the one from Chicago who is contesting a seat in Parliament?”2 
Faithful students of Kenyan politics, we were nonetheless stumped by his 
queries. We thought to ourselves, An American from Chicago running for 
the Kenyan Parliament? But it is not even an election year in Kenya! Ex-
hausted at the end of a long day of intensive interviews about colonial 
Kenya and slightly embarrassed by our lack of knowledge about US links 
to the region, we simply replied that we did not know. 
We realized a few months later that we had missed a prime opportu-
nity to engage with the early Kenyan roots of what grew into full-fledged 
“Obamamania.” Having spent the first several months of 2004 alternately 
buried in colonial documents at the Kenya national Archives (KnA) 
and traversing the country to do oral histories on various topics in Ken-
ya’s past, we had not been following the American media’s tracking of 
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Obama’s meteoric rise from representing Chicago as a state senator, to 
nominee for an open US Senate seat in Illinois, to emerging political 
star of the democratic Party. Our April interview with Gor came a few 
months before Obama’s keynote address at the 2004 democratic national 
Convention, which introduced the young senatorial candidate onto the 
national political scene in the United States and drew global attention 
to his paternal roots in Kenya.3 In the wake of Obama’s overwhelming 
victory in the democratic primary in Illinois, Kenyans embraced him 
as a “son of the soil” in ways very different from how the candidate him-
self positioned his relationship to his Kenyan heritage. Remarking in a 
March 18, 2004, New York Times article, Obama presented himself as 
American first and African American second: “I have an unusual name 
and an exotic background, but my values are essentially American. . . . 
I’m rooted in the African-American community, but I’m not limited by 
it. I think this election shows that.”4 
Obama’s message in the New York Times was a clear attempt to highlight 
his mainstream American “belonging,” and to thus legitimize him politically 
as a serious contender for national office in the United States. Africa figured 
only in the hyphenated, secondary identity of “African-American,” and Kenya 
not at all. However, in Lela, some fifty kilometers away from the Obama family 
homestead in Kogelo, Walter Gor and others did not need the American 
media or US political pundits to place Barack Jr. into popular narratives of 
Kenyan history. Since early 2004, the Kenyan state and the wananchi (citi-
zens), particularly Luo from Western Kenya, had been actively engaged in fit-
ting Obama into local history long before US media began describing him as a 
“son of a Kenyan goat herder.”5 From popular narratives in the Kenyan press to 
local interpretations used to market Luoland to the global tourist market, his-
tories emanating from Western Kenya have had political and socioeconomic 
applications. Their tone and goals, however, have been radically different from 
the Far Right forays into Kenyan history discussed in the last chapter. 
“Obamamania”
In Kenya, culture brokers—state officials and Luo elders and amateur his-
torians alike—have employed selective narratives in order to claim Obama 
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as a “son of the soil.” Mobilizing print and digital media, oral histories, 
and cultural monuments, state officials have aimed to weave Obama into 
the contested narrative of Kenyan nationhood, while Luo elders have fo-
cused on Obama in order to stake claims to political power and market 
Luo identity to a mass audience.6 Here the tone is not one of condemna-
tion, but widely celebratory, explaining Obama’s political ascendancy in 
the United States through local ethnopolitical histories. Reading Obama’s 
connections to Kenya through the local politics of “belonging,” by 2008, 
Kenyans were asking if it was indeed possible that “a Luo may be president 
of the United States before a Luo becomes president of Kenya.”7
In 2004, expectations of how the election of a “Luo” to the United 
States Senate might change the socioeconomic landscape of nyanza began 
to be articulated months in advance of Obama’s senatorial election. By the 
fall of 2004, enthusiasm for Obama’s election reached fever pitch among 
Luo populations across Kenya as people plied the busy Westlands matatu 
(minibus) route in a vehicle christened “Obama” and swapped their home-
brewed chang’aa for East African Breweries Limited’s new “Senator” brand 
beer that was aptly and instantly redubbed “Obama.”8
Given the importance of patronage in contemporary Kenyan poli-
tics, it is not surprising that speculation about what Obama’s senatorial 
election might mean to the remote reaches of Luoland had accompanied 
the excitement surrounding Obama’s rise.9 Commenting to a USA Today 
reporter on the indirect benefits expected with an Obama victory, can-
didate Obama’s uncle argued, “In order to develop, we need aid from 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The U.S. Senate 
carries a huge amount of weight, so it is important that one of our own 
will be there.”10 Outside the Obama family, the connections were even 
less subtle and more directly interpreted through the local politics of 
patronage. For example, Kisumu resident Frederick Otieno noted suc-
cinctly, “We will get support from America, as Africans, as Kenyans and 
particularly as Luo.”11
Upon Obama’s election to the US Senate, jubilation swept Western 
Kenya, and Luos expressed their hopes that his election would render 
Western Kenyan communities “Illinois, Kenya Chapter.”12 Rural residents 
across the region continued to articulate their demands of the newly fa-
mous member of the Luo diaspora through calls for public works projects 
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and jobs, the sorts of goods that could typically be expected to accompany 
the election of a “kinsman” to a Kenyan political office. One man stated 
simply, “If Obama will be giving funding to his State, we request that he 
sends a small percentage.”13 Another man stipulated, “now that our son 
has won, we can look forward to better roads, improved health and educa-
tional facilities since we know he can provide us all that.”14
 As many Luo people articulated their material expectations after 
Obama’s election, they drew on images of power and ethnic responsibilities 
first cultivated by the Luo Union in colonial Kenya and further realized by 
the postcolonial politics of regional-ethnic favoritism. Predicting a future 
visit to the region involving all the pomp and circumstance appropriate to 
that of a visiting dignitary of note, one young man explained, “We expect 
him [Obama] to fly into nyangoma-Kogelo by helicopter soon. In fact we 
have identified a spot where it will land.”15 These statements demonstrate 
the belief that infrastructure in rural Western Kenya would be upgraded, 
and also reflect the common knowledge that the Kenyan political elite fre-
quently travel in opulence unimaginable to the average Kenyan. People 
brought up “flight” in a more abstract sense as well, expressing their hopes 
that Obama could facilitate local people’s flight from the poverty of West-
ern Kenya to a better life in America. One man asserted, “Obama should 
now start planning on how some of our people from this village and all 
over Kenya can go to America and work.”16 And perhaps, reimagining the 
Mboya “airlifts” that we learned about in chapters 3 and 4, a self-professed 
friend of Barack Obama Sr. insisted, “I don’t see why his son cannot airlift 
my children to America.”17 
In sum, the wild excitement in Kenya surrounding Obama’s senatorial 
election showed the wide definition of Luoness forged in the colonial pe-
riod and the patrimonial character of postcolonial politics to be mutually 
reinforcing in contemporary Kenya. due to the history of political mar-
ginalization, in particular the detentions of political leaders like Oginga 
and Raila Odinga and the assassinations of tom Mboya and Robert Ouko 
that chapter 3 explores, Luos across Kenya believed that they needed a 
patron to develop and protect their interests, and they were willing to cast 
a wide net, even into the diaspora, to find such a Big Man. As one reporter 
for the Daily Nation neatly summarized, many Luo “had vested in Senator 
Obama the attributes expected from a local MP.”18 
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Even before his first official visit to Kenya in 2006, Obama sought to 
dispel expectations that his election in the United States had necessarily 
rendered him a Luo patron. As the Daily Nation reported in late 2004, “US 
Senator-elect Barack Obama says he cannot bring development to Kenya. 
He told a delegation of Kenyan community leaders in detroit and Chicago 
that no favours should be expected from him.”19 He sought to reinforce this 
message during his official trip two years later. He criticized patrimonial 
politics generally, speaking out against rampant governmental corruption 
in Kenya in a highly publicized speech at the University of nairobi that 
earned him the anger of the Kibaki regime, particularly that of its ambas-
sador to the United States. Casting accusations that put him at odds with 
local interpretations, he argued to a packed taifa Hall at the downtown 
University of nairobi campus:
Finally, ethnic-based tribal politics has to stop. It is rooted in the 
bankrupt idea that the goal of politics or business is to funnel as 
much of the pie as possible to one’s family, tribe, or circle with little 
regard for the public good. It stifles innovation and fractures the 
fabric of the society. Instead of opening businesses and engaging 
in commerce, people come to rely on patronage and payback as a 
means of advancing. Instead of unifying the country to move for-
ward on solving problems, it divides neighbor from neighbor.20
Obama also forcefully addressed expectations about his own capacities. 
during an interview with the Daily Nation, he was asked how he had 
handled the “high expectations of what [he] could do for Kenya now 
that [he is] a senator.” In reply, he dismissed his singularity, noting, “In 
terms of expectations, I’ve to explain very early on that I am just one 
senator out of a hundred senators. Ultimately decisions about programs, 
projects, are made in collaboration, by persons other than myself. I 
don’t have a chequebook where I can write a cheque directly for the US 
treasury.”21 He reiterated these sentiments in the documentary Senator 
Obama Goes to Africa. Continuing to advance his anticorruption plat-
form, he explained how he had aimed both to make it clear during his 
2006 visit to Kenya that his role as a senator was to facilitate relations be-
tween the United States and Kenya and to disabuse people of the notion 
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that he might have arrived with “bunches of money” to hand around.22 A 
letter to the editor of the Daily Nation suggests that Obama’s message did 
not go unheeded. The author wrote, “The idea of goodies flowing from 
the US to our country is ridiculous. Kenyans must work at improving 
their own lives. Leaders have an even bigger challenge to emulate the 
Obama vision.”23 
 As much as Obama’s political rise fueled the hopes of Luo politics 
at home, his ascendancy also highlighted the familiar history of po-
litical and social marginalization. In the colonial and early postcolo-
nial past, high-achieving Luo, as Lesa Morrison points out, “were not 
only notable, but they stood out—quite literally physically—in the so-
ciety.”24 this singularity emerged hand in hand with a certain degree of 
sociopolitical exclusion. In an interesting twist across time and space, 
critiques of Obama in the international arena, and especially in the 
United States, have been cast in much the same terms as the exclusion 
of Luos in Kenya. As James Howard Smith explains, “non-Luo have 
justified Luos’ marginalization from politics by arguing that they are 
somehow foreign: their language is exotic, they eat mainly fish (a major 
aspect of Luo ethnic identity) and their men are uncircumcised. Many 
have asserted that because Luo men are uncircumcised, they are not 
fully adult, and their immaturity makes them ill-suited to participate 
in national politics.”25 
By the winter of 2008, when it was clear that Obama was now vying 
for the democratic nomination for the presidency, Kenyan interpretations 
at home and abroad were both celebratory and divisive due to the increas-
ingly volatile politics of ethnicity. In the wake of the contested Kenyan 
election, which had seen a Luo and a Kikuyu wrangling for the presidency 
in december 2007 and the dramatic violence that followed, Kenyan po-
litical discourse began to reflect both local histories of Luo exclusion and 
contemporary realities of ethnic politics. Commentary in digital fora dis-
cussing the heated democratic primary races in the United States noted 
that many Luo in Kenya voiced their support for Obama, while non-Luo, 
especially Kikuyu, enthusiastically supported Hillary Clinton.26 A discus-
sion thread on the popular diaspora blog site Mashada.com even posed 
the question “Will Kikuyu Americans vote for Obama?”27 A few posters 
construed their responses along ethnic lines. For example, one poster ex-
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pounded, “Majority of kikuyu are campaigning for sen hillary clinton and 
praying day and night for sen barak obama to loose because they cant rig 
election in usa the way they did in kenya. Kikuyus are known thieves and 
their no. 1 thief is emilio mwai kibaki.”28 
  However, the overall tone of the thread was reflected in the 
reply to the above remark in an attempt to downplay the role of eth-
nicity in the Kenyan diaspora: “WHAt? Such sentiments shock me at 
times! Am kyuk and Obama is my guy!!!”29 Another poster rounded 
out the discussion, reading “Folks, there’s no kyuk or luo voter here 
(nor should there be anywhere!). It’s either Obama or the other guys. 
And if Obama loses, then much love to the winner. I’ll act grown up 
and live with it!!”30 And again such sentiments were expressed in the 
Kenyan press. As one letter writer argued, “Kenyans are not happy with 
Sen. Barack Obama just because he was fathered by a Kenyan. If our 
support for Obama was merely ethnic-based, only a section of Kenyans 
would be rooting for the Senator because the rest don’t share his ethnic 
background.”31
In early november 2008 the question “Will there be a Luo in the White 
House before there is a Luo in the State House?” was answered. Obama’s 
victory was not a surprise to anyone in Kisumu, where a mock election 
preceding the official one gave Obama a landslide victory.32 It was not just 
Luos, but Kenyans as a nation, who toasted Obama’s victory with even 
more zeal than did his supporters in the United States as “Senator” beer 
sold out across the country.33 More soberly, Kenyans lauded the peaceful 
transfer of power. Celebrations were official, as the Kenyan government 
declared a national day off, “Obama day,” and East African Breweries 
launched a special release of their popular Senator beer, under the ele-
vated title of “President Lager.”34 Beyond these political and commercial 
attempts to market Kenya’s connection to the newly elected American 
president, efforts to “cash in” on Obama’s ascendancy spread throughout 
the country. From t-shirts and other Obama memorabilia widely avail-
able across local markets to an increasing number of babies christened 
with names like Barack, Michelle, Sasha, and Malia—the symbolism of 
these real and imagined connections sparked new narratives of Kenya’s 
contested past produced to market the importance of local and regional 
histories.35
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Luo Incorporated: Monuments, Tourism, and Diaspora
Intangible cultural heritage . . . transmitted from generation to gen-
eration, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in re-
sponse to their environment, their interaction with nature and their 
history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity.36 
Across Kenya, Obama’s status as a “son of the soil” has been unquestioned. 
Under the national Museums and Heritage Act, which provides for the 
“protection, conservation, and transmission of the cultural and natural 
heritage of Kenya,” the national government gazetted the village of Kogelo, 
location of the Obama family homestead, as a protected national heritage 
site.37 The following sections of this chapter engage the diverse “heritage 
work” concerning the Obama family that has been undertaken by culture 
brokers, ranging from government officials to local ethnic entrepreneurs, in 
Western Kenya since 2009. tracing the development of the array of heritage- 
Figure 5.1. “Congratulations Barack Obama: Love and Peace has been granted to 
us by God.” This leso (wrap) has been sold across East Africa since the 2008 US 
election. Photo by Emma Burr.
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based enterprises that have grown up around the Obama family and their 
Kenyan roots shows how, to borrow from derek Peterson, Kodzo Gavua, 
and Ciraj Rassool, “heritage work” constitutes a key space in which “ideas 
about tradition, patrimony, and authenticity are debated and defined.”38 In 
Luoland, with the history of the Obama family at the center, such work has 
transformed local narratives of Luo diasporic affinity and belonging into 
a basis for international ties and into a brand to be marketed to a global 
audience. On a popular level, by the summer of 2009, Kisumu, Western 
Kenya’s principal city, was solidly gripped by “Obamamania,” awash with 
both paraphernalia and discussions of the benefits the Obama presidency 
might bring to the region and the country. From government efforts to 
improve rural infrastructure in the Obama family’s village of Kogelo to 
hotel expansions in Kisumu, local interpretations of these projects were 
often filtered through a bold government prediction that the region would 
witness a 10–15 percent jump in international tourism.39 However, while 
many local residents were eager to transform Western Kenya into an inter-
national tourist destination, others interpreted government efforts within 
a more personal connection with the US president and his family roots 
in the region. For instance, in response to a state project to lengthen the 
runway at the Kisumu airport, a number of informants casually quipped 
that “Air Force One will now have a place to land.”40 
Yet, despite this clear desire to claim Obama for Kenyan development, 
his particular function within ethnic and national histories has been more 
complicated. The Kisumu branch of the national Museums of Kenya pro-
vided a ripe terrain for examining state and local concerns of how to rep-
resent the Obama story within local histories. Situated in the urban heart 
of Luoland, the Kisumu branch museum exhibits the flora and fauna of 
Western Kenya, with the museum’s cultural displays focusing on the Luo 
community and the “mythical descendants of Ramogi.”41 Representing the 
local histories of identity and belonging common across regional affiliates 
of the national Museums of Kenya, the Kisumu branch has also attracted 
increasing numbers of international tourists newly drawn to Western Ken-
yan by an interest in the history of the Obama family.42 As of the summer 
of 2016, an exhibit devoted to President Obama and his Kenyan family had 
yet to be developed. The potential for such an exhibit in Kisumu and Ko-
gelo and the associated issue of how to best situate the president’s familial 
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history within wider regional and national narratives were, however, the 
subject of much discussion among museum curators and staff. 
Though enthusiastic about rising interest in the museum and in Luo 
culture and history more generally, curators and staff expressed concerns 
about implicit and explicit pressures to “distill local knowledge into a 
brand” and sell it to an expanding and diversifying audience.43 First was 
the issue that the expectations brought by local visitors to an Obama ex-
hibit might be colored by styles of local history strong on ethnic patriotism 
and hagiography like those discussed in chapter 3; they could demand a 
celebratory portrayal of Luos overall and the Obama family in particular. 
Second was the direct pressure—emanating from influential political cir-
cles—to officially represent the Obama family’s history with a reverential 
respect that glossed over the more checkered elements of the life history 
of Barack Obama Sr., such as his problems with alcohol and his tumul-
tuous career in the Kenyan civil service that we learned about in chapter 
3. Museum employees revealed that they were coaxed after the 2008 US 
election to be sure the Obama family history was told according to local 
conventions of patriotism, particularly emphasizing the connection to the 
historic and broader migratory origins of the Luo diaspora in South Sudan 
while ignoring any focus on election violence, or Mau Mau–inspired co-
lonial histories that the American Far Right has so eagerly repackaged.44
Yet, the problems of how Obama histories should be pitched and pack-
aged are not confined to the Kisumu branch museum. Since late 2008, 
government directives like that officially making Kogelo a national heri-
tage site have evidenced a clear goal of marketing the cultural history of 
Western Kenya to an international audience.45 In early 2009 the position 
of “Cultural development Manager” for Kogelo was created, a position 
that at the time did not exist for any other community in Kenya.46 This 
post, sponsored directly by the Office of the Vice President, was part of 
a larger initiative of the Ministry of State for national Heritage and Cul-
ture to develop Kogelo in support of Kenya Visions 2030, the country’s 
new development blueprint, which aims to make “Kenya among the top 
ten long haul tourist destinations.”47 The symbolism of using heritage to 
attract international investment and remittances was not confined to the 
discourse of tourism and even reached the floor of Parliament. In 2010, 
during a debate about repatriating Kenyan cultural artifacts from US 
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museums, Boni Khalwale, member of Parliament (MP) for Ikolomani, 
clearly evoked the connection between cultural heritage and political pa-
tronage, noting, “The biggest artefact in the USA today that belongs to this 
country is one Barack Obama. How does he intend to repatriate himself or 
part of the money that is realized from all the royalties that he is attracting 
all over the world.”48 
In a related vein, in november 2008, a delegation led by then minis-
ter of tourism najib Balala and including other high-profile politicians 
descended on Kogelo and announced that the Kenyan state planned to 
build a multimillion-shilling museum and cultural center in Kogelo.49 
Loosely reminiscent of presidential libraries in the United States, the 
Kogelo center is intended to house documents pertaining not merely to 
the history of the Obama family, but to the Kogelo subclan more gen-
erally, as well as “artifacts and works” belonging to Barack Obama Sr.50 
Mobilizing UnESCO (United nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization) rhetoric, the minister of state for national heritage 
and culture, William Ole ntimama, noted that his ministry planned to 
develop the Kogelo Community Cultural Center “not only to serve as 
a cultural centre but also to promote and safeguard intangible cultural 
heritage.”51 In turn, Luo patrimony was performed at the Obama Kogelo 
Cultural Festival, held at the Senator Obama Kogelo Primary School in 
mid-January 2010, to mark the first year in office of “the 44th President 
of America who traces his cultural roots in nyang’oma Kogelo village 
Kenya.”52 While these grand visions of diaspora remittances and tour-
ists flocking to Kogelo on Obama “heritage” tours did not immediately 
materialize, by 2011 the new Kogelo Cultural and tourism Information 
Office housed a number of local businesses selling souvenirs to the esti-
mated 150 local and international visitors that Kogelo village receives on 
a weekly basis.53 
Overall, the inhabitants of Western Kenya heartily embraced Obama. 
As journalist Philip Ochieng pithily put it on the eve of the presidential 
inauguration and at the height of Obamamania, “As far as the Luo are con-
cerned, Barack Obama is 200 per cent Luo.”54 However, in many instances 
Luos have greeted development initiatives dependent on the commodifi-
cation of history with some reluctance and suspicion since government 
projects were all but absent from Kogelo before 2008. For example, res-
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idents of Kogelo were shocked that a cultural development manager had 
been appointed with no prior consultation with the Kogelo community 
and were suspicious when the manager starting making her rounds.55
The commodification of history has also been keenly experienced at 
the Senator Obama Kogelo Secondary School, renamed in 2006 to cele-
brate Obama’s visit to Kenya and site of the Obama Kogelo Cultural Fes-
tival.56 despite the state’s grand plans for the material memorialization of 
Luo history, curious tourists arriving in Western Kenya since 2009 have 
had very little to see by way of the Obama family’s history. As a result, they 
have decamped unannounced to Obama Secondary. As English teacher 
Samuel Opondo commented, everyone from foreign dignitaries to inter-
national tourists and local politicians “arrive without an appointment. . . . 
We have to receive them as they have traveled a long distance, but it makes 
teaching very difficult.”57
Figure 5.2. Senator Obama Kogelo Secondary School, a short walk from the Obama 
homestead in Kogelo. Photo by author.
  |  Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging
Read within the interpenetrated contexts of Obama’s ascendancy and 
tom Mboya’s illustrious “airlifts,” the preponderance of visitors to Senator 
Obama Kogelo Secondary School also serves to create untenable expec-
tations among many students and their families about the advantages of 
attending a school named after the foremost “son of the soil.” As Opondo 
noted, the consistent presence of visitors “falsely raises the students’ hopes 
of scholarship opportunities.”58 A group interview with twenty students 
further confirmed their teacher’s view, as many expressed that they felt 
pressure from family and friends to attend and that they were expected to 
be awarded university scholarships to the United States upon graduation. 
Others complained that they had to spend long hours trying to convince 
family and friends as to why the school charged tuition at all. One student 
recounted her uncle’s insistent query: “I’m sure the president himself will 
pay the school fees of students from his namesake?”59 While the Obama 
links to Kogelo and Kenya have been championed by the national gov-
ernment, local political actors with roots in the colonial past have also 
situated Obama’s “belonging” within their own local and diasporic claims 
to political power. 
With Obama’s 2004 senatorial victory and the fresh touristic interest in 
Western Kenya, the LCE mobilized narratives of both distant precolonial 
migration and more contemporary political histories in a broader proj-
ect of ethnic “branding.” As we saw in chapter 3, the contemporary work 
of LCE is rooted in the colonial activities of the Luo Union and reflects 
long-standing attempts by cultural brokers and amateur historians to 
package Luo history in grand reverence. At the same moment, the organi-
zation has endeavored to retain control over the modes and meanings of 
Luoness in an environment in which “ethnicity is also becoming more cor-
porate, more commodified, more implicated in the economics of everyday 
life.”60 The contentious nature of these aims emerged in high relief at a July 
2009 meeting of the LCE’s Maseno West branch at Kit Mikayi, a religious 
and cultural site marked by a picturesque boulder formation towering just 
off the busy Kisumu-Bondo highway.61
As residents from farms near Kit Mikayi came forward to collect from 
the day’s visitors a set entry fee to the site, LCE members (a contingent 
composed primarily of former local government officials) swooped for-
ward, intercepted them, and commenced a heated argument over who had 
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rights to profit from this particular piece of the Luo past. The LCE mem-
bers pushed their way onto the grounds, asserting that “Kit Mikayi be-
longs to the whole community and thus only the whole community should 
benefit from it.”62
Having asserted themselves as broad custodians of Luo cultural her-
itage, LCE members reclaimed Kit Mikayi in the name of moral ethnic 
development. Commencing first with a prayer that marked the site’s spiri-
tual significance, the LCE then proceeded with a detailed work of histori-
cal theater, which paid homage to local notions of Obama’s “belonging.” 
In an oral narrative titled “A Brief History of the Rock,” ex-chief and local 
teacher James Gwada repackaged the common story of the fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century Luo migrations to Kenya from as far as South Sudan. 
However, while the mythical journeys of Luo ancestors are often locally 
retold, Gwada made a specific point to emphasize a certain stream of this 
migration. In retelling the origin stories of Luo communities in Western 
Kenya, Gwada deliberately highlighted the centrality of Alego—Obama’s 
ancestral home area—to Luo migratory histories, thus rendering him a 
Figure 5.3. Members of the Luo Council of Elders, with Kit Mikayi in the 
background, 2009. Photo by author.
  |  Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging
legitimate “son of the soil.” Gwada went further, emphasizing the relation-
ship between Kit Mikayi, Kogelo, and journeys of Ramogi (the mythic 
original ancestor of Kenyan Luo). He declaimed that Ramogi’s direct de-
scendants had been told to “settle on the land with many hills and rocks” 
and emphasized that the elders were the ones entrusted with their pro-
tection.63 to wide assent offered by the nearly fifty LCE members present, 
Gwada asserted that LCE was the logical caretaker of the site and outlined 
a larger plan to build a museum and guesthouse so that “key artifacts are 
displayed for [future] studies.”64
The incident at Kit Mikayi was not isolated, but rather part of a longer 
conflict in which LCE members were pressuring neighboring landowners 
and lobbying government officials to declare Kit Mikayi officially a na-
tional monument and to prevent locals from collecting entrance fees.65 
Throughout the Kit Mikayi conflict and beyond, the LCE has set itself up 
as both the official arbiter of Luo culture and the marketer of Luoness, har-
kening to its 2001 constitution, which stipulates that the LCE represents 
the “apex for guidance of the entire Luo Community,” whose work is to 
“restore, regularize, update, consolidate, propagate, disseminate, defend 
and protect the time tested Luo culture.”66 The view was rearticulated by 
LCE secretary general Gilbert Ogutu that the organization’s head (ker) 
should be regarded as royalty, similar to the kabaka (king) of Buganda, 
and serve as the ultimate “defender of norms and values” for the whole 
Luo community.67
The LCE’s narrative of the Luo past has not been confined to merely 
staking out culture and politics at the local level. Rather, “homegrown” 
Luo histories have offered a vehicle by which to critique national politics 
and have served to link the Luo past to urgent issues of geopolitical im-
port, from the ascendancy of Obama to the emergence of South Sudan. 
For example, when parsing popular historical discourse about Obama, 
journalist david Kazia noted, “Public descriptions of Obama sound like 
a recycling of phrases used of men like the Odingas, tom Mboya, Apollo 
Milton Obote, Kabalega and Labongo before him.”68 This list of names op-
erates both as a recitation of the patriotic and patriarchal Luo diasporic 
past and as a cautionary tale about how Luo speakers have been elimi-
nated from the upper echelons of political power through military coups, 
assassinations, and political marginalization. In a similar vein, discussing 
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the Mau Mau era, LCE chairman Riaga noted, “If you look into history, 
without Odinga (Sr.), Kenyatta could have died in jail. But he insisted that 
without him, there would be no Kenya. He made Kenyatta a gift of Kenya. 
But when Kenyatta became president, his first plan was to eliminate the 
Luo from power.”69
The LCE’s recent narratives of the Luo past have also worked to extend 
the scope and significance of the Kenyan Luo community in particular 
and of Luo “male stars” more broadly.70 For example, in a 2004 interview, 
Riaga reiterated the opinion common among LCE leadership that claims 
the Kenyan Luo under a broad umbrella of the bulk of nilotic speakers 
from Uganda to Egypt.71 Indeed, in a 2001 keynote address to the LCE, 
the organization’s secretary general went so far as to link the origins to the 
biblical exodus of the Israelites from Egypt.72 
While these glorified and patriotic accounts linking Obama loosely to 
the distant Luo past might not stand up to close archaeological or linguis-
tic scrutiny, the grand vision of the broader Luo community of East Africa 
has linked nilotic Lwo–speaking communities in more tangible ways. As 
early as 1927, the newly formed Luo Language Committee (LLC), which 
was based in Kenya and led by emerging ethnic patriots such as B. A. 
Ohanga, Paul Mboya, and Achieng Oneko, was concerned not only with 
the standardization of dholuo but also with creating connections among 
the greater nilotic Luo–speaking diaspora of Eastern and Central Africa.73 
two decades later, Ohanga traveled to Uganda, Congo, and the Sudan in 
an effort to make cultural-linguistic connections with other Lwo-speaking 
groups. Leaders of these societies expressed a strong sense of shared his-
tory and common identity, which was echoed by Ohanga and Luo Union 
members. For instance, when Ohanga visited leaders of the Acholi As-
sociation in Uganda, its chairman stated in clear diasporic terms that he 
“wished the Luo to be informed that in fact their neighbors in Uganda had 
not forgotten them. . . . If any Luo cared to go back to their land of origin, 
they would be well received.”74 A closer connection between nilotic Luo 
speakers was subsequently championed by the LLC and promoted in the 
Luo Union publication Ramogi.75 
When, six decades later, LCE informants recounted the popular nar-
rative of Luo origins in the southern Sudan in 2004, it was often accom-
panied by more contemporary political statements such as “You know, 
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Garang is our friend.”76 Referring specifically to the now deceased leader 
of the South Sudanese secessionist movement, John Garang, recent efforts 
by LCE reveal the ways a shared Luo historical narrative is employed to 
bolster the political community at “home” by claiming historic links to 
political luminaries “abroad.” In May 2009, the LCE consummated these 
implied ties by officially installing Garang’s successor and first president of 
South Sudan, Salva Kiir, as a Luo elder. The event coincided with a cere-
mony that awarded the South Sudanese president an honorary degree at 
the Great Lakes University of Kisumu after he reportedly donated some 
$100,000 to the university to construct a hall in honor of Garang. Ac-
Figure 5.4. Luo Council of Elders chairman Riaga Ogallo, center, with LCE 
members, June 18, 2009. Photo by author.
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cording to local press reports of the event, LCE chairman Riaga Ogallo 
remarked to Kiir, “We are bestowing you with these honours because you 
are one of our most respected sons. You are a Luo like us, it is only that you 
remained in Sudan as we trekked south to Kenya.”77 
In the wake of this vibrant reaffirmation of diasporic political ties, Riaga 
Ogallo and LCE members were asked again in 2009 about their recent ac-
tivities. Meeting LCE officials outside the Luo Union–built Ofafa Memo-
rial Hall in Kisumu, Ogallo was literally crowned with evidence of his new 
political ties. Sporting a hat adorned with the South Sudanese flag and the 
political slogan “new Sudan,” Ogallo and other LCE officials had recently 
returned from a weeklong visit to Juba, where they reportedly held extended 
talks with Kiir and other political leaders.78 Thus, clearly emboldened by 
both the continued excitement of a “Luo in the White House” and the re-
newed friendship with their linguistic neighbors in South Sudan, it is no 
surprise that LCE officials have been keen to assert their cultural legitimacy 
throughout Western Kenya in the wake of an Obama presidency.
This “nilotic embrace” has served to shore up Obama’s “belonging” 
even further and has inspired others not only to link Obama’s ascendancy 
to the contemporary political fortunes of South Sudan but to assign him a 
broader place with the royal lineages of East Africa’s distant past.79 Indeed, 
after interviews with the LCE leadership, Kazia was prompted to write 
of the Ugandan Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom, “Some 628 years ago, a time 
barely thought of now, the seeds of Obama’s ascendancy to the world stage 
were sown here.”80 Whether or not these accounts of the Luo past would 
withstand close scrutiny, they offer prime exemplars of local attempts to 
brand Luo identity within ancient royal reverence. As Cohen and Odhi-
ambo have explained, “Historical accounts within Western Kenya” should 
be read as “intensely negotiated and arbitrated.”81 It is through such histo-
ries that “the past is brought to bear on the untangling and resolution of a 
variety of conflicts.”82 
Toward a Popular History of Obama and Kenya
From museum exhibits and cultural monuments to memorabilia and her-
itage tours, efforts to claim Obama have reshaped the popular oral and 
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written histories of Kenya in a variety of ways. Since 2008, the commodi-
fication of Kenyan history and Luo identity has transcended the discourse 
of tourism and identity in Western Kenya and even moved beyond the 
pages of the popular press. Scanning the bookshelves of bookshops and 
libraries in nairobi or Kisumu, one can even encounter an increasing body 
of children’s literature that reinforces many of the notions of Obama as 
both “Kenyan” and “Luo.” These texts market the US president with a pa-
triotic reverence usually reserved for his most ardent political supporters 
at home. Using both the language of ethnicity and Kenyan nationalism, 
these texts make Obama into an uncritical hero and role model for Ken-
yan youth in ways similar to the portrayals of Kenyan political luminaries 
like Odinga, Mboya, and Kenyatta found in popular histories produced 
for young audiences.83 Lila Luce’s Barack Obama: Yes, We Can! describes 
the ways in which Obama was both welcomed and worshipped in Kenya. 
Communicating to her “young adult” audience, she describes a roadside 
portrait during his 2006 visit where, “in the picture, Barack had a glow 
around his head, almost like a halo. . . . On the painting were the words 
‘Waruaki, Dala,’ dholuo for ‘We welcome you home.’ ”84 
Even though the influence of the Obama presidency on the wider 
historiography of Kenya is still fairly new, it is evident already that the 
Kenyan/Luo past has been used alternately to reinforce and combat po-
litical aspirations at home and abroad and to market Western Kenya on 
a global scale. As shown above, the majority of Kenyan efforts since 2004 
have worked to claim Obama in grand diasporic splendor, and these di-
verse local narratives have reinforced the celebratory, popular ethnic no-
tion that in January 2009 a “Luo” was inaugurated to the highest political 
office in the United States. Yet, in the American context, celebratory popu-
lar accounts of the Obama-Kenya connection are beginning to emerge, 
and they share a similar glorified narrative akin to the patriotic histories 
emanating from Western Kenya. For example, Peter Firstbrook’s popular 
genealogical tale The Obamas: The Untold Story of an African Family even 
includes a family tree linking Barack Obama Jr. directly with the mythical 
Luo founding ancestor, Ramogi.85 In contrast, recent media commentary 
in Kenya has begun to take a more critical view of the Obama-Kenya con-
nection, in particular by looking more openly at the contentious history of 
Barack Obama Sr. and providing an increasingly balanced, nuanced analy-
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sis more critical than the historic reverence exhibited by members of the 
diaspora.86 
As historians, we again ask what effect these histories have on popu-
lar understandings of Kenya. The histories and discourses examined here 
stake strict claims to the politics of belonging, ultimately demonstrating 
the contentious yet malleable nature of identity politics within a specific 
sociopolitical framework; a malleability that makes the growing popular 
historiography of Obama and Kenya ripe for historical analysis. As a sym-
bol of cultural and political identity, the distant past has loomed large in 
local celebrations of Obama in East Africa and in condemnations of him 
in the United States. Yet, the question of what can be made of Obama’s 
actual political influence in Kenya and throughout the African continent 
remains. How, if at all, would the election of the first African American 
president of the United States change the trajectory of US-Africa relations? 
The next chapters turn to this question. 
116
6
Political Violence and History at  
the Ballot Box
Our social and political environment has been susceptible to manip-
ulation and practices that have made it difficult to reduce inequality 
in a meaningful manner. This, in turn, led to disenchantment, inse-
curity and suffering. In addition, our competing ethnic and politi-
cal interests connived to override the national interest, with serious 
repercussions. This, tragically, has on occasion led to violence and 
loss of life and property.
 —Uhuru Kenyatta, 20131
Much like their colonial counterparts, Kenya’s political elite have long 
practiced the politics of divide and rule to monopolize power and divert 
attention from pressing national issues. In the first five decades of inde-
pendence, Kenyans have grappled with bouts of violent political conflict 
that stems from unresolved issues of the colonial past. From the politics of 
land tenure to the manipulation of ethnicity, the colonial legacy still looms 
large over contemporary Kenyan concerns at the ballot box. Unpacking 
this history reveals a complex story that tends to be hidden in simplis-
tic, popular narratives of endemic government corruption and primordial 
“tribal” violence. However, the political violence in Kenya’s recent past has 
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had as much to do with the legacies of land policy and regional favoritism 
dating from the colonial period as with the failures of postcolonial politi-
cal leadership. 
As we have seen, much of Kenya’s postcolonial political history has 
been dominated by a highly centralized government composed of long-
lived “Big Men” and imperial presidents. By 2002, the country had been 
independent for nearly forty years, but had been ruled by only two presi-
dents and one political party. In five out of the first seven presidential elec-
tions held since independence, Jomo Kenyatta and daniel arap Moi stood 
unopposed. And after an attempted coup to overthrow Moi in 1982, Kenya 
was officially declared a one-party state. nearly a decade later, growing 
domestic activism and international pressure forced the reintroduction 
of a multiparty political system. This reform did not immediately lead to 
greater freedom, cooperation, diversity, equality, or transparency in Ken-
ya’s political, social, or economic life. Rather, it provided the country’s po-
litical elites with both the impetus and the means to use Kenya’s complex 
politics of belonging as a tool with which to grab and consolidate political 
power. Fifty years removed from independence, Kenyans ushered in a new 
constitution in an attempt to decentralize power and address the legacy of 
“Big Man” politics. However as the son of Kenya’s first president faced off 
against the son of the nation’s first vice president in 2013, the nation was 
still grappling with the social, economic, and political legacy of colonial 
inequality and postcolonial governance.2 
Since 1991, bouts of election-related violence have plagued the politi-
cal system in Kenya and resulted in thousands of deaths and hundreds of 
thousands of internally displaced persons (IdPs). This chapter analyzes 
the violence surrounding the ballot box and the historical issues at its root. 
It addresses the sociopolitical circumstances surrounding recent presiden-
tial elections, paying close attention to the ways in which the stakes of eth-
nicity hardened over two decades. Focusing again on representation, this 
chapter addresses international press coverage of the 2007–2008 Kenya 
elections, which alternately suggested that the postelection violence was 
an anomaly in a country known as the “island of peace in a sea of conflict” 
or the result of primordial “tribalism,” tropes repeated during the 2013 
election campaigns. drawing on Kenyan commissions of inquiry and ob-
servers’ reports about electoral violence, the chapter challenges both no-
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tions, setting the 2007–2008 violence and the 2013 campaigns within the 
broader history of the politics of “belonging.” In doing so, it also attends 
to how the wananchi (citizens) “wrote back,” mobilizing social media to 
critique outsiders’ depictions of Kenya and to develop and disseminate 
their own analyses of the sociopolitical scene. As the 2007 and 2013 period 
spanned Obama’s rise from senator to president, this chapter also exam-
ines the ways US political rhetoric impacted the representation and reality 
of Kenya’s electoral politics in both countries and beyond. 
Land, Ethnicity, and Elections, 1991–2002
to simply summarize a complex history, beginning in 1991, multiparty-
ism wound ethnicity and politics even more tightly together as the ruling 
Kenya African national Union (KAnU) party now had to actually contest 
elections and do so across areas inhabited by multiethnic populations with 
variable interests, loyalties, and histories. Multipartyism also exposed the 
unfinished struggles of the independence era, when the promise of greater 
access to land and resources motivated thousands to risk their lives in the 
struggle against colonial rule. 
to comprehend Kenya’s history of electoral violence, it is necessary to 
understand the intertwined problems of land tenure, land transfer, and 
the uses of access to land and to land ownership as political tools. In 1963, 
faced with the overwhelming tasks of trying to recover from and get past 
the depredations of the colonial era, the Kenyatta government came to 
adopt a policy of “forgive and forget.”3 Addressing the settler community 
on the eve of independence, Jomo Kenyatta noted that he wanted to focus 
on the future and not dwell on “the bad old days.”4
Under Kenyatta, the general policy was not to forcibly restore land 
seized by white settlers to black Kenyans, but to work with the settler com-
munity to repatriate land on a willing- buyer/willing-seller basis, thereby 
limiting land ownership to black Kenyans with sufficient means to pur-
chase property. As a result, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, settler land 
was not transferred to the wananchi, but to the emerging African elite. 
Black Kenyans who had prospered under colonialism pooled their re-
sources to purchase thousands of hectares, particularly in the Rift Valley, 
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and politically connected families like the Kenyattas acquired huge tracts 
all over the country.5 Claims by more humble black Kenyans dispossessed 
of their lands during the colonial era were virtually ignored by postcolo-
nial governments.
In the Rift Valley in particular, postcolonial land policy exacerbated 
tensions between the pastoralist Maasai and Kalenjin communities, who 
had lost significant grazing and farmland due to colonial appropriation 
schemes, and the “newcomers,” who had arrived as part of colonial-era 
labor migrations or who had migrated in response to land policies imple-
mented by the postcolonial state.6 Further, throughout the 1980s, as the 
Moi government seized land to redistribute in exchange for the loyalty 
of its clients, these tensions emerged in high relief while at the same time 
land tenure became even more tied up with ethnic exclusivity and regional 
favoritism.
In this context of conflicts over land, “belonging,” and political favor, 
the reemergence of multiparty politics in the 1990s rekindled debates 
about regional versus national governance dating from the independence 
era. Majimboism, the strategy of dividing Kenya into provinces with equal 
political power that would handle their domestic matters while the cen-
tral government controlled defense and foreign relations, had first been 
entertained in the 1950s. during the struggle for independence, majimbo-
ism was championed by political leaders who represented smaller regional 
communities in an attempt to diversify a political system dominated by 
one political party, KAnU, and controlled by a tenuous Kikuyu-Luo al-
liance.7 As david Anderson writes, majimboism reemerged in the 1990s, 
“first from within KAnU by Moi’s Kalenjin and Maasai supporters seeking 
to defend themselves against the rising tide of the opposition,”8 and was 
eagerly reimagined as a political tool with which to grab more land and 
gain more political capital. As the chairman of the Law Society of Kenya 
explained, majimboism also “means the displacement of non-indigenous 
communities from their region to wherever they came from.”9 More point-
edly, in 1991 the member of Parliament (MP) for Baringo, Moi’s home area, 
stated of government critics, “Let them keep quiet or else we are ready for 
the reintroduction of Majimbosim whereby every person will be required 
to go back to his motherland. Once we introduce Majimbo in the Rift Val-
ley, all outsiders who acquired our land will have to move and then leave 
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the same land to our children.”10 The incitement, exacerbating, and spon-
soring of violence directed at ethnic “Others” was the approach taken by 
Moi, his associates, and supporters in dealing with the electoral challenges 
posed by multipartyism and ethnically mixed constituencies. 
By 1991, with its already ethnicized political landscape and a governing 
culture dominated by the “Big Man” model critiqued in chapters 3 and 
4, Kenya remained ripe for further electoral manipulation carried out 
through violent means. At its most mild, violence was intended to cow 
potential opponents in Kalenjin-dominated and -allied areas into voting 
for KAnU or refraining from voting at all. At worst, violence was directed 
at literally eradicating those who were not regarded as “sons of the soil.” 
testifying to Kenya’s political context in the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) proceedings against deputy Vice President William Ruto, who had 
been charged with crimes against humanity carried out during the 2007–
2008 election period, political scientist Hervé Maupeu explained, “during 
the 90s . . . then President Moi progressively moved on to the policy of eth-
nic cleansing in order to keep tight control of his region, which has many 
constituencies. . . . This strategy was targeted at the migrant population 
who had settled in the Rift Valley.”11 This testimony echoes the findings of 
the Akiwumi Commission, which investigated the waves of violence from 
1991 forward, concluding that “ethnic cleansing” was one objective of the 
clashes.12
Violence erupted in the fall of 1991 as Kalenjin youth in the Rift, 
equipped with rungu (clubs), panga (machetes), and spears, attacked local 
Luo, burning thirty homes and displacing thousands. According to Daily 
Nation reports, such violence was preceded by inciting statements made 
by KAnU MPs at political rallies in the Rift, such as “The Kalenjin, Maasai, 
Samburu and West Pokot . . . were ready to protect the Government ‘using 
any weapon at their disposal,’ ” and urging “the people of the province to 
arm themselves with bows and arrows and ‘destroy any FORd [opposi-
tion] member on sight.’ ”13 As violence persisted through the autumn and 
expanded to the western Luo areas of the country, the conflict between the 
Luo and the Kalenjin spread to include Luhya and Kikuyu people. This 
violence preceding the december 1992 elections (in which Moi again se-
cured the presidency in the face of a fatally divided opposition) helped 
produce a hardening of ethnic identities and a heightening of politico- 
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economic stakes around ethnicity. Accordingly, after a lull during the elec-
tions, conflict reignited across another swath of the Rift to include new 
groups—the Maasai and the Pokot—with Kikuyu again as targets. After 
a respite, violence between Kalenjin and Kikuyu again plagued the Rift in 
the mid-1990s. In total, Human Rights Watch estimated that by 1993, up 
to 1,500 people had been killed, with over 300,000 internally displaced.14 
The second round of multiparty elections in 1997, which again enabled 
Moi to retain the presidency, was accompanied by violence that flared 
intensely on the coast. Like the “sons of the soil” of the Rift, the ethnic 
groups of the coast who claimed to be the original inhabitants—the Mi-
jikenda and digo—were profoundly discontented with the “newcomers” 
who had settled on the coast during the colonial era and with the array 
of up-country migrants drawn by work opportunities that the tourism 
industry provided in the postcolonial era.15 digo and Mijikenda looked 
to KAnU’s promises about majimboism to cure their ethnic ills, carry-
ing out violence against “newcomers” to generate support for the party. 
Echoing Mau Mau, this violence included an attack on a police station in 
which guns were stolen for use in later attacks and an oathing campaign 
to recruit and bind fighters. The net results of the clashes of the 1990s were 
massive destruction of property, largely through arson, the deaths of sev-
eral thousand people, the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands 
more, many of them violently exiled “newcomers,”16 and the overall in-
tensification of the politics of “belonging.” As daniel Branch emphasizes,
 The bitter violence of the multiparty era led to a new emphasis on 
notions of identity that emphasized autochthony, the notion of be-
longing to a particular place or, in everyday parlance, of being a son 
of the soil. Older notions of what it meant to be Kikuyu or Luo, for 
example, were formed during long histories of migration. By the 
early 1990s, these identities were more commonly anchored in a par-
ticular place. . . . But these newer notions of ethnicity conflicted with 
the realities of people’s lives and made no allowance for those living 
outside their supposed home provinces and districts.17 
While well-documented and well-known in Kenya, these ethnic clashes 
that form the backdrop to 2007–2008 and 2013 were neither widely re-
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ported nor, would it seem from the coverage of the 2000s, remotely re-
membered in the international press. Rather, the peaceful transfer of 
power in 2002–2003, in which Moi was (finally) outmaneuvered by Mwai 
Kibaki and Raila Odinga’s national Rainbow Coalition (nARC) in elec-
tions deemed free and fair by international observers, provided one lens 
through which subsequent elections would be read, while tribal atavism 
provided another. 
Luo Marginalization and the Longevity of the Odingas
The story of power in the middle decades of the postcolonial period was 
largely that of the Mount Kenya peoples, Kenyatta’s Gikuyu, Embu, and 
Meru Association (GEMA), and then of the Kalenjin, an amalgamation 
of Moi’s tugen, nandi, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Sabaot, and Pokot peoples. At 
independence this collection of colonial “tribes” was transformed into a 
broad supraethnic group based on their geographic and cultural proxim-
ities and the mutual intelligibility of their languages. “Kalenjin,” Gabrielle 
Lynch points out, refers to a nandi word meaning “I say to you,” which 
began to be used as an ethnic identifier during radio broadcasts in the 
1940s.18 As Charles Hornsby explains of the “Kalenjin veneer” overlying 
Kenyan governance and business by the early 1990s, “Kalenjin were para-
chuted at every level into parastatals, universities, and the civil service, 
and held many of the top jobs in the police, the provisional administra-
tion, finance, telecommunications and agricultural parastatals. Even pri-
vate businesses saw it was in their interest to ensure that the president’s 
community were represented in their management teams.”19 Concretely, 
Kalenjin predominance in essential positions and sectors facilitated the 
ethnic violence discussed above, while, more abstractly, it helped heighten 
the stakes of ethnic patrimonialism. 
This period was the low ebb of Luo power on a national stage, when 
Luo were marginalized generally and political figures, including Raila 
Odinga and his wife, Ida, and intellectuals, such as Professor E. S. Atieno 
Odhiambo, were detained and subjected to tortuous persecution and im-
prisonment. In maximum security prisons built on the sites of former Mau 
Mau interrogation centers and camps and in the basement cells of nyayo 
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House, the stuccoed, mustard yellow high-rise in downtown nairobi in-
tended as a monument to Moi’s signature development program, political 
opponents of the ruling regime were routinely tortured and sometimes 
even murdered.20 For the Luo community, the 1990 murder of Robert 
Ouko, discussed in chapters 3 and 4, is the most sober memory of this 
time. 
In the summer of 1991, on the eve of the restoration of multiparty poli-
tics, Oginga Odinga and five of his allies announced the formation of a 
new lobby group (political parties other than Moi’s KAnU were outlawed) 
called the Forum for the Restoration of democracy (FORd). When FORd 
was registered as a party in late 1991, it won the support of nearly every 
Luo, including Ramogi Achieng Oneko, whom you will recall from ear-
lier chapters was a leading light of the Luo Union and among the famous 
alleged Mau Mau imprisoned with Kenyatta known as the Kapenguria 
Six. The group also came to count numerous Kikuyu among its ranks who 
perhaps recalled the Kikuyu-Luo alliance of the early colonial period. 
By the time of the election, however, FORd had split into two parties—
FORd-Kenya and FORd-Asili. The question of who should be its pres-
idential candidate, Jaramogi Odinga or the young Kikuyu businessman 
and dissident Kenneth Matiba, and contention over Odinga’s vision of a 
social justice approach to the country’s rampant inequality versus Mati-
ba’s market-based plans for development, drove the split.21 With the op-
position thus split, and having employed the strategies of manipulation 
and intimidation discussed earlier, Moi and KAnU sailed to victory in the 
1992 elections, with Kalenjin-dominated areas voting 93 percent for Moi.22 
Odinga came in fourth with slightly over 17 percent of the vote, two-thirds 
of which came from nyanza, reflecting the ongoing marginalization of the 
Luo and the continuing importance of ethnicity in voting. Odinga’s death 
in early 1994 set off a period of profound personal and political mourning 
among Luo in nyanza and in the diaspora. One Luo Council of Elders 
(LCE) supporter summed up Luo despair with the collective cry, “Ker Jar-
amogi is dead! Who shall lead my people?”23
With Oginga Odinga’s death, the torch of Luo leadership passed to his 
son Raila Amolo Odinga. As noted in chapters 4 and 5, Raila, the second 
of Jaramogi Odinga’s sons, was a successful businessman educated as an 
engineer in East Germany who had been detained on multiple occasions 
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by the Moi regime and who had won the parliamentary seat for nairobi’s 
Langata constituency in 1992. The political vacuum in the opposition cre-
ated by the senior Odinga’s death was not filled without controversy. Raila, 
deputy chairman of FORd-Kenya, tangled with another “son of the soil” 
of Western Kenya, Michael Kijana Wamalwa, a Luhya chairman of FORd-
Kenya, over leadership of the opposition and ultimately split off to create 
his own party, the national development Party (ndP). 
By the time of the second round of multiparty elections in 1997, Raila 
had built a formidable political machine that included the majority of the 
Luo political establishment and that evidenced an “enduring commitment 
to the Odinga dynasty.”24 The fracturing of the opposition, accompanied 
by significant voting irregularities and the violent clashes described above, 
again paved the way to victory for Moi and KAnU. Raila finished a dis-
tant third, again gathering up nearly all the Luo vote and solidifying him-
self as the scion of Ramogi.25 With the established Luo elite largely out of 
government and watching a schism develop in KAnU over who would 
be Moi’s successor in 2002, Raila threw ndP support behind KAnU, the 
party of the man who’d had him detained and tortured scant years earlier 
and whom he had plotted to overthrow in a failed 1982 coup that con-
stituted the primary challenge to Moi’s power before the introduction of 
multipartyism.26 Raila went on to serve as minister of energy in the Moi 
administration. 
Raila’s move, to borrow a phrase from another bold “Luo” politician, 
pointed to the “audacity of hope”; hope that through collaboration he 
would emerge as the KAnU flag-bearer in 2002. This hope was upended, 
however, by Moi’s effort to designate the young Uhuru Kenyatta, Jomo 
Kenyatta’s son, who had been appointed by Moi as chairman of the Kenya 
tourist Board and who was also the party chairman in Thika outside nai-
robi, as his successor. Africa Confidential reported, “When Moi anointed 
Uhuru Kenyatta as KAnU’s presidential candidate, Odinga stormed out, 
taking an improbable gang of KAnU stalwarts with him. . . . This broke 
KAnU in two.”27 Raila began talks targeted at uniting the opposition and 
negotiated a secret deal with Mwai Kibaki, a venerable Kikuyu politician 
who, as we learned in chapter 4, had worked in the Kenyatta government 
with Mboya and Obama Sr. The two men made an agreement reminis-
cent of the collaboration between Jaramogi Odinga and Kenyatta at inde-
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pendence: Kibaki would stand unopposed as the opposition presidential 
candidate, constitutional reform would be completed in three months to 
create the office of prime minister for Raila to occupy, and half the cabi-
net seats would go to Raila’s supporters.28 With this agreement, the nARC 
was formed and organized a rally in nairobi’s Uhuru Park scheduled to 
coincide with the announcement of Kenyatta’s candidacy. Flanked by the 
opposition leadership, Raila expounded in Swahili to the cheering crowds 
“Harambee!!! tunataka serikali ambaye inaweza kubadilika na wananchi 
wa Kenya. . . . Kibaki tosha!” (Pull together! We want a government that 
can be changed by the people of Kenya. . . . Kibaki is enough!).29 
Campaigning around the country, nARC politicians of all ethnic 
groups took “Unbwogable,” a song by the Luo hip-hop group Gidi Gidi 
Maji Maji, as their unofficial theme song. The lyrics in English, dholuo, 
and Sheng invoke the names of Luo luminaries and martyrs—Oginga 
Odinga, tom Mboya, Robert Ouko, and Raila Amolo—in between de-
manding “Am a Luo but who are you?” and declaring, “You can’t bwoga 
me! I am unbwogable!” that is, “You can’t scare me! I am undefeatable!”30 
The song proved quite prescient, as the opposition, united for the first time 
in the multiparty era, defeated KAnU in the elections of december 27, 
2002, ending forty years of the party’s domination. Three days later, Mwai 
Kibaki was sworn in as Kenya’s third president before jubilant crowds in 
Uhuru Park.31 In his inaugural address, Kibaki challenged the political 
naysayers. “Some prophets of doom have predicted a vicious in-fighting 
following this victory,” he explained. “I want to assure you that they will be 
disappointed. When a group of people come together over an idea or be-
cause of a shared vision, such a group can never fail or disintegrate. nARC 
will never die as long as the original vision endures. It will grow stronger 
and coalesce into a single party that will become a beacon of hope not 
only to Kenyans but to the rest of Africa.”32 The next five years showed the 
predictive powers of the new president to be unreliable.
The 2007–2008 Elections: Contest and Context
A year after the 2002 elections, palpable optimism could still be felt 
across the country. The new government had taken important steps, such 
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as providing free primary education and overhauling the public trans-
port sector to enhance safety. Yet, despite the new government’s vaunted 
anticorruption initiatives—which involved sacking Kalenjin from their 
Moi-era appointments in the civil service and public sectors—the 2004 
transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, which de-
fines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain” and mea-
sures “the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public 
officials and politicians,” ranked Kenya among the most corrupt coun-
tries in the world.33 Indeed, by 2005, John Githongo, who had been ap-
pointed to lead the government’s anticorruption campaign, was forced 
into exile in the United Kingdom after he unearthed a major public 
procurements scandal dating from the Moi era.34 Involving a company 
called Anglo-Leasing, the affair was quickly dubbed “Anglo-Fleecing” 
in popular discourse. Insecurity ranging from petty theft to carjackings 
continued to be rampant in nairobi, and the tensions that had driven the 
clashes of the 1990s had never been resolved. daniel Branch explains, 
“The failure to enact change was partly a result of the simple fact that the 
government included many of those responsible for earlier misrule.”35 
Indeed, responding to the administration’s plan to reshuffle ministers 
suspected in the Anglo-Leasing affair, Raila noted that reshuffling “is like 
saying to them: You have eaten enough from this side, now go and eat 
from the other side.”36 
The agreement between Raila and Kibaki disintegrated as the constitu-
tional review process that was meant to establish the office of prime min-
ister to be occupied by Raila stalled, only to be concluded with a draft for 
public referendum from which had been purged earlier sections laying 
out fresh limits on presidential power. together with other nARC minis-
ters, Raila formed the Orange democratic Movement (OdM) to oppose 
the draft. OdM took its name from the orange symbol indicating “no” 
on the constitutional ballot (“yes” was indicated with a banana) and from 
the Orange Movement in Ukraine.37 In the referendum, oranges topped 
bananas in every province except Kibaki’s home area, Central Province.38 
The grand coalition party of 2002 was destroyed as OdM, now a political 
party, joined the opposition, while Kibaki huddled with his “Mount Kenya 
Mafia” and GEMA supporters. Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba, split off and 
founded his own party, OdM-Kenya.
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As the 2007 presidential elections grew near, Kibaki headed a new 
party, the Party of national Unity (PnU), which campaigned on economic 
growth—its Swahili slogan was “Kazi endelea,” or “Work should continue.” 
Raila headed OdM, which, recalling the socialist principles of Jaramogi 
Odinga and Raila’s own background, campaigned on a platform of socio-
economic justice, constitutional reform, and a decentralized majimbo 
model of federal governance. As Hornsby neatly sums up, Raila “personi-
fied a popular movement for radical change, while Kibaki was positioned 
as leader of a reactionary, tribalist, old guard that had mismanaged Kenya 
in the past.”39 With leaders from every major ethnic group, OdM spoke to 
ethnoregional grievances across the country, and Raila built a wide web of 
alliances that even reached into the international Luo diaspora for finan-
cial and political capital. Polling in late autumn of 2007 showed that Raila 
and OdM had a comfortable lead everywhere except ethnically mixed 
nairobi, Kikuyu-dominated Central Province, and Kamba-dominated 
Eastern Province. 
two months later, on election day, Friday, december 27, 2007, Kenyans 
turned out in droves to vote for the president, MPs, and local representa-
tives. daniel Branch, who served as an election observer in nairobi’s Kib-
era slum, described voters’ certainties: “First, that if a free and fair election 
were held, Raila Odinga and his Orange democratic Movement (OdM) 
had sufficient support to win Kenya’s presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions. Second, that the polls would be fixed in order to ensure a second 
term of office for President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of national Unity 
(PnU).”40 Kibera’s voters turned out to be astute political analysts. Parlia-
mentary returns showed a resounding victory for OdM, which won ninety- 
nine parliamentary seats to PnU’s forty-three.41 Early tallies showed Raila 
ahead by close to a million votes, and, as Branch notes, the morning edi-
tions of Kenya’s major dailies “had effectively called the election for him” 
on december 29.42 But by early afternoon Raila’s lead had dwindled to a 
mere one hundred thousand votes, and on the third day after the election, 
the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) declared victory for Kibaki 
before teatime.43 In a telling contrast to his jubilant inauguration before 
thousands of wananchi and foreign dignitaries a few years earlier, Kibaki’s 
2007 swearing-in occurred in private at State House before a small group 
of close associates, with Moi the chief dignitary present.44 
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The vote tabulation was regarded by observers, by nGOs, and by many 
of the wananchi as a deliberate shambles of epic proportion, carried out 
by PnU with the collusion of a number of operatives in the ECK. Even 
before the tallies were complete, OdM levied allegations of vote rigging 
as Raila’s lead dropped off suspiciously and precipitously. After Kibaki was 
declared the winner, Raila reinforced the message that the election was 
rigged, noting at an international press conference, “Kenyans are deeply 
disturbed and angered by the attempt of this Government to steal this 
election through a process that was fraudulent at every step of the way,” 
and adding, “I cannot and would not accept a Kibaki win; the results are 
there, if I had lost I would have accepted, this is fait accompli (over).”45 
The OdM leadership called for a campaign of civil disobedience, and as 
Human Rights Watch reported, “Police in nairobi shot demonstrators 
under circumstances that remain largely unexplained on every day that 
significant opposition protests attempted to convene in the capital.”46 
Similar crackdowns on OdM protesters occurred in other major urban 
centers. And when OdM supporters in Kisumu and other urban centers 
targeted Kikuyu property, turning to vandalism and looting to the chant 
of “no Raila, no Peace!” the police used live ammunition to subdue them, 
injuring many bystanders as well. As the official government inquiry, the 
Waki Commission, later explained, “Luo nyanza rose up to protest what 
was seen as a rigged election. . . . Unlike other parts of the country that 
were ravaged by violence in the postelection period, the majority of deaths 
recorded in Luo nyanza were as a result of shootings attributed to the po-
lice.”47 In nairobi, running battles took place across Kibera and the city’s 
other poor neighborhoods as youthful gangs of OdM and PnU support-
ers attacked each other and the police used live ammunition against them. 
The violence that broke out with the announcement of a Kibaki victory 
was not merely a response to the election results, but deeply rooted in the 
politics of “belonging,” postcolonial land policy, and the personalization of 
political power. tensions around these issues had only increased since the 
violence of the 1990s, with many state actors working to actively exploit 
rather than to curb them, some going so far as to develop ethnic militias 
and co-opt criminal gangs. disaffected urbanites regarded their material 
existence as inextricably linked to having “their” Big Men at the pinna-
cle of power. “There appeared to be a strong perception among voters,” 
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the report of the Commonwealth Observer Group noted, “that having a 
kinsman in State House would substantially increase their access to the 
national cake.”48 
In a brutal redux of the violence of the previous decade, Kalenjin 
in the Rift turned on “outsiders,” primarily Kikuyu who were perceived 
as supporters of Kibaki, while the local Kalenjin supported Raila.49 It is 
worth noting the similarities between the discussion of electoral vio-
lence in the Akiwumi Commission of 1998 and the Waki Commission of 
2008. The earlier commission reported, “In each clash area, non-Kalenjin 
or non-Maasai, as the case may be, were suddenly attacked, their houses 
set on fire their properties looted and in certain instances, some of them 
were either killed or severely injured with traditional weapons like bows, 
arrows, spears, panga, swords and clubs. . . . The attacks were barbaric, 
callous and calculated to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, 
to cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatize them.”50 
The Akiwumi Commission arrived at the conclusion that the clashes 
were “carefully planned” to “recover ancestral land” for the Kalenjin and 
“to drive away the ‘madoadoa’ (spots/foreigners) in order to achieve the 
main political purpose” of renewing the Rift into a Kalenjin zone.51 The 
2008 commission reported that around Eldoret, a major town in the Rift, 
“gangs with crude weapons also barricaded access to various sites, in-
cluding farming communities in the largely Kikuyu inhabited settlement 
schemes. Here, mostly unsuspecting and terrified victims were suddenly 
overwhelmed by large numbers of Kalenjin youth who set fire to their 
compounds, burned and stole their possessions, as well as maiming, gang 
raping, and hacking to death large numbers of defenseless families, most 
of whom were Kikuyu.”52 
In areas of the country where Luo and Kalenjin were “strangers,” Ki-
kuyu militias began a violent reprisal campaign using the same tools of 
terror and intimidation mobilized in the Rift Valley to reclaim territory for 
the “sons of the soil.” For instance, criminal gangs, such as the infamous 
Mungiki, carried out attacks against supporters of Raila Odinga in the Rift 
Valley towns of nakuru and naivasha, targeting mainly Luo and Kalen-
jin residents, and forcing thousands to flee their homes.53 By mid-January 
2008, the cycle of violence had spread west from nairobi and engulfed 
much of the Rift Valley and reached as far as Kisumu. 
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In early February peace talks organized by the Un and led by former 
Un secretary general Kofi Annan were under way, and Kibaki and Odinga 
came to the negotiating table to avoid greater civil unrest. When a power- 
sharing deal, the national Accord and Reconciliation Act, was signed 
on February 28, Kenya was pulled back from the brink of disaster.54 The 
agreement provided for the creation of the post of prime minister to be 
held by Odinga, but there was no talk of overturning the election results 
and starting campaigns anew.55 With the agreement, Kenya’s most violent 
electoral season, which had seen rigging on both sides and continuation of 
the “tradition” that no sitting Kenyan president be voted out of office, was 
finally concluded. The Kibaki-Odinga government and the wananchi had 
to come to terms with the aftermath of the violence, which had claimed 
upward of fifteen hundred dead and added nearly six hundred thousand to 
Kenya’s already significant number of internally displaced persons (IdPs). 
By mid-2008, with basic security restored, questions of justice, recon-
ciliation, and the development of a new constitutional framework had 
emerged in high relief.
Representations and International Relations: From  
“Tribal Atavism” to Obama
International press coverage of the postelection violence was structured 
by common tropes about violence and conflict in Africa and overwhelm-
ingly ignored the long-standing patterns of electoral manipulation and re-
lated violence detailed above as well as the deeper issues of colonial land 
policy and postcolonial regionalism. Even the most respected news agen-
cies could not resist tantalizing readers with reductive descriptions of the 
“tribal” violence and “primitive” conflict exploding from beneath Kenya’s 
veneer of civilization and modernity. Most pointedly, Jeffrey Gettleman, 
East Africa Bureau chief for the New York Times, wrote within scant days 
of the outbreak of violence, “The election seems to have tapped into an 
atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay beneath the surface in Kenya 
but until now had not provoked widespread mayhem.”56  
Failing to situate the violence within Kenya’s particular history and 
contemporary politics, coverage also lumped the country’s specific strug-
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gles together with the cataclysmic ethnic cleansing and genocide that had 
engulfed the nearby Great Lakes region in the 1990s. Within a few weeks 
of the election, the BBC dared to ask, “Could Kenya Become Rwanda?”57 
Writing on the church burning in Eldoret discussed earlier, the corre-
spondent for Der Spiegel, Germany’s major daily, observed, “The scenes 
are grim reminders of the genocide of Rwanda, where hundreds of thou-
sands of people were massacred in just a few weeks in 1994. Many of the 
deaths in nairobi too seem to have resulted from tribal clashes.”58 Such 
comparisons to the Rwandan genocide were dangerously unfounded, 
with the violence and rhetoric more about electoral politics and land 
rights than a function of an orchestrated campaign to eradicate entire 
ethnic communities. Overall, such broad comparisons and bald stereo-
typing failed to inform audiences abroad about the political complexity 
of the conflict, the organized and diversified character of the perpetra-
tors, and the historical issues at stake. Calling to mind the coverage of 
Mau Mau analyzed in chapters 2 and 4, the 2008 images of young men 
wielding spears, machetes, and bows and arrows, together with simplistic 
discourse about the tools of violence, did little to explain the historic real-
ities and marketed the mistaken, simplistic notions that the election had 
“re-awakened ancient ethnic rivalries” and that Kenyans were “settling 
scores the old fashioned way.”59 
Kenyans, in contrast, understood how the complicated history and 
contemporary stakes of the violence were rooted in ethnic patrimonialism 
and attendant inequality, regionalism, and political corruption. As one 
perpetrator in Eldoret stated, “We got incited. . . . They would tell us, ‘now 
you see the government has gone to Central Province. We should fight to 
ensure that all the resources come back in accordance to our wish.’ The 
businessmen said that roads would be built in Central Province only. They 
said that if the OdM had won we could have received favors and develop 
more economically than the other regions.”60 For others the motivation 
to pick up arms was to simply put money in their pockets, as perpetra-
tors were widely reported to have been paid, with the violence carried out 
overwhelmingly within poor communities. Many also cited the contested 
land question in opportunistic and historical context. As another perpe-
trator lamented, “Maybe in the next 10 years we will have such a genera-
tion when all the outdated leaders who plant colonial thoughts in us will 
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be no more. Maybe one acquired two acres of land illegally during the co-
lonial times and so he wants to protect it. Those who stole public property 
earlier are the ones who are sponsoring such activities to safeguard their 
corrupt gains.”61 
The violence surrounding the election coincided with the middle of 
the US presidential campaign season. Kenya’s troubles provided a fresh 
space for Obama’s supporters and detractors to insert him into narratives 
of Kenyan history and contemporary politics where he did not belong and 
to characterize him again as a “son of the soil” of Western Kenya. In gen-
eral, discourse on Obama’s connection to Kenya’s election crisis cast Ken-
yan politics in boldly “tribalist” terms; more specifically, it attached him 
directly to the Odinga dynasty. For instance, in a BBC interview shortly 
following the election, Odinga claimed that Obama’s father was his ma-
ternal uncle, making the two “Luo” politicians blood relations.62 Even 
though the Obama campaign denied such a relationship, Raila’s claiming 
of Obama was eagerly taken up by Obama’s political opponents in the 
United States, who wove together narratives asserting that Obama actively 
supported his “cousin” Odinga and was structuring a foreign policy plat-
form accordingly. 
Unsurprisingly, Jerome Corsi, who, as we learned in chapter 4, de-
veloped a cottage industry of publishing revisionist narratives of Kenyan 
history meant to discredit Obama, was among the most active in endeav-
oring to connect Obama and Odinga personally and politically. Obama 
Nation presented Raila as “the most extreme Luo in Kenyan politics,” and 
as a closeted Muslim, invoking the lexicon mobilized by the American Far 
Right to rebuke Obama and reinforcing claims about the association and 
affinity of the two “Luo tribesmen.”63 At the same moment, such charac-
terizations laid the foundation for dangerous misreadings of the sources 
and nature of the 2007 election, and the involvement of Raila and Obama 
in the postelection strife.
Corsi ascribed responsibility for the violence directly to the actions 
of Raila and OdM. noting Raila’s claim that he lost the presidency due to 
electoral fraud, Corsi stated, “Odinga’s claim led to widespread fighting 
that killed more than 1,000 people.” He also asserted that “while proving 
involvement is difficult, many in Kenya assumed the postelection violence 
was supported, if not organized, behind the scenes by Odinga and his Or-
Political Violence and History at the Ballot Box  |  
ange democratic Movement.”64 Corsi thereby situated the blame for the 
violence explicitly in Raila’s declaration and tacitly in an OdM plot rather 
than in the complex material reasons detailed above.65 
Corsi also addressed Obama’s phone call to Odinga, made from the 
campaign trail a week after the announcement of the election results, 
and points out that Obama had reiterated to reporters that Raila be-
lieved “the votes were not tallied properly.”66 “Odinga’s charge against 
Kibaki, namely that there had been irregularities in the vote tabula-
tion,” Corsi contended, “was certain to play well with liberal demo-
crats who still believe that George W. Bush stole the 2000 presidential 
election from Al Gore.”67 Such a contention elided the statements of 
various international election observers discussed above, tightened 
the ties between Obama and Odinga, and underscored similarities in 
the electoral fortunes of Obama’s democratic Party and Raila’s Orange 
democratic Movement. 
Characterizing Raila as a “Muslim sympathizer,” Corsi offers an 
egregious and dangerous misreading of the postelection violence as reli-
giously based. Privileging the voices of evangelical “Christian missionar-
ies,” Corsi noted that they had “reported that more than three hundred 
Christian churches were severely damaged or destroyed in the wave of 
violence that swept the country, but mosques were left undisturbed.”68 
Corsi extrapolated, “The violence was not only Luo against Kikuyu, it 
was also Muslims against Christians, reflecting the divisions that op-
posed Kibaki and supported Odinga.”69 A demographically grounded 
analysis of the church burnings indicates that the overwhelming ma-
jority of violence occurred in nyanza Province, Central Province, and 
the Rift Valley, all heavily Christian areas, and among Kikuyu, Luo, and 
to some extent Kalenjin, all of whom are predominantly Christian, with 
pockets of adherents to traditional religions and scant Muslims. Corsi’s 
figuring of the postelection violence along clear binary religious lines 
also draws from the stream of American popular idioms of the “clash of 
civilizations.” This religiously driven reading pointed tacitly to the dan-
gers and risks of having a “Muslim sympathizer” in a position to contest 
the presidency in Kenya—or in America. Overall, The Obama Nation’s 
narrative of Kenya’s political history maps onto Raila and OdM the same 
kind of threatening “Otherness” that the American Far Right has applied 
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to Obama, and in drawing tight, even familial connections between the 
two men reinforces the perception of Obama as a “stranger” to America 
and a “son of the soil” of Kenya. In reality, Obama himself remained way 
outside the fray of Kenya’s electoral conflict. When he did address the 
violence from the campaign trail in an interview with Capital FM Kenya, 
he did so in decidedly neutral terms:
I have personally been touched by your generous, democratic spirit 
through my ties to my own family, and during my travels to Kenya—
most recently as a United States Senator in 2006. This Kenyan spirit 
rises above ethnic groups or political parties, and was on display in 
Kenya’s recent election, when you turned out to vote in record num-
bers, and in a peaceful and orderly way. But recent troubling events 
in Kenya bear no resemblance to the Kenya I know and carry with 
me. . . . We must not look back years from now and wonder how and 
why things were permitted to go so horribly wrong. Kenya, its Afri-
can friends, and the United States must now be determined pursuers 
of  peace—and this determined pursuit must start today with in-
dividual Kenyans refusing to resort to violence, and Kenyan leaders 
accepting their responsibility to turn away from confrontation by 
coming together.70
Celebrating his Kenyan heritage in a general way, and putting the primary 
onus on the wananchi and the Kenyan political leadership to achieve 
unity and restore peace, Obama disappointed observers on both sides of 
the political spectrum in the United States and many in Kenya who ex-
pected him to come out strongly in support of a more intensive US role 
in mediating or even intervening in Kenya’s troubles. This broad-based, 
neutral statement prefigured the Obama administration’s approach to 
Kenya and to the president’s heritage during the first term. Five years 
later, the president’s own response to Kenya’s 2013 contested election and 
the ICC indictments of Kenya’s top two politicians for their alleged roles 
in the violence of 2008 proved much the same, although members of the 
administration took a more critical line. The next section turns to Ken-
ya’s tenuous efforts to cope with the aftermath of the electoral violence 
and forge a fresh political path.
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Building the Coalition of the Accused
As a tense peace was restored in Kenya over the winter of 2008, justice and 
reconciliation emerged at the forefront of public discourse. The country’s 
future was debated on the street and in the press, and memories of the vio-
lence of 1992 and 1997 discussed above and of the political assassinations 
of Mboya and Ouko examined in chapter 3 rose to the surface. The most 
pressing question was whether or not Kenya’s historic culture of impunity 
would be allowed to continue. The hope was that this time would be dif-
ferent as evidence from investigations and observations by international 
agencies like Human Rights Watch and the new government’s own offi-
cial inquiry, the Waki Commission, clearly demonstrated that the violence 
had been orchestrated by Kenya’s politically connected class: elected poli-
ticians, employees of the civil service and security forces, and members of 
the media.71 Yet, the Waki Commission report, published in October 2008, 
failed to specifically finger perpetrators from among the highest echelons 
of the political elite—the commissioners were unwilling or unable to name 
their own bosses. The commission’s most significant contribution was its 
specific recommendations to establish a local tribunal to “seek account-
ability against persons bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes, par-
ticularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 General Elections 
in Kenya.”72 
As the next year elapsed and international pressure mounted on the 
Kenyan government to prosecute those responsible for the violence, no 
action was taken to establish the judicial framework recommended by the 
commission. despite their initial hopes, the wananchi were unsurprised; 
numerous Moi-era commissions had failed to go anywhere.73 In this con-
text, Kofi Annan sent the names of the alleged orchestrators of the vio-
lence to the ICC in the Hague during the summer of 2009. The Kenyan 
public was initially supportive, with “don’t be vague, let’s go to the Hague,” 
becoming a catchphrase around the country.74 
By december 2010, ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo had 
identified six individuals deemed most responsible for the violence. While 
Kibaki and Odinga were not named, MP and deputy Prime Minister 
Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, MP William Ruto, as well as the 
commissioner of police, the director of a Kalenjin-language radio station, 
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and four key political operatives were eventually indicted to wide inter-
national praise.75 Almost a year into his first term, Obama commented, 
“Kenya is turning a page in its history, moving away from impunity and di-
visionism  toward an era of accountability and equal opportunity.”76 In 
early 2012, charges were confirmed for four of the six indictees, including 
Kenyatta and Ruto. At the same time, Kenya was engaged in crafting a new 
constitution, a key stipulation of the 2008 power-sharing agreement, and 
in August 2010 Kenyans voted on a new constitution aimed at establish-
ing a federalized system of government with clear checks on presidential 
power. Accepted with 68 percent of the vote, the constitution fundamen-
tally changed Kenya’s political landscape, breaking up colonial-era prov-
inces and devolving power into forty-seven counties, each with its own 
governor and county legislature.77 
Questions of devolution, justice, and Kenya’s relations with the 
West dominated the political scene in the buildup to the March 2013 
presidential elections as establishment politicians jockeyed for posi-
tion and formed new coalitions.78 Prime Minister Odinga emerged as 
the standard-bearer for the new Coalition for Reform and democracy 
(CORd).79 Ruto, who had held two ministerial posts in the second Ki-
baki government as well as being an MP, made his ICC indictment work 
for him, teaming up with fellow indictee Kenyatta; this “alliance of the 
accused” campaigned on the idea that the court was a neocolonial in-
stitution that the West was using to again determine Kenya’s fate.80 The 
pair’s political allies even went so far as to argue on the floor of the Par-
liament that Kenya should withdraw as a signatory to the Rome Statute, 
which had established the ICC. Summing up the attitude of Kenyat-
ta-Ruto supporters, Kiriatu Murungi, who was then minister of energy, 
argued, “If you look at the signatories of the statute you will see only 
African and former colonies appeared to be tried at the ICC. . . . There 
will be no American who will ever be tried by the ICC. no Briton will 
be tried at the ICC. no French will be tried at the ICC. Why should we 
allow ourselves, as independent countries, to willingly go back to colo-
nial or neo-colonial situations?”81 This notion began to resonate with 
Kenyans, evidenced by opinion polls showing a decline in earlier sup-
port for the ICC, especially in Kenyatta and Ruto strongholds. despite 
the slaughter in the Rift not even five years earlier, ordinary Kikuyu and 
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Kalenjin lined up behind their Big Men, believing that Kenyatta and 
Ruto had been unfairly targeted.82 
Representations, International Relations, and the  
“O Factor”: The Wananchi Write Back
Unsurprisingly, Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s unprecedented situations—simul-
taneously occupying top spots on the Jubilee Alliance ticket and on the 
docket of the ICC—attracted international attention. Foreign leaders and 
dignitaries hinted that a Kenyatta-Ruto administration would render 
Kenya a pariah state in the eyes of the international community. Obama 
made very few direct statements about the ICC or Kenya’s upcoming 
elections, and when the “Ocampo Six” were named, Obama urged “all of 
Kenya’s leaders, and the people whom they serve, to cooperate fully with 
the ICC investigation,” but he also cautioned, “no community should be 
singled out for shame or held collectively responsible. Let the accused 
carry their own burdens—and let us keep in mind that under the ICC 
process they are innocent until proven guilty.”83
A month before the 2013 elections, Obama again spoke in general 
terms, reiterating the call for peace: “The choice of who will lead Kenya is 
up to the Kenyan people. The United States does not endorse any candi-
date for office, but we do support an election that is peaceful and reflects 
the will of the people.”84 Overall, Obama’s statements reflected neutral sup-
port for the institution of the ICC and for Kenyan electoral sovereignty.
While the president’s words were measured, members of his adminis-
tration made more direct statements, suggesting that the ICC case would 
be significant to US relations with Kenya in the future. Responding to the 
president’s statement about the Kenya election, George Harris, special 
assistant to the president and senior director for African affairs, stressed 
that the election was “a moment to put strife and impunity firmly in 
the past.”85 More pointedly, Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of 
state for African Affairs and former ambassador to Kenya, repeatedly 
responded at a press conference to questions about Kenyatta with the 
remark “Choices have consequences.”86 This language was widely quoted 
in the Kenyan media.
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Many Kenyans read the administration’s rhetoric as evidence of the 
neocolonial character of the ICC and of the West’s attitude toward Kenya’s 
domestic affairs. Opponents of Raila Odinga took statements by Obama 
and members of his administration as opportunities to bind Odinga with 
Obama, characterizing the Kenyan prime minister as a lackey of his fel-
low Luo and “cousin” in the White House. For instance, the Huffington 
Post reported in a widely reposted article that there was widespread be-
lief in Kenya in the “O Factor.” The article explained, “Obama, Ocampo, 
Odinga—they all share the distinctive first letter of members of the Luo 
tribe in Kenya, and some in this East African nation believe that the 
three are brothers in a conspiracy to see six suspects convicted at Ocam-
po’s Hague-based court so that Odinga can become president in the land 
where Obama’s father was born.”87
By the time the ICC case was launched, Odinga’s opponents had al-
ready been borrowing tactics and remaking rhetoric from the American 
Right to portray Raila as a dangerous extremist with disturbing politi-
co-religious ties to Kenya’s Muslim community and worrying ethnic and 
familial ties to the neocolonial West. For example, outlandish claims link-
ing Obama and Odinga published on WND—that Raila was an “Obama 
funded foreign thug who promised an Islamic state” and that the “commu-
nist” Raila’s career was being manipulated by a “democrat firm”—gained 
traction among anti-Odinga circles in Kenya.88 Indeed, when Miguna Mi-
guna, formerly a chief aide to Odinga, wrote a “tell-all” book about the 
prime minister after a bitter falling-out with him, Miguna forwarded his 
manuscript to Corsi, who promoted it on his website for months before 
copies hit the shelves in Kenya.89 Articles containing broad, unsubstan-
tiated claims about Raila’s purported political ineptitude appeared in a 
flurry in the more mainstream Kenyan media as well during the summer 
before Kenya’s election, providing fodder for Odinga’s and Obama’s re-
spective political opponents.90
As the campaigns heated up and the ICC cases developed, the inter-
national press covered events in Kenya and the Hague through the lens of 
“tribalism,” figuring another outbreak of “tribal violence” to be inevitable 
during the 2013 elections. For example, New York Times nairobi Bureau 
chief Jeffrey Gettleman invoked the same sort of simplistic, ahistorical 
analysis he had used to characterize the “tribal clashes” of 2008, writing, 
Political Violence and History at the Ballot Box  |  
“Every five years or so, this stable and typically peaceful country, an oasis 
of development in a very poor and turbulent region, suffers a frighten-
ing transformation in which age-old grievances get stirred up, ethnically 
based militias are mobilized and neighbors start killing neighbors.”91 One 
Cnn segment went so far as to showcase a costumed “local Kikuyu tribal 
militia” preparing for “war” by theatrically engaging in simulated fighting 
with bows and arrows for the camera.92
In the intervening years between the elections of 2007 and 2013, Ken-
yans had acquired new tools and technologies with which to “write back” 
against the simplistic depictions of their country’s history and politics as 
being driven solely by “tribal atavism.” The tremendous growth in Internet 
and mobile phone availability in Kenya gave the wananchi access to global 
content and global audiences and reinforced connections between Kenya 
and its politically interested, wealthy diaspora. now able to respond in 
real time to Kenya’s critics, Kenyans at home and abroad did so with satire 
and seriousness. For example, an article in the Daily Nation quipped that 
foreign journalists were “armed and ready to attack Kenya.”93 noting that 
foreign “demand for Kenyan clichés is outstripping supply,” the article pro-
posed an itinerary and lexicon to aid foreign journalists:
Outings for journalists will include a guided tour of Kibera, a nairobi 
slum. It should be described as Africa’s largest, teeming with resi-
dents who are resilient, cheerful and enterprising. trips to Mombasa 
will include word-packs with steamy, Moslem, tinderbox, golden 
sand and azure sea, designed to fit into any intro. Colour intros 
should include a reference to Happy Valley, Kenya cowboys, leafy 
suburbs and dusty streets. Finally foreign correspondents are urged 
to put their name for “Meet the Mungiki,” who have kindly agreed to 
perform a traditional oathing ceremony, which can be described as 
“bloodthirsty.” no goats will be harmed.94
More serious critiques were forthcoming as well. For example, Mukoma 
wa ngugi, an English professor at Cornell and son of Kenya’s most famous 
novelist, explained in one of Britain’s major dailies, “Journalists have been 
left behind by an Africa moving forward: not in a straight line, but in fits 
and starts, elliptically, and still full of contradictions of extreme wealth and 
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extreme poverty, but forward nevertheless.”95 Such pieces were comple-
mented by the voices of numerous members of the Kenyan media calling 
for peace and denouncing ethnic rhetoric as a political tool.96 
The elections of March 4, 2013, proved that ethnic violence was not 
an inevitable accompaniment to Kenya’s electoral process. By all reports, 
voting was carried out peacefully, with the wananchi turning out in high 
numbers at polling stations across the country. When tallies began to sug-
gest that the Kenyatta-Ruto ticket had defeated Odinga and his running 
mate, Kalonzo Musyoka, by the slimmest of majorities (50.07 percent of 
the vote), allegations of vote irregularities were voiced alongside calls for 
peace and unity. In this contested election, Kenyans took their challenges 
to the courts instead of to the streets. On March 30, 2013, the Kenya Su-
preme Court confirmed Kenyatta’s win, and Raila conceded his claim to 
the presidency.97
Since the beginning of the multiparty era, electoral violence rooted 
in a deep history of inequality and ethnically based patrimonialism has 
shaped the Kenyan political landscape. This violence went largely unac-
knowledged by the international press, which chose to recognize the un-
hampered elections of 2002 as confirmation of the West’s image of Kenya 
as “an island of peace in a sea of conflict.” When violence in 2008 shattered 
these illusions, Western observers read the situation through the uncom-
plicated lens of “tribal atavism.” 
Occurring in the same year as the violence, the election of the first 
African American president of the United States, and one of Kenyan de-
scent to boot, did not transform life in Kenya or US-Kenya relations, 
contrary to the expectations of many wananchi. Kenyans’ patrimonial 
expectations of their “son” did not accord with American political reali-
ties. At the same time, political pressure on Obama applied through the 
American Far Right’s continued efforts to paint Obama as a “son of the 
soil” of Western Kenya and thus a dangerous outsider were reinforced by 
images of “ethnic clashes” and “tribal war” in his alleged home country 
and by depictions of his purportedly close relationship with “his fellow 
Luo tribesman,” the “radical” Raila Odinga. For their part, by 2010 the 
wananchi consumed and reacted to these representations of Kenyan 
history, politics, and culture through mobilizing digital media to “write 
back” against them or to rework them to forward their own political 
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ends on the local and global levels. The upcoming final chapter delves 
deeper into American foreign policy toward Africa in the Obama era, 
inquiring into the ways in which the president’s Kenyan heritage has or 
has not interacted with American and Kenyan politics to shape his ad-
ministration’s approach to Africa.98
142
7
Obama for Africa or Africa for Obama?
Mr. deputy Speaker, Sir, indeed, history is in the making. I knew 
that we can all try to relate to President Obama in various ways. This 
morning I was listening to the BBC and I heard the Southern Suda-
nese claim that President Obama is Sudanese. Just sitting here next 
to my learned friend, Mr. James Orengo, he is saying that even the 
Irish are claiming parentage of President elect Barack Obama. Ev-
erybody is claiming a piece of Barack Obama. Be that as it may, what 
does it actually mean for the world today?
 —Kalonzo Musyoka, 20091
Across the continent, the initial years of the Obama administration were 
marked by a flurry of excitement about the potentially positive implications 
the election of the first African American president of the United States held 
for Africa. While the Kenyan press dubbed Obama “Kenya’s Gift to Amer-
ica,” efforts to claim the US president were certainly not confined to East 
Africa.2 discourses flowing from myriad African nations broadly embraced 
Obama as a symbol of diasporic leadership and simultaneously read his po-
litical ascendancy through conspicuously local politics of belonging. 
This chapter examines how Obama’s ascendancy has affected Africa, 
tracing the broad brushstrokes of American foreign policy to the microp-
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olitics of uneven development in the village of Kogelo. It explores whether 
the Obama administration’s Africa policy has reflected a nuanced, second- 
generation “immigrant insider” view of the continent’s place in the world 
or a more blunt Western perspective, that of a world leader interested pri-
marily in the primacy of American political power. It asks to what de-
gree the efforts to paint Obama as a “son of the soil” of Kenya discussed 
throughout this book have or have not influenced the administration’s Af-
rica policy. In so doing, the chapter addresses how since Obama’s election 
in 2008, Africans generally and Kenyans in particular have mobilized digi-
tal media to compare and contrast American politics with those across the 
continent, to articulate their expectations, desires, and disappointments 
vis-à-vis Obama, to hash out ethnic politics, and to write back against the 
inaccurate representations of Kenya’s past and present that have prolifer-
ated with Obama’s ascendancy.
Obama’s Kenyan heritage opened a space for lively debates about the 
nature of African versus American politics.3 From the 2008 campaign to 
the 2009 inauguration, African writers across the continent and through-
out the diaspora addressed the Americanness of Obama’s rise, drawing 
upon it to express African desires and African discontents. Kenyan com-
mentary was particularly pointed, suggesting that the politics of patronage 
would have made Obama’s ascendancy impossible in Kenya itself. Mark-
ing out a sharp contrast between Obama and the archetypal Big Man, 
one editorialist explained, “You are in business if you are a son of a past 
president or party leader, a political opportunist as opposed to a crusader 
for people’s rights, have vast wealth, have been on the political scene for 
awhile and can bring the advantage of your tribal numbers.”4 Likely with 
the histories of the entrenched Kikuyu and Luo political dynasties dis-
cussed in this book in mind, one writer even suggested that as a “Luo” in 
Kenya, Obama would have met the same fate as Odinga, Mboya, Ouko, 
and other past political luminaries.
In a similar vein, during the US campaign season, a writer from 
Cameroon described Obama’s success as a most extraordinary feat that 
could “only be achieved in America, the land of opportunities, even if 
these opportunities are not always equal,” and further speculated that 
if Obama had been born Cameroonian, local authorities “would have 
banned his political rallies, brutalised his followers and sympathisers, 
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and ordered [him] to toe the line.”5 And, while a writer from namibia 
called Obama’s rise stuff of “a fairytale nature” possible only in the United 
States, another author from Abuja noted that nigerians had to embrace 
a message of “change” emanating not from their own government but 
from America.6 
Celebrations of Obama’s rise were also made to speak to particular 
political contests and to Pan-Africanist attitudes more generally. For one, 
taking a cue from Obama’s own campaign rhetoric, the Zimbabwean op-
position party Movement for democratic Change (MdC) noted that the 
Obama election was “a victory of hope, faith, change, a restart, values and 
dreams which have underpinned our fight . . . against dictatorship and the 
neo-fascism of (President) Robert Mugabe.”7 Other writers from around 
the continent used the 2008 election to affirm broad, Afrocentric readings 
of world history, claiming, for instance, that Obama was simply the latest 
in a long line of “Great Black Men Who dominated the World.”8 The 2008 
US election provided an important space for Africans to debate “the poli-
tics of victimhood” versus “the politics of hope” in ways that both shined 
significant light on African governance generally and promoted local poli-
tics with an entrepreneurial spirit.9  
While the press and other media outlets across the continent ap-
proached Obama’s rise with largely unfettered optimism about the benefits 
that the election of an American president of Kenyan descent could poten-
Figures 7.1 and 7.2. “Obama Inc.” African merchants selling Obama wares in 
djenné, Mali (left), and Accra, Ghana (right). Photographs courtesy of doris 
Wright and don Wright.
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tially hold both for the continent as a whole and for their own localities, 
African scholars and intellectuals were more circumspect about what an 
Obama presidency would mean for Africa. For example, renowned Cam-
eroonian philosopher and political theorist Achille Mbembe remarked 
with caution during the campaign that even with all the praise erupting 
from across Africa, Obama himself had not yet “indicated a willingness 
to significantly depart from the outdated view of the continent that has 
underpinned US policy since the end of the Cold War.”10 Indeed, Africa 
seemed to feature only minimally in Obama’s larger foreign policy vi-
sions.11 According to a former assistant secretary of state for Africa who 
served as an adviser to the campaign, while Obama’s strategy for the conti-
nent was focused on economic integration, security, and democratization, 
this strategy was rarely addressed by the campaign.12 Further, analyses of 
the transcripts of the three presidential debates and the one vice presiden-
tial debate of 2008 show that “Africa” was uttered only three times and 
“Kenya” was mentioned just once.13  
After the excitement of the campaign and election died down, more 
sobering scholarly critiques of Obama’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa 
emerged—his Kenyan heritage provided no free passes. during the first 
years of the Obama presidency, scholars pointed out that despite an in-
crease in foreign aid during the Bush administration, the post-9/11 focus 
on the “war on terrorism” had actually eroded American diplomatic influ-
ence on the continent. taking note of the mounting pressure in domestic 
politics, the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the global eco-
nomic recession, intellectuals were quick to remark that Africans should 
not expect much more than “symbolic support” from the first African 
American president of the United States.14 
during the summer of 2009, Obama made his first presidential visits 
to the African continent, traveling to Egypt and then to Ghana—but not 
to Kenya. delivering a speech in Cairo popularly dubbed as “an address 
to the Muslim world,” he emphasized his own familial connections to Af-
rica and Islam with the aims of highlighting shared cultural affinities and 
diffusing popular notions that American foreign policy was shaped by re-
ligion.15 Perhaps as a reward for Ghana’s successful 2008 democratic elec-
tion, or their emerging role as a new oil-producing state, or as a nod to the 
long affinity African American civil rights leaders have had for the coun-
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try, Ghana’s coastal city of Accra was selected as the location for Obama’s 
first official statement in sub-Saharan Africa.16 Reflecting on Ghana’s his-
tory as the first country south of the Sahara to win freedom from colonial 
rule and emphasizing his African heritage, Obama’s remarks in Accra re-
inforced his policy agenda for the continent. His focus on the role Africans 
should play in fighting corruption and promoting development in a later 
speech before the Ghanaian Parliament echoed remarks he had made as 
a senator in regard to Kenya discussed in chapter 3. Obama argued, “We 
must start from the simple premise that Africa’s future is up to Africans. I 
say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this 
part of the world. After all, I have the blood of Africa within me, and my 
family’s own story encompasses both the tragedies and triumphs of the 
larger African story.”17
Media and scholarly responses to the statement and speeches and to 
the Obama administration’s Africa policy followed trajectories like those 
of reactions to the 2008 campaign and election. Both the Cairo and the 
Ghana speeches were met with great celebration and fanfare in the domes-
tic and international press, signaling perhaps hopes for a new and more 
personalized engagement with Africa by the administration. Scholars in 
turn were quick to point out the disconnects between hopeful expecta-
tions and policy. Early assessments of the Obama administration’s track 
record regarding Africa pointed to more continuities than changes. For 
example, while at first glance portions of the Accra statement seem to sug-
gest a departure from neocolonial modes of political engagement with the 
continent, Obama’s repeated stressing that African issues should be left 
“up to Africans” was reminiscent of a 1970s call by Jimmy Carter for “Afri-
can solutions to African problems.”18 
In many respects, however, Obama’s approach to Africa was ham-
strung by global forces. The advent of the world economic recession and 
the ongoing “global war on terror” left little political and practical capital 
for fresh initiatives on the continent. Consequently the administration’s 
African agenda mirrored long-established paradigms of engagement 
through humanitarian aid, security issues, and the politics of oil. Of these, 
security initiatives have been the most visible element of the administra-
tion’s approach to Africa and reflect the legacy of the Bush administration’s 
“global war on terrorism.”
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From active military involvement in Libya to US support for antiter-
rorism operations in Somali, security interventions even inspired a feel-
ing among some African politicians that Obama’s foreign policy agenda 
was detrimental to Africa. For instance, some critics of the US military 
intervention to overthrow Mu‘ammar Gadhafi of Libya in 2011 argued 
that Obama’s actions were contrary to historic Pan-Africanist goals of 
African unity. dictator of Libya for decades and chairperson of the Af-
rican Union (AU) from 2009 to 2010, Gadhafi lent significant financial 
support to the AU. He had also been a major supporter of the antiapart-
heid movement, so much so that one of nelson Mandela’s grandsons 
was called “Gaddafi.”19 The patronage of the “King of Kings” (Gadhafi 
had been styled as such by a conclave of one hundred Kenyan elders for 
whom he sponsored a lavish junket to Libya in 2010) on the continent 
extended even to the humble shores of Lake Victoria, as members of the 
Luo Council of Elders (LCE) made several trips to Libya between 2009 
and 2011, returning each time with monetary donations.20 This sort of 
patronage, carried out on a microscale but across far-flung locales, to-
gether with a nostalgia for Kwame nkrumah’s vision of a “United States 
of Africa” that Gadhafi had cleverly co-opted, prompted strong cri-
tiques of the Obama administration’s activities in Libya in particular and 
across the continent more generally. Most boldly, namibian prime min-
ister nahas Angula asserted, “Obama did not show any respect for the 
African continent during his first term.”21 Generally less influenced by 
notions of “respect” and “diasporic responsibility” than members of the 
media, numerous scholars have posited that the administration’s modes 
of engagement on the continent gave lie to Obama’s rhetoric voiced in 
Accra that “Africa’s future is up to Africans.”22
By the beginning of Obama’s second term in office, the formerly glow-
ing estimates of African media outlets had taken on more critical tones 
as well. While people across the continent widely celebrated Obama’s re-
election, the level of excitement, even in Kenya, was nowhere near that of 
2008.23 African supporters in 2012 often framed their praise less with pre-
sumptions of diasporic loyalty and more with inducements to the Ameri-
can president to work harder for the continent. For one, a Kenyan editorial 
in the wake of Obama’s 2012 electoral victory expressed both resounding 
praise and an overt call for more action: 
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Africanists who believe Obama has not helped the continent out 
of its vicious cycle of violent conflict, poor governance and wanton 
poverty will be looking for hope in the sober and humane face of 
Obama to light their lives. He cannot shy away from the conflicts 
in Congo, the Maghreb or Horn of Africa any more. Obama should 
look beyond the Arab-Israel conflict and take his eyes off Iran, which 
has become the pet obsession of the West. There is more to world 
peace than Iran’s exaggerated nuclear program.24
Writing after Obama’s reelection, many African journalists offered expla-
nations of why the president had demonstrated no special commitment 
to the continent during his first term, a number positing that pressures on 
Obama to show clearly that he was a “son of the soil” of the United States had 
played a role. For example, Boniface Mwangi, a Kenyan photographer and 
political activist who admitted Obamamania drove him to take out a loan 
to finance his US trip to the 2009 inauguration, read the administration’s 
lack of special concern with Africa through the lenses of political patron-
age in Kenya and the complex politics of “belonging” in the United States. 
While he noted Obama’s links to Kenya and Africa with pride and expressed 
hopes that Obama’s second term would lead to more tangible engagement, 
his optimism was tempered by the recognition that the president’s approach 
to Africa was circumscribed by domestic politics. He explained, “Obama is 
afraid of how he’ll be judged, how he’ll come out. So he’s not truly himself.”25 
More pointedly, in a New York Times op-ed, Kenyan journalist Murithi 
Mutiga noted simply, “Obama has not been perfect,” but also included a 
lengthy rebuttal of the American Far Right’s efforts to paint Obama as a 
Kenyan socialist that this book details in chapter 4.26 Responding directly 
to attempts to situate Obama in an inaccurate, revisionist narrative of 
Kenyan history, Mutiga worked to reframe Kenya’s relation to the United 
States, underscoring, “Kenya is anything but a socialist haven. Since in-
dependence in 1963, Kenya has been America’s staunchest ally in East Af-
rica.”27 Such reflections point to the keen awareness among Kenyans of 
how Obama’s personal history, and by extension the history of Kenya, was 
being distorted, politicized, and exploited abroad.
Four years after his visits to Accra and Cairo, a five-day, three-country 
African tour marked Obama’s first substantial engagement with the con-
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tinent during his second term, undertaken at a time when his popularity 
on the continent and foreign policy approval numbers had dropped sig-
nificantly since the euphoria expressed in 2008.28 The itinerary—Senegal, 
South Africa, and tanzania—was targeted to speak to America’s contem-
porary interests in and historical ties to the continent. The bulk of the tour 
was devoted to South Africa, which receives more than one-third of all 
US exports to Africa.29 There the Obamas visited nelson Mandela’s cell at 
the Robben Island Prison, which offered a space to reflect on the United 
States and South Africa’s common historical experiences of profound ra-
cial discrimination and heroic civil rights struggles. An official stop at the 
infamous and controversial “door of no return,” through which slaves de-
parted from Senegal’s Gorée Island, emphasized the United States’ historic 
connections with West Africa. And a wreath-laying ceremony paying trib-
ute to victims of the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in dar es 
Salaam, tanzania, served to reinforce ties forged between the two coun-
tries in fighting the “global war on terror.”30 Official rhetoric throughout 
the trip remained little changed from that of 2009. Kenya was not a part of 
this second and more extensive African tour. 
Questions of when Obama would next visit Kenya persisted after the 
2009 visit. For example, in a brief interview on the eve of Vice President 
Joe Biden’s trip to Kenya in 2010, Rachael nakitare, a senior producer 
and journalist with the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), queried 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4. President Obama (left) looking out from the infamous slave 
quarters on Gorée Island in Senegal. Michelle Obama (right) places a wreath with 
tanzanian first lady Salma Kikwete at the dar es Salaam memorial to the victims of 
the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombing of the United States Embassy Building. Official White 
House photos, https://www.whitehouse.gov/africa-trip-2013.
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Obama about plans to visit the country. Obama made the widely cited 
comment, “Well, I’m positive that before my service as President is com-
pleted I will visit Kenya again.”31 Thus, when plans were being discussed 
for the 2013 African tour, Kenyans were hopeful that their country would 
receive the special recognition accorded to South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, 
and tanzania, and were optimistic that they might get an opportunity to 
relive the Obamamania of 2008 through pageantry and an official visit.32 
However, the highly contentious results of Kenya’s March 2013 elections 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments of Uhuru Kenyatta 
and William Ruto, the newly elected president and vice president, disquali-
fied Kenya from potential itineraries. Indeed, during a televised “town hall” 
meeting in South Africa in 2013, Obama spoke to what members of the Ken-
yan press had deemed a “snub” of his ancestral homeland.33 Alluding to the 
indictments, he explained, “I was very proud to see the restraint in which 
the election was held. We did not see a repeat of the violence that we saw in 
the last election. But with a new administration that’s also having to manage 
some of the international issues around the ICC, I did not think it was the 
optimal time for me to visit. But as I said, I’m going to— I’ve got three and a 
half years. So if in three years and seven months I’m not in Kenya, then you 
can fault me for not following through on my promise.”34 
Kenyans offered a variety of responses to Obama’s decision to not visit 
the country. Most dramatically, Vice President William Ruto’s comments 
hinted that the “snub” potentially threatened bilateral relations, arguing, 
“Obama’s failure to visit the country does not stop us running the govern-
ment. We have other friendly nations we will partner with.”35 Kenyans easily 
grasped the politics of a presidential visit and the shape of the tacit dialogue 
between the American president and the Kenyan vice president being car-
ried out in public remarks. As one Kisumu resident remarked, “I understand 
Obama’s decision. His relatives in Kogelo, and in fact all of nyanza will be 
sad, but our politicians are corrupt, so what can we expect?”36 nonetheless, 
disappointment was palpable in Kenya as Obama again stayed away. For 
example, in responding to the selection of tanzania over Kenya, one Luo 
noted, “It is like hearing that your son came so close to home, but just visited 
your neighbours and not you his father or mother.”37
We next turn to developments in Obama’s “home cubed” since his 
election in 2008.
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Back in Kenya: A Tale of Two Kogelos
Returning to Kogelo in May 2013, we were pleasantly surprised that the 
sixty-kilometer drive from Kisumu was smooth and quick. Recalling a 
similar journey in 2004 that took several hours on dilapidated roads, we 
speculated that Obama’s election had stimulated tangible investments in 
his paternal homeland. Indeed, with the international attention showered 
on Kogelo since 2008, the area has received a boost in development as-
sistance from the Kenyan government. As we experienced firsthand, the 
formerly tortuously bumpy road to Kogelo from the main Kisumu-Bondo 
highway was upgraded and paved, and electricity was connected to the 
small village in Siaya County for the first time. Aiming to capitalize on 
this fresh attention, investors trickled into Kogelo, driving up local land 
prices and starting a few new business ventures during the first years of 
the Obama presidency.38 Also, tourists interested in the president’s ances-
tral home made their way to Western Kenya. However, by 2013, the initial 
excitement of Obamamania had died down, and the rural landscape of 
Kogelo reflected increasing inequality. The Obama family’s ties to Kogelo 
were not necessarily a boon to all the village’s residents.39 
Kogelo is now a community of contrast. Run-down maduka, small 
kiosk shops, and businesses visibly struggling to make ends, so typical 
of many rural Kenyan communities, stand at the market crossroad of the 
town center. However, the paved road forks at a glossy sign for the Ko-
Figures 7.5 and 7.6. The main building at the Kogelo Village Resort (left) contrasted 
with a local business at the main trading center (right), less than two hundred 
meters away, in May 2013. Photographs by author.
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gelo Village Resort and the Senator Obama Kogelo Secondary School, 
leading ultimately to the homestead of Obama’s step-grandmother, who 
is affectionately known as “Mama Sarah” or “Granny Sarah.” The resort, 
which opened in 2011, features well-manicured lawns and a swimming 
pool (under construction) opposite the three-story building some Kogelo 
residents call the “White House.” The resort is owned by nicholas Rajula, a 
controversial former local official and self-proclaimed cousin of President 
Obama.40 Financed in part by a loan of close to twenty million Kenyan 
shillings (KSH) from the Kenya tourism development Corporation and 
benefiting from waivers on VAt and import taxes, the property has been 
reported to be worth close to 80 million KSH (close to 1 million US dol-
lars).41 With rooms named “Michelle,” “Sasha,” “Malia,” and “Mama Sarah,” 
it is clear that the resort’s goal is to market the president’s connections to 
Kenya—and to Kogelo. The resort’s manager reported a slow but steady 
growth in visitors, adding that the hotel was not yet operating at capacity 
(in summer 2013), and served mainly out-of-town tourists and local pol-
iticians.42 
traveling down the road from the hotel, one immediately passes the 
Senator Obama Kogelo Secondary School, which, as its name suggests, 
has also benefited the president’s connection to the area. Since 2006, the 
institution, formerly Kogelo School, has seen nearly a 100 percent increase 
in enrollment, stimulated mainly by the speculation that scholarship op-
portunities abroad would be forthcoming. donations from abroad have 
trickled in, including a 2009 gift of $35,000 from the Corporate Coun-
cil on Africa for new classroom space.43 Past the new construction at the 
resort and school, the road then winds down a few more meters to the 
imposing gate of the Obama homestead. no longer can visitors just arrive 
at Granny Sarah’s doorstep as they did in 2008; a newly constructed po-
lice barracks guards the compound twenty-four hours a day. The roughly 
half-mile span of road between the Obama homestead and the main road 
reveals the full scope of recent development in Kogelo. Infrastructure has 
been upgraded and local health-care facilities improved. However, the 
profound economic benefits envisioned for all Kogelo residents in 2008 
have been realized by only a select few. 
The brief development boom and growing inequality in Kogelo did 
not translate into an increase in the village’s political clout. By 2013, even 
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the mystique surrounding the Obama name had begun to fade. For in-
stance, President Obama’s half brother Malik launched a campaign for the 
governorship of Siaya County, but the campaign failed to gain political 
momentum. Without the backing of Raila Odinga’s OdM party, Malik 
campaigned as an independent and garnered less than 1 percent of the 
total votes.44 As one reflects back on the dreams and grand visions Kogelo 
residents espoused from 2004 to 2008, two key points become clear. The 
election of a “Luo” to the White House did not translate into the windfall 
that residents would have expected based on their experiences of patrimo-
nial politics at home. However, the ascendancy of Obama quite literally 
put Kogelo on the map.45 At the same time, the voices of its residents began 
to be heard around the world. The next section turns to how the increas-
ing digitization of media has enabled the wananchi (citizens) to speak to 
global audiences about Kenya’s past and present. 
Debating Contested Histories and the Politics of  
Belonging in the Digital Age
Much of the story of Obama and Kenya has unfolded in a world of in-
creasingly digitized media. Whether engaging with the political blogo-
sphere in the United States or the growing digital platforms of African 
news media, readers around the world who are interested in Obama and 
Kenya are more likely to search for answers through Google than they 
are to scan the shelves of bookstores and libraries. When we first began 
this project in 2004, it would have been hard to imagine Kogelo residents 
posting on Facebook or twitter and reading Kenyan newspapers on their 
mobile phones. However, in the period of Obama’s ascendancy, Kenya has 
witnessed a massive increase in “connectivity.” With over 50 percent of 
the population now online and more than thirty million mobile phone 
subscriptions throughout the country, the digital spaces for Kenyans to 
comment publicly on their own histories are increasing exponentially.46 
today’s African intellectuals and amateur historians who have taken to 
the Internet have the potential to reach much broader and more diverse 
audiences than did their forebears whose pamphlets and vernacular news-
papers we explored in chapter 3. As the explosion of discourse on Obama 
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and Kenya shows, digital media offer Kenyans spaces in which to shape 
international representations of local issues and to debate the politics of 
“belonging” from the local to the global.
The proliferation of mobile phone and Internet technologies through-
out the country is helping Kenyans increasingly to express their political 
ideas online. For much of the twentieth century, Kenyans had little chance 
to compete with global representations of their past and present—and 
certainly could not do so in real time. As we learned in earlier chapters, 
in the colonial era, black Kenyans’ opportunities to express discontent 
with the colonial regime and challenge the ways in which Kenyan cul-
ture and history were represented by British colonials were strongly cir-
cumscribed. Fifty years after independence, Kenyans can and do take to 
twitter and Facebook to respond in real time to scathing Western news 
reports like those addressed in the previous chapter or exploitative cine-
matic portrayals such as those we learned about in chapter 1. For example, 
in 2012, Cnn’s coverage of an Al-Shabaab attack in nairobi that framed 
the incident as representative of endemic violence throughout the region 
sparked outrage among Kenyan viewers who critiqued the network’s over-
wrought portrayal via “#SomeonetellCnn.” The Kenyan public’s tweeted 
responses to the report were so overwhelmingly negative that the Cnn’s 
East Africa correspondent actually apologized for misrepresenting Kenya 
to the network’s global audience, an unprecedented move that would likely 
have never occurred in a slower print age.47 
Social and digital news media offer Kenyans at home an important way 
to push back at the global representations of African affairs. These spaces 
are also key media of exchange between East Africa and the three-million- 
strong Kenyan diaspora, which remits over a billion dollars to Kenya 
annually.48 nonetheless, while digital fora offer a chance for Kenyans to 
participate in the narration of their country’s past and present, the global 
reach of media giants like the New York Times, Cnn, and BBC make the 
playing field anything but equal. 
Social media also offer an increasingly important space to debate local 
politics of belonging and to hold political elites increasingly account-
able for their actions. For example, when former vice president Kalonzo 
Musyoka dismissed a question at an April 2014 press conference because 
of the journalist’s ethnicity (Musyoka made an assumption based on the 
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journalist’s surname), Kenyans took to twitter in droves to call out Musy-
oka. Within just forty-eight hours after the televised press conference 
on Kenya’s ntV, more than 11,000 tweets had responded to the hashtag 
#SomeonetellKalonzoMusyoka and another 2,000 to a related hashtag, 
#EthnicityinKenya.49 Comments about the politics of ethnicity in con-
temporary Kenya were revealing as many dismissed the former VP as a 
“tribalist,” while others admitted that Musyoka’s comments “portray what 
many think, but don’t say.”50 
In a similar vein, from late spring 2014 into winter 2015, Gatundu 
South member of Parliament (MP) Moses Kuria took to Facebook and 
twitter to condemn the OdM opposition led by Raila Odinga in a series of 
posts that accused OdM of supporting terrorist attacks in Lamu and went 
so far as to revive the infantilizing old charge that Luo were “boys” rather 
than “men” because Luo do not circumcise, which is the Kikuyu marker 
of adulthood. After online outrage over Kuria’s comments overflowed into 
the Kenyan press, the country’s director of public prosecutions, Keriako 
tobiko, initiated a charge of hate speech against the MP.51
Yet, while digital media have offered Kenyans at home and abroad new 
avenues and ease of expression, this freedom has also worked divisively to 
reinforce the importance of ethnic identification and local politics of “be-
longing.” At the most extreme ends, as we learned in the previous chapter, 
rumors and hate speech were spread widely through mass text messaging 
and vernacular radio in order to incite violence after the 2007 elections.52 
More benignly, among Luo people, debates about the political and moral 
definitions of “Luoness,” about “claiming” Obama, and about the politics 
of “belonging” carried out in vernacular online forums like jaluo.com 
and the Luo Union Facebook group and on the vernacular radio station 
Ramgoi FM continue to reinforce the notions of Luo identity discussed 
throughout this book.53 
At the same time that digital media, ranging from chat rooms to com-
ment boxes to social media platforms, have provided sources and spaces 
for challenging misrepresentations of Kenya’s past and present, easily ac-
cessible online materials have also provided fodder with which to reinforce 
them and spaces of comfortable anonymity and unaccountability from 
which to cast aspersions on Obama, which are purportedly historically 
based, but are in fact historically biased. For instance, one commenter on 
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the Right-leaning website the daily Caller coined the nickname “O’Mau 
Mau” to refer to the president.54 And, as noted above, digital media–based 
misrepresentation has gone global as Obama’s opponents have mobilized 
online news sources from the continent and Kenyan government sources 
(newly available on Google Books) to stake claims about Obama’s being 
a “son of the soil” of Kenya. While as scholars it is tempting to dismiss 
these flawed readings of Kenya’s past and present as outlandish prattle, it is 
important to keep in mind that a significant proportion of the American 
public takes them at face value and recycles them into popular political 
discourse through various media platforms where they gain deeper trac-
tion and continue to do political work, ginning up racial prejudice and 
reinforcing a provincial politics of belonging. 
Overall, the representations of Kenya’s politics and history that we 
have examined throughout this book point to how easily ideas of “be-
longing” can be manipulated to serve political ends and how seemingly 
static self-evident categories like “tribe” are in fact dynamic and compli-
cated, capable of doing important political work. The African dimension 
of the story of the first African American to hold the presidency of the 
United States will undoubtedly be a continued source of scholarly debate 
for years to come. Indeed, the Obama and Kenya story is still evolving, 
and the narratives produced within a larger geopolitical context can tell 
us a great deal about Kenya’s contested past and the ways African issues 
are represented more broadly. They also tell us that the past is constantly 
being renegotiated in the present and that history and contested historical 
interpretations are often an underlying source of debate on a whole host 
of contemporary issues. The following epilogue continues to address these 
themes in the context of Obama’s 2015 “homecoming” in Kenya, the first 
visit of a sitting US president to Kenya.
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Epilogue
Tuko Pamoja—We Are together
On the evening of July 24, 2015, Air Force One touched down at nairobi’s 
Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, bringing Barack Obama back to his 
“home cubed” for the first time in nearly ten years. The president arrived 
in Kenya for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES) in nairobi and 
to meet with Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta. Obama then traveled to 
neighboring Ethiopia to meet with President Mulatu teshome in Addis 
Ababa, also the headquarters of the African Union (AU). All the events 
were contained within a brief, three-day East African diplomatic junket. 
In the almost three decades since Obama had first visited Kenya, 
bumping along the road to Kogelo in his sister Auma’s dilapidated Volk-
swagen Beetle, the country had experienced tremendous transformations 
and crises, as we have discussed throughout this book. In the months lead-
ing up to this historic visit, speculation swirled both in Kenya and in the 
United States about how Obama, as the first Kenyan American president 
and the first sitting American president to visit Kenya, would engage with 
Kenya’s contested domestic and international politics and with his own 
complicated heritage. 
A whirlwind of controversy incorporating many of the tropes explored 
in this book encompassed the visit. As we have illustrated throughout, 
discourse about the Obama-Kenya connection is often rife with hyper-
bole, historical inaccuracies, and political misinformation. Critiques of 
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the president’s trip were no exception as alarmist voices touched on issues 
ranging from terrorism to tribalism to Birtherism. 
Critics used blanket warnings about “terrorism” and gruesome de-
scriptions of attacks by Al-Shabaab, the radical Somali-based Islamist ter-
ror group with links to Al-Qaeda, to question Obama’s decision to visit 
Kenya. The US and Kenyan governments jointly announced Obama’s 
visit on March 30.1 Three days later, Al-Shabaab conducted a bloody as-
sault on Garissa University College in northeast Kenya, during which 148 
people were killed on a campus near a Kenyan military base where se-
curity forces waited hours to intervene. Pundits questioned the wisdom 
of making a trip to such a purportedly perilous country despite the fact 
that Garissa is far removed from nairobi and the attack followed regional 
patterns of insecurity and political violence that have plagued northeast 
Kenya for decades.2 Other commentators like William Bellamy, ambassa-
dor to Kenya under George W. Bush, suggested that while it was unlikely 
that Al-Shabaab would attack the president and his entourage directly, the 
group might exploit the high-profile visit to attack elsewhere in nairobi, 
“embarrassing” Kenya as the world watched. 3 Recalling earlier occasions 
when other periods of political violence and insecurity were dismissed as 
evidence of persistent primordial “tribalism,” Western media accounts re-
garded the Garissa attack through the simplistic, totalizing prism of the 
“global war on terrorism” (GWOt). 
Most bluntly, shortly before the visit, Cnn published an article by its 
Pentagon correspondent asserting that in traveling to Kenya, “President 
Barack Obama [is] not just heading to his father’s homeland, but to a hot-
bed of terror.”4 On the same day, the network introduced a segment about 
precautions and measures surrounding the president’s trip with the tagline 
“And now security concerns for President Obama on the eve of his trip to 
one of the most dangerous countries in the world.”5 Similar critiques fol-
lowed, with one writer going so far as to suggest, “Kenya is arguably more 
treacherous for the president than Afghanistan.”6  
Cnn also tweeted the story and Kenyans responded in kind, mar-
shaling the power of social media and the country’s increasing economic 
strength to contest the inflammatory, broad-brush images of their coun-
try depicted in the Western media.7 taking to twitter and reviving the 
hashtag #SomeonetellCnn discussed in the previous chapter, the wanan-
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chi (citizens) mocked Cnn by appropriating the term “hotbed,” often with 
wry humor, and using it to underscore Kenya’s growing economic clout, 
achievements, and culture: “Kenya is a hotbed of entrepreneurship ideas,”8 
“Kenya is a hotbed of champions,”9 “Kenya is a hotbed of BBQ!”10 As one 
Kenyan tweet suggested, “I think we can now safely say that Kenya should 
request Copyright of the term ‘Hotbed of . . .’ From @Cnn We actually 
LOVE using the term nowadays,”11 and another observed, “The term ‘hot-
bed’ has become vernacular in Kenya.”12 
By way of an official response to the Western press’s myopic view of 
contemporary Kenya, the Kenya tourism Board (KtB), the government 
agency charged with promoting Kenya’s tourist industry, suspended a 
million-dollar advertising deal with Cnn that was intended to market 
Kenya to a global audience.13 And President Kenyatta, speaking at the 
GES, reclaimed the “hotbed” vernacular, describing Kenya as a “hotbed 
of vibrant culture, national beauty, and infinite possibility.”14 taking ac-
tion that reflected the growing power of Kenya’s national brand, Cnn 
global executive director and managing director tony Maddox even 
flew to nairobi in August to apologize in person to President Uhuru 
Kenyatta.15 
Objections to the trip did not focus solely on terrorism. Echoing 
the misconceptions about Kenyan history and ethnic politics analyzed 
throughout this book, critics also posed tribalism as potentially threaten-
ing to the (Luo) American president in Kenya. For example, in a widely 
cited article on the upcoming Kenya visit, Robert Rotberg speculated that 
the mere presence of Obama, particularly if he decided to visit Kogelo, 
would “do nothing for inter-group harmony in that volatile country.”16 He 
asked: 
do President Obama and his advisors realize that the president’s fa-
ther was a Luo and that the Luo largely backed President Kenyatta’s 
opponent in the 2012 Kenyan presidential election? The rift between 
Luo and the Kikuyu (President Kenyatta’s people) dates back to at 
least Obama’s father’s era when Jomo Kenyatta, Uhuru Kenyatta’s fa-
ther, ruled Kenya and was opposed by Oginga Odinga. In the last 
presidential contest, which Uhuru Kenyatta won, his chief opponent 
was Raila Odinga, son of Oginga Odinga.17
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Leaving aside that Rotberg was off by a year in regard to the date of the 
Kenya elections, with this query, he revives the tropes of atavistic tribalism 
and the notion of literally inheritable ethnic animosity we explored ear-
lier and thus thrusts Obama into the midst of a historical-political rivalry 
where he does not belong. Responding to the article’s ahistoricity and eth-
nic stereotyping, the wananchi mobilized social media, taking Rotberg to 
task on twitter, chiding the author with remarks such as “LMAO. Robert 
Rotberg say Obama shouldn’t visit Kenya coz his dad was Luo and Uhuru 
is Kikuyu,”18 and “#SomeonetellRotberg playing the tribalism card wont 
work.”19 
From tweets and Facebook posts to the blogosphere, Kenyans reacted 
forcefully to this simplistic ethnic argument. noted blogger dikembe de-
sembe, for instance, critiqued Rotberg for proposing that the trip could 
morph into a full-scale “Luo-Kikuyu schism,” suggesting that such a 
view revealed Rotberg’s “ignorance of ‘contentious issues’ in contempo-
rary Luo-Kikuyu relations in all aspects of public life.”20 He further took 
Rotberg to task for not understanding how Kenyans, particularly the Ki-
kuyu elite, regarded the visit as a boost to Kenyan global entrepreneurship 
rather than as an exercise in ethnic politics.21 Responding on the popular 
website of the Sahan Journal to Rotberg’s argument about the visit stoking 
ethnic conflict, Jamal Axmad-Guudle pointed out that Obama would be 
visiting Kenya first as head of state and “second as a son of Kenya,” a fact 
clearly recognized by the wananchi.22
Other critiques of the trip vis-à-vis Obama’s Kenyan heritage centered 
not on tribalism but on whether the president’s personal connections 
were influencing US political interests. For instance, on the day Obama 
arrived in Kenya, Fox news host Bret Baier posted a query on his Face-
book page: “Is President Obama’s Kenya trip necessary, or just Obama 
self-indulgence?”23 Responses from the Fox audience ranged from the 
expected, “Think we all could think of a better way to spend 2,000,000 
dollars, rather than on a flight to visit family in Kenya. Just another way 
to hide from his responsibilities as President,” to the absurdist “Free trip 
to see his brothers, and set up the wedding of his daughter, she is worth 
20 goats and some chickens, and probably a meeting with the muslim 
brotherhood to get his terrorist award for his work at the destruction of 
america, its his legacy.”24 
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In an interesting reversal, the wananchi trolled Fox, overwhelming the 
Baier thread with their comments. In addition to welcoming Obama and 
shining a light on Kenya’s culture and achievements—“Yes it was wise for 
him to come and see our #magicalkenya and also get a feel of M-PESA 
money transfer technology”—Kenyans expressed profound dismay at 
Americans’ racist suppositions and seemingly willful lack of knowledge 
about Kenya. One Kenyan commentator succinctly summed up by invok-
ing the newly fashionable term “hotbed”: “The comments here are a true 
hotbed of ignorance and stupidity. Period.”25
Unsurprisingly, Birthers, whose movement we explored in chapter 
4, have been very well represented in online forums pertaining to the 
trip like the Facebook page addressed above. Throughout this book, we 
have argued that Obama’s relationship to Kenya has been profoundly 
constrained by the American Right’s use of his Kenyan heritage to in-
dict him as “foreign,” as “un-American,” as “untrustworthy,” and as 
“Other.” Speaking to the New York Times on the eve of the visit, david 
Axelrod, former chief strategist to the president, addressed the issue, 
explaining, “If you’re asking me, ‘Was there a political discussion as to 
whether it would be disadvantageous to show up in Kenya when donald 
trump was questioning his citizenship,’ I don’t recall ever having that 
discussion,” adding witheringly, “But maybe no one needed to have that 
discussion.”26
discourse surrounding the trip, even some comments offered jokingly 
by the president himself, further bears out the contention that Far Right 
pressures have restricted Obama’s relationship with Kenya. For instance, 
appearing on Fox news the day the trip was announced, John Sununu, 
former governor of new Hampshire and chief of staff to George H. W. 
Bush, argued that by visiting Kenya, Obama would be reviving the passion 
of Birthers. He explained, “I think his trip back to Kenya is going to create 
a lot of chatter and commentary amongst some of the hard right who still 
don’t see him as having been born in the U.S. . . . I personally think he’s just 
inciting some chatter on an issue that should have been a dead issue a long 
time ago.”27 Obama himself addressed the critiques with humor during his 
toast at the state dinner welcoming him to Kenya, saying, “I suspect some 
of my critics back home are suggesting that I’m back here to look for my 
birth certificate. . . . That’s not the case,”28 and stated in his speech to the 
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wananchi at Safaricom Indoor Arena that he was “proud” to be “the first 
Kenyan-American to be President of the United States.”29 
Keeping in line with the conspiracy theories that have followed Obama 
since 2008, Birthers, including Fox news commentator todd Starnes, took 
to social media to parse the purportedly hidden meaning of the president’s 
remarks, suggesting that Obama was tacitly admitting to having been born 
in Kenya.30 Birther narratives have continued into the 2016 US presidential 
campaigns, even though Obama is not legally eligible to run for reelection. 
A September 2015 Cnn poll found that 20 percent of Americans still be-
lieve that Obama was not born in the United States, and nearly 30 percent 
claim that he is Muslim.31
Whether critiquing the trip through claims about Kenya’s insecurity, 
the threat posed by tribalism, or Obama’s personal “indulgence,” com-
mentators fail to recognize the geopolitical importance of Kenya and its 
significance to the US interests on the continent. In the last one and a 
half decades, Kenya has emerged as a key strategic partner, along with 
Ethiopia, in efforts to degrade Al-Shabaab in East Africa and Al-Qaeda 
in the Horn. Since the 2011 invasion of southern Somalia by the Kenyan 
defense Forces, the United States has poured hundreds of millions into re-
gional counterterrorism operations. As part of the African Union–backed 
AMISOM mission, Kenya has maintained a strong military presence in 
Somalia and has been a clandestine supporter of US drone strikes and 
counterterrorism operations in the Horn.32 
Critics of the trip also tended to overlook Kenya’s economic signifi-
cance, not merely as a regional center but also as a global growth center. 
With an annual growth rate of close to 6 percent in 2015 (the World Bank 
predicted similar rising rates to continue until at least 2018), Kenya has 
emerged as a regional economic powerhouse.33 In particular, the country 
has become a hub of manufacturing industry and technical innovation. 
For example, in his video promoting the GES and welcoming businesses 
to Kenya and “to opportunity,” President Kenyatta, standing in front of a 
backdrop of nairobi’s high-rise skyline, described Kenya as “a land once 
known for its savanna, now earning international repute as a silicon sa-
vanna.”34 More specifically, the Kenyan telecom giant, Safaricom, which 
has more than twenty million subscribers, pioneered the mobile money 
transfer service M-Pesa and has recently developed M-Shwari, a mobile 
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banking system.35 In 2013, the company acquired branding rights to the 
stadium-arena complex where Obama addressed the wananchi, changing 
its name from Moi International Sports Centre to Safaricom Stadium and 
Safaricom Indoor Arena.36 
Cementing its historic role as the regional corridor for trade and op-
portunity in Eastern Africa, Kenya has recently made strategic investments 
in infrastructure (neglected for the first forty years of independence), and 
these have been key drivers of the region’s continued growth. A rapidly 
expanding partnership between China and Kenya is also reflected in the 
country’s recent growth; trade between China and the continent was val-
ued at 222 billion US dollars in 2014.37 With Chinese firms winning mas-
sive contracts to build ports and new roads and railway lines in Kenya, 
Obama’s trip provided a space to assert US economic interests and power 
in counterpoint to China’s mounting influence. Finally, Kenya is poised to 
be the central corridor for South Sudan’s exportation of billions of barrels 
of crude oil and for recently discovered commercial reserves in Uganda 
and northern Kenya.
However, the economic picture in Kenya is not one of unhampered 
prosperity. Large-scale development projects such as the controversial 
new port planned for Lamu and the development of commercial oil pro-
duction in turkana have embroiled local communities, generally to their 
detriment, in the politics of national development. These conflicts be-
tween the state and the local have been broadly defined by the politics 
of belonging, where regional or ethnic markers are perceived to control 
access to national development schemes. despite Kenya’s recent mount-
ing economic successes addressed above, the stratification of wealth in the 
country remains profound. A corner of the “silicon savanna” is occupied 
by Kibera, Kenya’s largest informal settlement, or slum, with an estimated 
population of over two hundred thousand.38 The United nations develop-
ment Programme (UndP) reports that Kenya suffers significant human 
development losses due to inequality.39 today, noted historian of Kenya 
Robert Maxon’s assessment of the immediate postcolonial era still holds: 
“In independent Kenya, stratification by race would go, but in its place 
would emerge stratification by wealth.”40
The Kenyatta regime has also come under fire from domestic and 
international critics for human rights abuses related to GWOt, most 
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notably Operation Linda Usalama. Carried out in the aftermath of the 
September 2013 Al-Shabaab attack on the tony Westgate Shopping Mall 
in nairobi, the operation entailed Kenyan security forces going door-to-
door in nairobi’s Eastleigh section, known as “Little Mogadishu” due to 
its long-standing Somali population, and in other parts of the city with 
concentrated Somali populations, and sweeping up thousands of ethnic 
Somalis, including Kenyan citizens and refugees from Somali; many of 
those detained were women and children.41 The detainees were held and 
many interned in Safaricom Stadium, the site of Obama’s speech to the 
Kenyan people. The explanation of the process by then cabinet secretary 
Joseph ole Lenku had eerie echoes of British colonial counterinsurgency 
tactics used to combat Mau Mau: “We bring the arrested persons to this 
place, screen them, verify those who have documents and those who do 
not have; we take appropriate action.”42 Since 2013, the crackdown on the 
Kenyan Somali population has continued and has been defended with in-
creasingly nativist approaches to regional relations.43 Kenyan lawmakers 
have gone so far as to take a cue from the American Far Right and propose 
building an elaborate fence along the Kenya-Somali border in the wake of 
the horrific attack on Garissa University College.44 
On the eve of the visit, we wrote in Politico about the potential and 
challenges presented by the Obama-Kenya connection and about our 
hopes that Obama, with the combined power of the US presidency and 
his status as Kenya’s favorite “son,” would be uniquely empowered to 
speak to key issues such as terrorism, human rights, corruption, and de-
velopment. This trip, we argued, offered an unprecedented opportunity 
for Obama “to employ his controversial American identity with an au-
thority no U.S. politician may ever wield again.”45 In contrast, the ma-
jority of pundits in the United States, together with the dozens of foreign 
journalists preparing to travel to East Africa, covered the upcoming visit 
with a provincial focus on contemporary America. For instance, by read-
ing the controversy over LGBtQ rights in Kenya and on the continent 
more generally through the lens of gay marriage debates in the US, or 
treating Kenya’s struggles with Al-Shabaab simply as an example of the 
kind of “Islamo-terrorism” that might befall the United States, global 
media discourse refracted Kenyan issues through primarily American 
perspectives and values.46 
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When Obama landed in Kenya, the expectations of the wananchi ran 
high as they renewed their excitement and turned their eyes to enterprise, 
reviving Obamamania to a degree reminiscent of the celebrations sur-
rounding Obama’s 2008 presidential victory. Local markets throughout the 
country were again awash in Obama paraphernalia. Cnn reported, “The 
Obama craze has spared no sector, from mobile phone ringtones offering 
extracts from his speeches, to bespoke billboards highlighting products of 
all kinds in the light of the president’s arrival.”47 Many Luo sported Obama 
t-shirts and hats emblazoned with the simple dholuo phrase “Abiro dala” 
(I have come home).48 
For its part, the nairobi county government threw tremendous re-
sources into beautifying nairobi for the state visit, going so far as to plant 
grass a few days before the president’s arrival and then to replace it with 
turf, which was widely reputed to have been taken up and returned to 
the vendor at the visit’s conclusion.49 After nairobi county governor Evans 
Kidero made an impassioned twitter plea for nairobians to stick to the 
sidewalks and let the grass grow,50 the wananchi, true to form, tweeted 
back: “Obama atapiwe googles za green while on Mombasa road #Kiber-
agrass” (Obama should get green googles while on Mombasa road #Kid-
erograss)51 and “#KideroGrass kwani Obama atakuja na ngombe? What of 
Pope will he build new churches?” (#KideroGrass why is Obama going to 
come with a cow?).52 
Kenyans’ excitement was necessarily tempered, however, by the pres-
ident’s rigid schedule, which had him spending two packed days in nai-
robi. to the disappointment of many in the Luo community, the visit did 
not include a trip to Kogelo. Obama’s relatives brought the spirit of his dala 
(home) to nairobi, gathering for a family dinner. nevertheless, 250 miles 
away in Kogelo, the government of Siaya celebrated lavishly, organizing 
the “Obama 7s rugby tournament” and a “Grand Air Force One Welcome 
Party.”53
His visit structured by bilateral talks with Kenyan leaders, a speech to the 
audience of the GES, and an address to the wananchi, Obama seized the op-
portunities to critique and celebrate Kenya. For example, ignoring warnings 
by Kenyan politicians that he should not bring up gay rights, and despite 
President Kenyatta’s claim that LGBtQ rights were a “non-issue,” and anti-
gay demonstrations in nairobi,54 Obama spoke forcibly about his opposition 
  |  Epilogue
to discrimination based on sexual orientation.55 At the other end of the spec-
trum, he embraced, to wide acclaim, the “Lipala,” Kenya’s latest dancehall 
craze, hitting the dance floor with President and First Lady Kenyatta and his 
national security adviser, Susan Rice, at the official state dinner.56
The trip culminated with a lengthy speech at Safaricom Indoor Arena 
in front of a packed, influential political audience. Obama began his forty- 
minute address to the Kenyan people by pointing to his own humble ori-
gins in Kenya. Aiming to connect to the Kenyan masses, he recalled how 
during his first visit in 1988, “instead of eating at fancy banquets with the 
President, we were drinking tea and eating ugali and sukumawiki (a daily 
Kenya staple dish).”57 drawing on arguments from his memoir Dreams 
from My Father, Obama connected his family’s Kenyan roots to the na-
tion’s colonial past. Setting up a critical view of Kenya’s fifty years of post-
colonial development, he argued for the importance of understanding 
deep and recent histories, of linking past and present, noting:
Figure E.1. President Obama greeting the audience at the Safaricom Indoor 
Arena in nairobi, Kenya, July 26, 2015. Official White House photo by Pete Souza, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/07/24/behind-lens-photographing-
president-50-countries.
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The daily limitations—and sometimes humiliations—of colonial-
ism—that’s recent history. The corruption and cronyism and trib-
alism that sometimes confront young nations—that’s recent history. 
But what these stories also tell us is an arch of progress—from for-
eign rule to independence; from isolation to education, and engage-
ment with a wider world. It speaks of incredible progress. So we have 
to know the history of Kenya, just as we Americans have to know our 
American history.58 
tempering his critiques of contemporary politics and governance with a 
generalization about the problems of all “young nations,” Obama then fo-
cused on the future of Kenya and US-Kenyan relations, citing good gover-
nance, development, peace, and reconciliation as key markers of success. 
He promised US support for all of the aforementioned issues while at the 
same time holding Kenyans to account, arguing, “Progress requires that 
you honestly confront the dark corners of your own past; extend rights 
and opportunities to more of your citizens; see the differences and diver-
sity of this country as a strength.”59 
While mobilizing his unique political capital to speak forcefully 
throughout his visit about a range of contentious issues, Obama none-
theless chose his words carefully. Although he spoke at length about 
terrorism and political violence, his criticisms remained general, not 
targeting particular individuals or regimes, and his calls for peace and 
reconciliation did not point to specific injustices or the long history of 
impunity among Kenya’s leaders. Some commentators in Kenya read the 
visit as a tacit endorsement of Kenyatta and Ruto’s Jubilee government; a 
regime marred by the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments 
of its president and vice president, who had brazenly run for office under 
a slogan pundits deemed “the coalition of the accused” in 2013. Some 
critics saw the timing of the visit toward the end of Obama’s presidency 
as awkward, offering “too little too late.”60 Others, however, suggested 
that the trip could mark the beginning of a more intensive engagement 
between the United States and Kenya, which could extend beyond the 
Obama presidency. For one, Kenyan political activist Boniface Mwangi 
expressed both the disappointment in and the continued hopes that Ken-
yans hold for their favorite “son”: “George W. Bush did more for Africa—
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it’s a fact—but now Obama has a chance to redeem himself. . . . If you 
look at what he’s done in the last few months, he’s redeemed himself to the 
black community in the United States and he’s redeemed himself to black 
Africans. Have you seen the movie django Unchained? This is Obama 
Unchained.”61
In the buildup to the visit, Obama reflected on the political frustra-
tions of engaging with Kenya as president. Responding to a question 
about the trip during a White House press conference in early July, he 
lamented, “I’ll be honest with you, visiting Kenya as a private citizen is 
probably more meaningful to me than visiting as President.”62 
Speculation has already begun about what Obama’s connection to 
Kenya will yield when he is no longer constrained by the duties of his 
office or the intransigencies of the Far Right. Obama will be only fifty-six 
years old when he leaves office, ideally positioned to play an active role in 
public life for many years to come. Indeed, as of 2015, preparations for his 
presidential library and foundation in Chicago were already well under 
way, with reports stating that the immediate fund-raising goal for his 
postpresidential endeavors was upward of one billion dollars.63 Obama 
declared to Kenyans, “The next time I’m back I may not be wearing a 
suit,” and he very well may bring a powerful voice and full coffers to bear 
on public missions in East Africa when he leaves office.64 While specula-
tion about Obama’s personal future in 2015 is still mainly conjecture, it 
is clear that Kenya’s contested histories and the politics of belonging will 
continue to inspire heated political debate about the impact of the first 
African American president of the United States on Kenya and through-
out the African continent. The wananchi wished Obama as he departed 
Kenya, “Kwaheri #Potus . . . we kenyans are proud of you. tutembelee tena 
. . . karibu,” that is, “Goodbye #Potus . . . we Kenyans are proud of you. you 
should visit us again . . . you’re welcome.”65
169
Notes
Introduction: Obama and Kenya in the Classroom
1. Matthew Carotenuto and Brett Shadle, “toward a History of Violence 
in Colonial Kenya,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 45, no. 
1 (2012): 1.
2. For some useful teaching sources aimed to privilege African voices in 
world history, see trevor R. Getz, ed., African Voices of the Global Past: 1500 to 
the Present (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2014); and donald R. Wright, The World 
and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, the Gam-
bia (new York: Sharpe, 2010).
3. See terry Barringer and Marion Wallace, eds., African Studies in the 
Digital Age: DisConnects? (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
4. For example, Gerald Horne, Mau Mau in Harlem? The U.S. and the Lib-
eration of Kenya (new York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
5. Cnn Library, “Barack Obama Fast Facts,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/ 
12/26/us/barack-obama---fast-facts. 
Chapter 1: Discovering Obama in Kenya
1. A career diplomat, William Bellamy served as US ambassador to Kenya 
from 2003 to 2006. A graduate of tufts University Fletcher School of Law and 
diplomacy, he is currently the Warburg Chair in International Relations at 
Simmons College in Boston.
2. For more on the place of Muthaiga in colonial and postcolonial elite so-
ciety, see danielle de Lame, “Grey nairobi: Sketches of Urban Socialities,” in 
Nairobi Today: The Paradox of a Fragmented City, ed. Hélène Charton-Bigot 
and deyssi Rodriguez-torres (dar es Salaam: Mkuki na nyota, 2010), 167–214.
  |  Notes to Pages 12–17
3. For more on Barack Obama Sr., see Sally H. Jacob’s popular account, 
The Other Barack: The Bold and Reckless Life of President Obama’s Father (new 
York: Public Affairs, 2011).
4. Obama was projected to win easily due primarily to the scandals that 
plagued a series of Republican nominees; he ultimately captured 70 percent of 
the vote while his Republican challenger, Alan Keyes, attained 27 percent. See 
Cnn, “Obama Projected to Gain Seat for dems,” november 2, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLItICS/11/02/senate.illinois/index.html.
5. daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (new 
Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 2011), 230.
6. Luo speakers today are considered to be the fourth-largest ethnic group 
in Kenya, numbering just over four million and making up just over 10 per-
cent of the country’s citizens. Republic of Kenya, 2009 Population and Housing 
Census Results (nairobi: Kenya national Bureau of Statistics, 2010).
7. The GAdO (Godfrey Mwampembwa) cartoon shown in figure 1.1, de-
picting the “Obama Brand,” is available at http://gadocartoons.com/. Also see 
tejumola Olaniyan’s growing “educational encyclopedia,” available at http://
www.africa.wisc.edu/politicalcartooninginafrica/.
8. dane K. Kennedy, “The Imperial History Wars,” Journal of British Stud-
ies 54, no. 1 (2015): 6.
9. neal W. Sobania, Culture and Customs of Kenya (Westport, Ct: Green-
wood Press, 2003), 3.
10. Branch dates this pithy question back to at least 1964. See Branch, 
Kenya, 33. The “How is Kenya?” quip is often evoked in debates about north-
ern Kenya on the floor of Parliament. For instance, a simple Google Books 
search for “How is Kenya?” calls up dozens of citations of the jocular query in 
the official Kenya Gazette, which contains Kenya’s parliamentary debates from 
the late 1960s through the early 2000s.
11. For more on the Kenyan environment, see UnEP, Kenya: Atlas of Our 
Changing  Environment  (nairobi: United nations Environment Programme, 
2009), http://www.unep.org/dewa/africa/kenyaatlas/.
12. See the United nations population projections for Kenya at http://data.
un.org/data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inId%3A7. For an array of demographic 
information, see also the World Bank’s country report on Kenya at http://
www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya. For a broader analysis of urbaniza-
tion in Africa, see Bill Freund, The African City: A History (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007).
13. UnEP, Kenya, 2; and Republic of Kenya, Kenya Vision 2030 (nairobi: 
Ministry of Planning and national development, 2007), 19. For more on Ken-
Notes to Pages 18–22  |  
ya’s current development plan, popularly referred to as “Vision 2030,” visit 
www.vision2030.go.ke.
14. For an introduction to Kenya’s cultural and linguistic diversity, see So-
bania, Culture and Customs of Kenya.
15. Abdul Sheriff, Dhow Cultures of the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, 
Commerce and Islam (new York: Columbia University Press, 2010); and John 
M. Mugane, The Story of Swahili (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015).
16. notions of Luo identity and its regional connections will be discussed 
in chapter 3. For a short introduction to this broader literature, see John R. 
Campbell, “Who Are the Luo? Oral traditions and disciplinary Practices 
in Anthropology and History,” Journal of African Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 
(2006): 73–87; and david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Siaya: 
The Historical Anthropology of an African Landscape (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1989).
17. For a useful critique about notions of “tribe” in Africanist discourse, 
see Christopher Lowe, “talking about ‘tribe’: Moving from Stereotypes to 
Analysis” (Washington, dC: African Policy Information Center, 1997), http://
africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-153d.
18. Frederick d. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire: Early Efforts 
in Nyasaland and Uganda (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1893), 585–87, 69–75. Ex-
cerpts of this important nineteenth-century text on British colonial ideology 
can be found online, along with many other useful primary sources for Afri-
can history, at Fordham University’s “Internet African History Sourcebook,” 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1893lugard.asp. The full-text digitized 
version of Lugard’s book is available at archive.org.
19. Ibid.
20. Robert Ruark, Something of Value (new York: doubleday, 1955), 135. 
Cited in david M. Anderson’s Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya 
and the End of Empire (new York: norton, 2005), 1.
21. Binyavanga Wainana, “How to Write about Africa,” Granta 92 (2005): 1, 
http://www.granta.com/Archive/92/How-to-Write-about-Africa/Page-1.
22. For useful texts on common stereotypes about Africa in popular dis-
course, see Chimamanda Adichie’s tEd lecture, “danger of a Single Story” 
(presented at tEdGlobal 2009, Palm Springs, California, July 21–29, 2009), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_
story.html. For a broader discussion of the influence of these stereotypes in the 
particular context of the United States, see Curtis Keim, Mistaking Africa: Cu-
riosities and Inventions of the American Mind (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2013).
  |  Notes to Pages 22–24
23. Hugh R. trevor-Roper, “The Past and the Present: History and Sociol-
ogy,” Past and Present 42 (1969): 6.
24. These works and other Western accounts of Obama’s Kenya connec-
tion are discussed in greater depth in chapter 4.
25. derek R. Peterson and Giacomo Macola, eds., Recasting the Past: His-
tory Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2009), 7. See also Karin Barber, ed., Africa’s Hidden Histories: Everyday 
Literacy and Making the Self (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
26. The proliferation of Kenyan texts relating to Obama in this vein will 
be discussed in later chapters. For early Kenyan examples, see Jomo Kenyatta’s 
Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu (London: Secker and War-
burg, 1938). Also see Paul Mboya’s Luo kitgi gi timbegi (nairobi: East African 
Standard, 1938).
27. Barack Obama, Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheri-
tance (new York: Random House, 1995). Also see Barack Obama, The Audac-
ity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (new York: Crown, 
2006).
28. John L. and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity Inc. (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2009). For more on the larger debates about evolving notions of 
ethnicity in Africa, see Thomas Spear, “neo-traditionalism and the Limits 
of Invention in British Colonial Africa,” Journal of African History 44, no. 
1 (2003): 3–27; and Julie MacArthur, “When did the Luyia (or Any Other 
Group) Become a tribe?” Canadian Journal of African Studies 47, no. 3 (2013): 
351–63.
29. For Kenya, see Philister Adhiambo Madiega, tracey Chantler, Gemma 
Jones, and Ruth Prince, “‘Our Son Obama’: The US Presidential Election in 
Western Kenya,” Anthropology Today 24, no. 6 (2008): 4–7; Matthew Carot-
enuto and Katherine Luongo, “Dala or diaspora? Obama and the Luo Com-
munity of Kenya,” African Affairs 108, no. 431 (2009): 197–219; Steve Ouma 
Akoth, “The Meanings of Obama in K’ogello: Culture, Ethno-Politics and 
the Making of Leaders in Multiparty Kenya,” Anthropology Southern Africa 
33, nos. 3–4 (2010): 114–25; Keguro Macharia, “Jambo Bwana: Kenya’s Barack 
Obama,”  Qualitative Sociology  35, no. 2 (2012): 213–27; Karin van Bemmel, 
“Obama Made in Kenya: Appropriating the American dream in Kogelo,” Af-
rica Today  59, no. 4 (2013): 68–90.  For a broader context, see Paul tiyam-
bie Zeleza, Barack Obama and African Diasporas: Dialogues and Dissensions 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009).
30. Stephen Ellis, “Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa,” Journal of 
African History 43, no. 1 (2002): 1–26.
Notes to Pages 25–29  |  
31. Matt Raymond, “How tweet It Is! Library Acquires Entire twit-
ter Archive,” Library of Congress Blog, April 14, 2010, http://blogs.loc.gov/
loc/2010/04/how-tweet-it-is-library-acquires-entire-twitter-archive.
Chapter 2: Representations of Kenya
This chapter draws attention to the numerous open-access primary sources 
pertaining to African history generally and the history of Kenya available on 
the web and ideal for use in undergraduate classrooms.
1. The Roosevelts paid for themselves. Smithsonian, “Celebrating 100 
Years: Smithsonian-Roosevelt African Expedition,” http://www.mnh.si.edu/
onehundredyears/expeditions/SI-Roosevelt_Expedition.html.
2. “President Roosevelt’s African trip,” Science 28, no. 729 (december 18, 
1908): 876–77.
3. Relative value is calculated at $1,320,000. Information available at http://
www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/. It should be noted that these calcu-
lations are estimates and highly varied. For a useful popular account of the 
challenging nature of this question for historians, see Ed Crews, “How Much 
Is That in today’s Money?” Colonial Williamsburg (Summer 2002). Available 
at http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/summer02/money2.cfm.
4. Edward I. Steinhart, “Hunters, Poachers and Gamekeepers: towards a 
Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya,” Journal of African History 30, 
no. 2 (1989): 253.
5. Ibid.
6. For example, Ernest Hemingway, Green Hills of Africa (new York: Scrib-
ner, 1935). The upmarket tour provider Abercrombie and Kent until this year 
operated a safari in Kenya and tanzania called “The Hemingway Safari,” and 
currently lodges its travelers at Hemingway’s, a new boutique hotel in nairobi 
built to resemble British colonial style. Images are available at http://www.
hemingways-nairobi.com/. For a scholarly account, see Edward M. Bruner, 
“The Maasai and the Lion King: Authenticity, nationalism, and Globalization 
in African tourism,” American Ethnologist 28, no. 4 (2001): 881–908.
7. Theodore Roosevelt, African Game Trails: An Account of the African 
Wanderings of an American Hunter-Naturalist (new York: Scribner, 1910), vii–
viii. Full text is available for download at https//archive.org/details/african-
gametrail00rooseve.
8. Barack Obama, Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance 
(new York: Random House, 1995), 434.
9. Will Jackson, “White Man’s Country: Kenya Colony and the Making of 
a Myth,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 2 (2011): 344–68.
  |  Notes to Pages 29–31
 10. Kenya is a corruption of the Kikuyu word Kirinyaga, the original name 
of Mount Kenya. Land alienation and squatter farming were similar to the 
South African model where the native Lands Act of 1913 effectively turned 
African squatter farmers into wanderers performing occasional, casual labor. 
This legislation was a driving force behind the development of the African na-
tional Congress. See Solomon t. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa (London: 
King, 1914).
11. See Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Mak-
ing of Kenya (London: Chatto and Windus, 1954).
12. Brian Herne, White Hunters: The Golden Age of African Safaris (new 
York: Holt, 1999), 6.
13. delamere later acquired another fifty thousand acres at Soysambu. 
James S. Olson and Robert Shadle, eds., Historical Dictionary of the British 
Empire, vol. 1 (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1996), 296. For a useful collec-
tion of primary sources on the life of early settlers, see Paul Sullivan, Kikuyu 
District: The Edited Letters of Francis Hall, 1892–1901 (dar es Salaam: Mkuti na 
nyota, 2006).
14. The section heading above is inspired by Bruce Berman and John Lons-
dale’s definitive, two-volume political history of colonial Kenya. See Berman 
and Lonsdale, State and Class, bk. 1 of Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and 
Africa (London: James Currey, 1992); and Violence and Ethnicity, bk. 2 of Un-
happy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa (London: James Currey, 1992).
15. Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag 
in Kenya (new York: Holt, 2005), 11. For a contemporary Kenyan reflection on 
this history fifty years after independence, see Morris Kiruga, “Socialite Set-
tlers: How Sex, drugs and Crime Built the Colony,” Daily Nation, June 6, 2013.
16. Isak dinesen, Out of Africa (London: Penguin, 1937). 
17. Out of Africa, directed by Sydney Pollack (1985; Hollywood: Mirage 
Enterprises/Universal Studios). See also Beryl Markham, West with the Night 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942). And on the most intrigue-laden scandal of 
the Happy Valley set, see Errol trzebinski, The Life and Death of Lord Erroll: 
The Truth behind the Happy Valley Murder (London: Fourth Estate, 2000).
18. More recently, Vogue shot June 2007 cover girl Keira Knightley “on 
safari” in the Maasai Mara, accompanied by Maasai warriors and attired in de-
signer clothing that echoed the Victorian era and heaped in Maasai beads. See 
Plum Sykes, “Keira Knightley: The Chronicles of Keira,” Vogue 97, no. 6 (June 
2007): 176–87, http://www.vogue.com/magazine/article/keira-knightley-the-
chronicles-of-keira/#1.
19. dane K. Kennedy, Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya 
and Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1939 (durham, nC: duke University Press, 1987).
Notes to Pages 32–34  |  
20. For example, see Johann L. Krapf, Travels, Researches, and Missionary 
Labors, during an Eighteen Years’ Residence in Eastern Africa (Boston: ticknor 
and Fields, 1860).
21. The true provenance of Kilimanjaro remains a point of contention 
in some circles. See Patrick Wachira, “did Queen Victoria Yank Mount 
Kilimanjaro from Kenya?” Standard Digital, August 13, 2011, http://www 
.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000040730/did-queen-victoria-yank- 
mount-kilimanjaro-from-kenya?pageno=1.
22. Berman and Lonsdale, State Class, bk. 1 of Unhappy Valley, 16.
23. John Lonsdale, “The Conquest State, 1895–1904,” in A Modern History 
of Kenya, 1895–1980: In Honour of B. A. Ogot, ed. William R. Ochieng’ (nai-
robi: Evans, 1989), 19–20.
24. At the time of its construction, the Mombasa-Kampala railway was 
considered a folly, and its progress was plagued by numerous setbacks, includ-
ing a pair of man-eating lions who consistently attacked the railway camps, 
carrying off the “coolies,” laborers imported from British India. See Charles 
Miller, The Lunatic Express (new York: Macmillan, 1971). The story is told 
from the perspective of a military-officer-cum-white-hunter tasked with slay-
ing the lions in the film The Ghost and the Darkness, starring Val Kilmer and 
Michael douglas, directed by Stephen Hopkins (1996; Hollywood: Constella-
tion Films/Paramount Pictures). Eventually shot to death, the (taxidermied) 
lions are now on display at Chicago’s Field Museum, http://archive.fieldmu-
seum.org/exhibits/exhibit_sites/tsavo/maneaters.html.
25. For Lugard’s vision in his own words, see Frederick d. Lugard, The 
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Blackwood, 1922).
26. Sara Berry, “Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to 
Agricultural Land,” Africa 62, no. 3 (1992): 327–55. “Hegemony” is an authority 
so taken for granted and unquestioned that it becomes natural and expected.
27. Brett L. Shadle, “Girl Cases”: Marriage and Colonialism in Gusiiland 
Kenya, 1890–1970 (Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 2006), 64.
28. Kenya national Archives (hereafter KnA), dC/MKS 1/1/3, Ulu Quar-
terly Report 1909, 42.
29. For a useful look at this style of colonial propaganda, see Alexander 
Shaw, Men of Africa (London: Colonial Empire Marketing Board, 1940). This 
film is available for streaming online at http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/.
30. John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), 323–24.
31. Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Justin Willis, Mombasa, the 
Swahili, and the Making of the Mijikenda (new York: Oxford University 
  |  Notes to Pages 34–38
Press, 1993); and Julie E. MacArthur, “When did the Luyia (or Any Other 
Group) Become a tribe?” Canadian Journal of African Studies 47, no. 3 
(2013): 351–63.
32. For example, the New York Times published Jeffrey Gettleman’s article, 
“tribal Rivalry Boils over after Kenya Election,” december 30, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/world/africa/30cnd-kenya.html?em&ex-
=1199250000&en=d992eb43cf06b8bd&ei=5087%0A&_r=0.
33. Paul tiyambie Zeleza, “The Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1905–
1920,” in Ochieng’, Modern History of Kenya, 43.
34. Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making 
of Kenya (new York: Praeger, 1968), 215. Cited in Opolot Okia, Communal 
Labor in Colonial Kenya: The Legitimization of Coercion, 1912–1930 (new York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 35.
35. KnA, dC/MKS 1/1, Machakos district Annual Report, 1908–1909.
36. Leah Onyango, Anne Omollo, and Elizabeth Ayo, “Gender Perspec-
tives of Property Rights in Rural Kenya,” in Essays in African Land Law, ed. 
Robert Home (Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2011), 137.
37. This idea first appeared in a 1921 report by the South African native Af-
fairs Commission and was cited by Kenyan counterparts in 1926 as a preferred 
model for Kenya. See KnA, Native Affairs Department Report (1926): 55.
38. Brett L. Shadle, “Settlers, Africans, and Inter-Personal Violence in 
Kenya, ca. 1900–1920s,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 45, 
no. 1 (2012): 61.
39. Shaw, Men of Africa. For other useful representations through digitized 
news reels and short films, see http://www.britishpathe.com/.
40. Opolot Okia, “In the Interests of Community: Archdeacon Walter 
Owen and the Issue of Communal Labour in Colonial Kenya, 1921–30,” Jour-
nal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32, no. 1 (2004): 23–24.
41. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resis-
tance (new Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 1985), xvi.
42. KnA, dC/MKS 4/1, G. H. Osborne, “Unrest in Ulu: Military Patrol,” 
March 23, 1912, Machakos district Political Record Book, 1911–1912. See also 
Katherine Luongo, “Prophecy, Possession, and Politics: negotiating the Super-
natural in 20th Century Machakos, Kenya,” International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 45, no. 2 (2012): 191–216.
43. KnA, dC/KSM, 1/35/5, Central Kavirondo Annual Report, 1929.
44. For a description of the workings of githaka, see tabitha Kanogo, 
Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905–63 (London: James Currey, 1987), 
10–11; and david M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in 
Kenya and the End of Empire (new York: norton, 2005), 25–28.
Notes to Pages 38–40  |  
45. For a comprehensive explanation of Luo land tenure and related ideas 
of belonging, see david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Siaya: 
The Historical Anthropology of an African Landscape (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1989), 25–30.
46. For a useful collection of primary documents from early African po-
litical associations, see Wangari Muoria-Sal, Bodil F. Frederiksen, John Lons-
dale, and derek Peterson, eds., Writing for Kenya: The Life and Works of Henry 
Muoria (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
47. Public Record Office—London (hereafter PRO), CO 533/530/10, Sir Al-
ison Russell, “Memorandum on Political Affairs in Kenya,” 1943.
48. John Lonsdale has suggested that there were “multiple” Mau Maus. The 
term referred to the rebellion itself, to its active fighters and passive adherents, 
and to the oaths they took or were forced to take. See Lonsdale, “Mau Maus of 
the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya,” Journal of African History 
31, no. 3 (1990): 393–421.
49. For a detailed, comprehensive study of the Mau Mau as a Kikuyu civil 
war, see daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, 
Civil War, and Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
50. Anderson writes that a conservative estimate would hold that one in 
four adult male Kikuyu were interned during Mau Mau. Anderson, Histories 
of the Hanged, 4, 313.
51. The prisoners, known as the “Kapenguria Six,” also included Achieng 
Oneko, Kungu Karumba, Fred Kubai, Paul ngei, and Bildad Kaggia. In 1993, a 
museum commemorating the Kapenguria Six was established as a branch of 
the national Museums of Kenya. Part of the project to expand the narrative 
of Mau Mau beyond the Kikuyu, the museum’s website describes the six as 
“founding fathers of the Kenyan nation,” http://www.museums.or.ke/content/
blogcategory/15/21/.
52. Propagandist British newsreel footage is widely available on You-
tube. For example, http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=british+newsreel+ 
mau+mau&FORM=VIRE2#view=detail&mid=B05Cd2BB0C1421C456A0B-
05Cd2BB0C1421C456A0.
53. For example, see “Mau Mau Growing despite Reverse; terrorist Move-
ment in Kenya Spreads Even as It Loses 100 Killed in One Week,” New York 
Times, June 6, 1952; Simba, directed by Brian desmond Hurst (1955; London: 
Rank Organisation); and Safari, directed by terence Young (1956; London: 
Warwick Films/Columbia Pictures).
54. Audio of Jomo Kenyatta’s thoughts on independence and cheering 
crowds on independence day is available via the BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/14chapter8.shtml.
  |  Notes to Pages 41–44
55. tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and 
Writings (London: Heinemann, 1970), 2.
56. For an interesting summary of the case and its contemporary, see the 
recent BBC Storyville documentary, Last White Man Standing, directed by 
Justin Webster (2009; London: BBC).
57. See Caroline Elkins’s controversial book, Imperial Reckoning.
58. Ibid.
59. “Mau Mau torture Victims to Receive Compensation—Hague,” BBC 
news UK, June 6, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22790037.
Chapter 3: The Obama Family
1. Barack H. Obama, Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inher-
itance (new York: Random House, 1995), 369. Also see Georgiana Banita, 
“‘Home Squared’: Barack Obama’s transnational Self-Reliance,” Biography 33, 
no. 1 (2010): 24–45.
2. The use of the word homeland here does not have the same connotations 
as in South Africa, where it defined the marginal, ethnically segregated rural 
regions to which black populations were relegated under apartheid. In Kenya, 
the “native reserves” discussed in the previous chapter bear the closest resem-
blance to the South Africa “homeland.”
3. david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Burying SM: The 
Politics of Knowledge and the Sociology of Power in Africa (Portsmouth, nH: 
Heinemann, 1992).
4. derek R. Peterson and Giacomo Macola, eds., Recasting the Past: His-
tory Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2009), 5–7.
5. Suzanna Owiyo, “Kisumu 100,” Mama Africa (West Sussex: ARC 
Music, 2002). Lyrics available in Luo at http://www.suzannaowiyo.net/lyrics/
kisumu100.txt.
6. Obama, Dreams from My Father, 372.
7. Kisumu’s urban population is estimated at 409,928 residents according 
to data from the 2009 census, available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Pop-
ulation/2009-Census-Vol-1-table-3-Rural-and-Urban-Populatie/e7c7-w67t/1. 
This figure indicates a remarkable expansion since the late 1960s, when the 
population was estimated at 32,000. See Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population 
Census 1969, Vol. 2, Data on Urban Population (nairobi: Statistics division, 
1971). On urbanization in Western Kenya, see Robert Obudho, “Urbanisa-
tion and Industrialisation,” in Historical Studies and Social Change in Western 
Kenya: Essays in Memory of Professor Gideon S. Were, ed. William R. Ochieng’ 
(nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2002), 194–218.
Notes to Pages 45–48  |  
8. Lesa B. Morrison, “Banished to the Political Wilderness? The Standard 
narrative and the decline of the Luo of Kenya” (Phd diss., duke University, 
2004).
9. Bethwell A. Ogot, A History of the Luo-Speaking Peoples of Eastern Af-
rica (Kisumu: Anyange Press, 2009), 485–92.
10. Charles W. Hobley, “British East Africa: Anthropological Studies in 
Kavirondo and nandi,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland 33 (1903): 326.
11. James Okoth, interview, nairobi, Kenya, June 12, 2007.
12. While many scholars speak of Luo as a linguistic group that encom-
passes this entire larger diaspora, we use the term “Lwo” when referring to the 
larger nilotic-speaking diaspora and leave “Luo” to refer only to the Kenyan 
dholuo-speaking population. This is a more valid distinction, as Acholi or 
Padhola groups might say, for instance, that they speak Lwo/Luo but they are 
Acholi. Kenya’s dholuo-speaking populations are the only cultural group who 
commonly assert both Luo linguistic and ethnic cultural markers.
13. Lwo-speakers more generally sometimes refer to themselves collec-
tively as Jonam/Joka-nyanam, or “people of lakes and rivers.”
14. See Bethwell A. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo: Migration and Set-
tlement, 1500–1900 (nairobi: East African Publishing, 1967); david William 
Cohen, “The River-Lake nilotes from the Fifteenth to the nineteenth Cen-
tury,” in Zamani, ed. Bethwell A. Ogot (nairobi: East African Educational 
Publishers, 1968), 135–49; Ralph S. Herring, david William Cohen, and Beth-
well A. Ogot, “The Construction of dominance: The Strategies of Selected 
Luo Groups in Uganda and Kenya,” in State Formation in Eastern Africa, ed. 
Ahmed I. Salim (London: Heinemann, 1984), 126–52; david William Cohen 
and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Siaya: The Historical Anthropology of an African 
Landscape (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989).
15. Herring, Cohen, and Ogot, “Construction of dominance”; William R. 
Ochieng’, An Outline History of Nyanza up to 1914 (nairobi: East African Lit-
erature Bureau, 1974); Bethwell A. Ogot, Building on the Indigenous Selected 
Essays, 1981–1998 (Kisumu: Anyange Press, 1999), 180–81.
16. Matthew Carotenuto, “Riwruok e teko: Cultivating Identity in Colonial 
and Postcolonial Kenya,” Africa Today 53, no. 2 (2006): 57.
17. Cohen and Odhiambo, Siaya, 31.
18. This quote comes from the English translation of Paul Mboya’s 1938 
text. See Jane Achieng, Paul Mboya’s “Luo kitgi gi timbegi”: A Translation into 
English (nairobi: Atai Joint, 2001), vii.
19. Frederick Cooper, On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the 
Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa (new Haven, Ct: Yale Univer-
  |  Notes to Pages 48–50
sity Press, 1987); Ralph d. Grillo, African Railwaymen: Solidarity and Opposi-
tion in an East African Labour Force (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1973).
20. Kenya national Archives (hereafter KnA), MAA 7/589, t. J. Askwith, 
“Municipal African Affairs Report, nairobi, 1948.”
21. For instance, KnA, dC/KSM 1/19/106, “Law and Order-Undesirables”; 
KnA, CA 9/92, “Movement of Women (Mombasa), 1941–52”; and Matthew 
Carotenuto, “Repatriation in Colonial Kenya: African Institutions and Gen-
dered Violence,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 45, no. 1 
(2012): 9–28.
22. “detribalization” and urban African life were major concerns of the 
anthropological Rhodes-Livingston Institute. For example, see the work of 
its founder, Godfrey Wilson, The Economics of Detribalization (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1940).
23. M. J. B. Molohan, Detribalization (dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 
1959), 11; Luise White, The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
24. derek R. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: 
A History of Dissent, c. 1935–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 133.
25. Luo were not alone in writing their own prescriptive ethnohisto-
ries as a response to the exigencies of colonial rule. Also published in 1938, 
Jomo Kenyatta’s Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu (London: 
Secker and Warburg), is the prime example of this genre of ethnohistori-
cal writing. However, Kenyatta’s text evidences the formal anthropological 
training he undertook with the famed Bronislaw Malinowski at the London 
School of Economics, and is much more explicitly political, having been 
produced in response to the controversy over female circumcision among 
the Kikuyu in the late 1920s. See also Bruce Berman, “Ethnography as Pol-
itics, Politics as Ethnography: Kenyatta, Malinowski, and the Making of 
Facing Mount Kenya,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 30, no. 3 (1996): 
313–44.
26. Ramogi, november 15, 1948.
27. Ramogi, March 17, 1951. For more on the gendered analysis of Luo dis-
course, see Carotenuto, “Repatriation in Colonial Kenya”; Peterson, Ethnic 
Patriotism, 127–51; and Samwel Ong’wen Okuro, “Our Women Must Return 
Home: Institutionalized Patriarchy in Colonial Central nyanza district, 1945–
1963,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 45, no. 5 (2010): 522–33.
28. Ramogi, december 15, 1947.
Notes to Pages 50–53  |  
29. See Carotenuto, “Riwruok e teko”; James Ogude, “The Vernacular 
Press and the Articulation of Luo Ethnic Citizenship: The Case of Achieng’ 
Oneko’s Ramogi,” Current Writing 13, no. 2 (2001): 42–55.
30. The earliest official references to the Luo Union emerged in nairobi. 
See, for instance, KnA, PC/CP 4/3/1, Annual Report for Central Province, 
1938, 19.
31. KnA, PC/nZA 3/1/363, Municipal native Affairs Officer, nairobi, to d. 
C. Kericho, April 29, 1944.
32. KnA, district Commissioner, Kakamega (hereafter dC/KMG), 2/1/99, 
Luo Union north Kavirondo Branch to dC/KMG, november 1945.
33. A. Odera, interview, Kisumu, Kenya, October 13, 2004; Awendo, inter-
view, Kisumu, Kenya, July 1, 2007.
34. Alogo Raila, interview, April 12, 2004. Some informants spoke of be-
longing to both their clan association and the Luo Union, and emphasized that 
the Luo Union was an umbrella under which these smaller organizations came 
together. Alogo Raila, interview, Bondo, Kenya, April 12, 2004.
35. KnA, dC/KMG 2/1/99, Luo Union, north Kavirondo Branch, to dC/
KMG, november 1945.
36. KnA, PC/nZA 3/2/368, Walter Odede to PC/nZA, March 1945.
37. KnA, Rn 13/23, Municipal Council of nairobi Annual Report, 1949. 
Mboya was widely praised by colonial officials for his work as a senior chief in 
South nyanza. during World War II he was even awarded the King’s Medal for 
Patriotic Service. See KnA, Ministry of African Affairs Summary Report, 1939–
1945 (nairobi: Government Printer, 1945). Available via microfilm through the 
Syracuse University’s Kenya national Archive collection; microfilm number 
4723, reel 63.
38. Ajuma Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga 
Odinga (London: Heinemann, 1967), 71.
39. Here we use the constructivist approach to understanding ethnic ties, 
which has been broadly applied to the colonial encounter.
40. Public Record Office—London (hereafter PRO), FCO 141/5927, “The 
Security Situation in nyanza Province—Appreciation by the Kenya Intelli-
gence Committee, nyanza Province and Mau Mau,” 1955.
41. Contrast these numbers with the scope of the internment of Kikuyu 
in Central Province described by Anderson, Branch, and Elkins, and evident 
throughout British colonial archives. Some scholars do, however, allege sig-
nificant Luo participation in Mau Mau. See William Ochieng’, “Thunder from 
the Islands: Mau Mau in Western Kenya,” in Ochieng’, Historical Studies and 
Social Change in Western Kenya, 181–93.
  |  Notes to Pages 53–57
42. Ramogi, February 1952. Cited in KnA, UY 1/11, “Summary of Opinions 
Expressed in Press, Jan-1951 to Feb-1953.”
43. KnA, dC/KMG 2/1/99, Luo Union to PC/nZA, September 1954.
44. Gilbert E. M. Ogutu, Ker in the 21st Century Luo Social System (Kisumu: 
Sundowner, 2004).
45. KnA, African Affairs department Report, 1952.
46. Bethwell A. Ogot, “Mau Mau and nationhood: The Untold Story,” in 
Mau Mau and Nationhood, ed. E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), 21–22. For a state view of Ofafa’s death, 
see KnA, African Affairs department Report, 1953.
47. Remark made at a June 1954 meeting of the Luo Union Mombasa 
branch, reportedly attended by 250 people. PRO, CO 822/842, “African Pol-
itics in Kenya, 1954–56.”
48. david M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya 
and the End of Empire (new York: norton, 2005), 200–212.
49. KnA, PC/nZA 4/4/63, t. C. Watts, Annual Report Central nyanza, 
1954.
50. KnA, Rn 13/4, Annual Report City African Affairs, 1955–1958.
51. PRO, FCO 141/592, “African Affairs, Unrest, nyanza Province,” 1952–1957.
52. “The Strength of Luo Loyalty,” Sunday Post, June 20, 1954.
53. KnA, PC/nZA 3/1/316, Luo Union to PC/nZA, “A Plan of Work,” Au-
gust 24, 1954.
54. Fund-raising for the Ofafa Memorial Hall was frequently mentioned in 
official Luo Union correspondence as well as in government summaries of the 
association’s activities throughout the late 1950s. See KnA, dC/KMG 2/1/99, 
Luo Union north Kavirondo Branch to dC Kakamega, november 1945; and 
KnA, dO/VOI 1/2/4, daily File, August, 1958.
55. KnA, PC/nZA 4/4/111, Central nyanza Annual Report, 1961.
56. Jomo Kenyatta, “The Kenya African Union Is not the Mau Mau” 
(speech presented at the Kenya African Union meeting at nyeri, July 26, 1952). 
Available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1952kenyatta-kau1.html.
57. “Kenya African Leader Held: Successor to Jomo,” Glasgow Herald, 
March 10, 1953.
58. Bethwell A. Ogot, “The decisive Years,” in Decolonization and Inde-
pendence in Kenya, 1940–93, ed. Bethwell A. Ogot and William R. Ochieng’ 
(London: James Currey, 1995), 58–61.
59. Justin Willis and George Gona, “tradition, tribe, and State in Kenya: 
The Mijikenda Union, 1945–1980,” Comparative Studies in Society and His-
tory 55, no. 2 (2013): 463–65; Julie E. MacArthur, Cartography and the Po-
Notes to Pages 57–61  |  
litical  Imagination: Mapping Community in Colonial  Kenya. (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2016).
60. tom Mboya, Freedom and After (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963); david 
Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget (Portsmouth, 
nH: Heinemann, 1982).
61. See a transcript of Mboya’s appearance on Meet the Press, vol. 3, April 
12, 1959; Gerald Horne, Mau Mau in Harlem?: The U.S. and the Liberation of 
Kenya (new York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 171–83; PRO, CO 822/1303, 
“The Activities of tom Mboya, 1957–1959.”
62. tom Shachtman, Airlift to America: How Barack Obama, Sr., John F. 
Kennedy, Tom Mboya, and 800 East African Students Changed Their World and 
Ours (new York: St. Martin’s, 2009).
63. Sally H. Jacobs, The Other Barack: The Bold and Reckless Life of Presi-
dent Obama’s Father (new York: Public Affairs, 2011), 54–75.
64. KnA, African Affairs department Report, 1957, 107.
65. Ochieng’, “Thunder from the Islands”; and Edith A. Miguda, “Mau 
Mau in nairobi: 1946–1956: The Luo Experience” (MA thesis, University of 
nairobi, 1987).
66. “People Who Want Assistance,” Ramogi, April 7, 1959.
67. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 9–53.
68. “Obama, Raila Similarities,” April 4, 2007. Available at http://www.
Jaluo.com. Jaluo.com, the discussion board for Luos in Kenya and in the di-
aspora, succinctly summed up contemporary interpretations of Luo exclusion 
at home and abroad.
69. Morrison, “Banished to the Political Wilderness?” 
70. david Goldsworthy, “Ethnicity and Leadership in Africa: The ‘Untyp-
ical’ Case of tom Mboya,” Journal of Modern African Studies 20, no. 1 (1982): 
107–26; Time, March 7, 1960 (cover designed by Bernard Safran).
71. Jacobs, Other Barack, 178–81.
72. Guy Vanthemsche, Belgium and the Congo, 1885–1980, trans. Alice 
Cameron and Stephen Windross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012).
73. PRO, dO 213/205, Internal Report from the British High Commission, 
nairobi, January 29, 1964.
74. daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (new 
Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 2011), 40–44.
75. Githu Muigai, “Jomo Kenyatta and the Rise of the Ethno-national-
ist State in Kenya,” in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, ed. Bruce Berman, 
dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 215.
  |  Notes to Pages 61–65
76. William R. Ochieng’, “Structural and Political Changes,” in Ogot and 
Ochieng’, Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 98–103; Branch, Kenya, 
44–66; Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (London: tau-
ris, 2013), 156–220.
77. Branch, Kenya, 75–88.
78. Ogot and Ochieng’, Decolonization and Independence, 98–102.
79. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism, 133–34.
80. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo, 25.
81. See Bethwell A. Ogot, My Footprints on the Sands of Time: An Autobi-
ography (Kisumu: Anyange Press, 2003)
82. Luo Union leaders and tom Mboya met with Kenyatta on June 21, 
1967, at Statehouse, nakuru. See KnA, MAC/KEn 70/2, Jodong luo oromo gi 
jaduong Jomo Kenyatta (nairobi: East African Institute Press, 1967).
83. david J. Parkin, The Cultural Definition of Political Response: Lineal 
Destiny among the Luo (London: Academic Press, 1978), 235. Oneko recalled 
the importance of this burial in a 2004 interview as a key point in reconciling 
the political unity of the Luo community. Achieng Oneko, interview, Kunya 
Beach, Kenya, October 15, 2004.
84. Patrick O. Alila, Kenya General Elections in Bondo and Gem: The Or-
igins of Luo Ethnic Factor in Modern Politics (nairobi: Institute for develop-
ment Studies, University of nairobi, 1984).
85. Ogot, My Footprints, 245–63.
86. KnA, CQ 1/39, Registrar of Societies, August 1970.
87. For an example of Cheluget’s engagements with Luo customary laws 
in the 1970s, see Paul nyambala, “P. C. Cheluget and the Luo,” Weekly Review, 
October 25, 1976; “Thus Spare the P.C.,” Weekly Review, February 20, 1978.
88. See Paul Mboya’s editorial in the Weekly Review, February 27, 1978. An 
earlier, similar editorial had also been published by nairobi Branch official 
Amolo Ochieng in the Weekly Review on december 27, 1976.
89. Ethnic associations began to have a problem with the shifting politi-
cal quality of their public images. This issue was increasingly covered in the 
national press throughout the 1970s. See “How Political Are tribal Societies?” 
Weekly Review, May 19, 1975; Christopher Mullei, “Is tribalism in Kenya In-
creasing, Waning?” Weekly Review, november 21, 1977.
90. For discussion of the Luo Union leadership controversy in the local 
press, see “Who’s the Boss in Luo Union (EA)?” Weekly Review, July 7, 1978; 
“Luo Union End of an Era,” Weekly Review, April 6, 1979.
91. Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 111–41.
Notes to Pages 65–67  |  
92. “Pressure on tribal Unions to Wind Up,” Weekly Review, August 8, 
1980.
93. “Luo Union disbanded,” Daily Nation, October 19, 1980.
94. James Ger,“Editorial,” Weekly Review, August 22, 1980.
95. It should be noted that the clan associations many Luo Union members 
also belonged to did not disappear after the 1980 ban. These associations contin-
ued to serve as burial cooperatives with the Umira Kager clan association, play-
ing a large role in the famous battle to bury Luo lawyer S. M. Otieno. See david 
William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Burying SM: The Politics of Knowl-
edge and the Sociology of Power in Africa (Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 1992).
96. Solomon Waliaula and Joseph Basil Okong’o, “Performing Luo Identity 
in Kenya: Songs of Gor Mahia,” in Identity and Nation in Africa Football: Fans, 
Community, and Clubs, ed. Chuka Onwumechili and Gerard Akindes (new 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
97. Martin Adero, personal communication, Lela, Kenya, April 1998.
98. daniel Branch, nicholas Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner, eds., Our 
Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1960 (Berlin: Lit, 2009).
99. david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, The Risks of Knowl-
edge: Investigations into the Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in 
Kenya, 1990 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004).
100. M. Metho, interview, Lela, Kenya, April 10, 2004.
101. Gilbert E. M. Ogutu, Ker Jaramogi Is Dead, Who Shall Lead My People? 
Reflections on Past, Present, and Future Luo Thought and Practice (Kisumu: 
Palwa Research, 1994).
102. See Amnesty International’s petition on Raila’s behalf, http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR32/007/1991/en/8054f100-f946-11dd-92e7-
c59f81373cf2/afr320071991en.pdf. Also see Babafemi A. Badejo, Raila Odinga: 
An Enigma in Kenyan Politics (Lagos: Yintab, 2006); and Raila’s autobiography: 
Raila Odinga: The Flame of Freedom (nairobi: Mountain top, 2013).
103. A. Odhiambo, interview, Maseno, Kenya, June 26, 2007.
104. Meshack Riaga Ogallo, interview, Karachuonyo, Kenya, October 14, 
2004, and July 1, 2007. Investment in “home” was promoted more broadly by 
Raila Odinga himself in 2008 with specific reference to Kenyans living abroad. 
Robert nyasato and Kepher Otieno, “Venture out of Kenya, Raila tells Busi-
nesses,” East African Standard Online, August 4, 2008.
105. This conclusion is drawn from a general trend of more than thirty 
interviews conducted with members and supporters of the Luo Council of 
Elders (LCE) in 2004 and 2007. For example, Opiyo Otondi, Awendo, Kenya, 
July 2, 2007.
  |  Notes to Pages 68–76
106. Excerpts from Jacobs, Other Barack, were published in one of Kenya’s 
leading newspapers. See, for instance, “How Obama Father’s dream Was Ru-
ined by nairobi’s Happy Hour and Ethnicity,” Daily Nation, July 30, 2011.
107. david Otieno, interview, nairobi, Kenya, June 10, 2007.
108. For an extended anthropological evaluation of how important these 
exchanges are in Luo society on a local level, see Parker M. Shipton, The Na-
ture of Entrustment: Intimacy, Exchange, and the Sacred in Africa (new Haven, 
Ct: Yale University Press, 2007).
Chapter 4: The Politics of Condemnation
1. Wesley Pruden, “Obama Bows, nation Cringes,” Washington Times, no-
vember 17, 2009.
2. We use the phrase “American Far Right” to describe the constituency 
for whom the condemnation of the Obama and Kenya connection resonated 
most. The tea Party, Libertarians, and other conservative political groups have 
actively sought to frame the Obama-Kenya connection in the tradition of na-
tivism increasingly espoused by the Republican Party more generally.
3. Peter Geschiere traces how a global array of political actors, most typi-
cally those situated far on the right of their respective political communities, 
have engaged languages of “belonging” in order to stake claims about rights 
to political power. See Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citi-
zenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), 2–6.
4. While biographies of Barack Obama Jr., Barack Obama Sr., and the 
Obama family abound, no body of literature and media has emerged from 
the Left with the goal of actively refuting claims made by the Far Right or to 
offer squarely partisan histories of Kenya and the Obamas like those Rightist 
examples discussed here.
5. The White House released Obama’s long-form birth certificate in April 
2011. This action failed to quell the furor of Birthers, who contend that the 
long-form birth certificate is a forgery. See www.birthers.org.
6. See Jim Edwards, “Lamar, CBS, Clear Channel Ban Obama Birth Certif-
icate Billboards,” CBS Moneywatch, June 12, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/lamar-cbs-clear-channel-ban-obama-birth-certificate-billboards/.
7. Ben Smith and Byron tau, “Birtherism: Where It All Began,” Politico, 
April 24, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53563.html.
8. Birthers seem to have cheerfully abandoned this line of argument with 
the announcement of the presidential candidacy of Canadian-born, Far Right 
wunderkind ted Cruz.
Notes to Pages 76–79  |  
9. Martin A. Parlett, Demonizing a President: The “Foreignization” of 
Barack Obama (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014).
10. Matthew W. Hughey, “Show Me Your Papers! Obama’s Birth and the 
Whiteness of Belonging,” Qualitative Sociology 35, no. 2 (2012): 171.
11. Stephanie Condon, “Poll: One in Four Americans Think Obama Was 
not Born in U.S.,” CBS News, April 21, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
poll-one-in-four-americans-think-obama-was-not-born-in-us/.
12. Benjamin R. Warner and Ryan neville-Shepard, “Echoes of a Conspir-
acy: Birthers, truthers, and the Cultivation of Extremism,” Communication 
Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2014): 4. Also see Jarret t. Crawford and Anuschka Bha-
tia, “Birther nation: Political Conservatism Is Associated with Explicit and 
Implicit Beliefs That President Barack Obama Is Foreign,” Analyses of Social 
Issues and Public Policy 12, no. 1 (2012): 364–76.
13. Peter Knight, ed., Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar 
America (new York: new York University Press, 2002).
14. Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Con-
temporary America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
15. “Kenyan-Born Obama All Set for U.S. Senate,” Sunday Standard, June 27, 
2004. For an example of how this is operationalized in Birther rhetoric, see John 
Charlton, “AP declared Obama ‘Kenyan-Born,’ ” InfoWars, October 16, 2009, 
http://www.infowars.com/ap-declared-obama-kenyan-born/; and drew Zahn, 
“Shocker! Obama Still ‘Kenyan-Born’ in 2007,” World Net Daily, May 18, 2012, 
http://www.wnd.com/2012/05/shocker-obama-was-still-kenyan-born-in-2003/.
16. “national Assembly Official Report,” March 25, 2010, 31, books.
google.com. For its use in Birther rhetoric, see drew Zahn, “Kenyan Offi-
cial: Obama Born Here,” World Net Daily, April 11, 2010, http://www.wnd.
com/2010/04/139481/.
17. George Lewis, “Barack Hussein Obama: The Use of History in the Cre-
ation of an ‘American’ President,’ ” Patterns of Prejudice 45, nos. 1–2 (2011): 
43–61.
18. Autochthony, or “belonging,” Geschiere points out, “needs history,” and 
to the “protagonists of autochthony claims, it seems of little concern whether 
these claims rest on a highly special interpretation of history or even a down-
right distortion.” Geschiere, Perils, 103, 169.
19. Jerome R. Corsi, The Obama Nation: Leftist Politics and the Cult of Per-
sonality (new York: Threshold, 2008).
20. The book reached #1 on August 10, 2008, and remained on the list for 
“Hardcover nonfiction” until mid-October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
best-sellers-books/.
  |  Notes to Pages 79–82
21. John E. O’neill and Jerome L. Corsi, Unfit for Command: Swift Boat 
Veterans Speak Out against John Kerry (Washington, dC: Regnery, 2004); G. 
Mitchell Reyes, “The Swift Boat Veterans for truth, the Politics of Realism, 
and the Manipulation of Vietnam Remembrance in the 2004 Presidential 
Election,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 9, no. 4 (2006): 571–600.
22. Corsi’s most recent book is devoted to directly challenging Obama’s 
American “belonging.” Jerome R. Corsi, Where’s the Birth Certificate? The Case 
That Barack Obama Is Not Eligible to Be President (Washington, dC: Wnd, 
2011).
23. Corsi, Obama Nation, 15–16.
24. Achille Mbembe and Janet Roitman, “Figures of the Subject in times 
of Crisis,” Public Culture 7, no. 2 (1995): 323–52.
25. Corsi, Obama Nation, 93.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.,101.
28. See toyin Falola and Kwame Essien, eds., Pan-Africanism, and the Pol-
itics of African Citizenship and Identity (new York: Routledge, 2014).
29. Corsi, Obama Nation, 107. See Peter Kagwanja, “Courting Genocide: 
Populism, Ethno-nationalism and the Informalisation of Violence in Kenya’s 
2008 Post-Election Crisis,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 
(2009): 377; Justin Willis, “What Has He Got up His Sleeve? Advertising the 
Kenyan Presidential Candidates in 2007,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 
no. 2 (2008): 264–71.
30. Corsi, Obama Nation, 107–9.
31. Athman Amran, “Propagandists now Utilising technology,” Standard, 
november 11, 2007.
32. Hassan Mwakimako, “The Historical development of Muslim Courts: 
The Kadhi, Mudir and Liwali Courts and the Civil Procedure Code and Crim-
inal Procedure Ordinance, c. 1963,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 
2 (2011): 329–43. See also Pravin Bowry, “demystifying the Kadhi Courts,” 
Standard, April 20, 2010; Yash Ghai, “Why the Constitution Should Recognise 
Kadhi’s Courts,” Pambazuka News, April 29, 2010; and Alphonce Shiundu, 
“Groups Warn Church Leaders of Kadhi Courts,” Daily Nation, February 7, 
2010.
33. Amran, “Propagandists.”
34. Corsi, Obama Nation, 108–9.
35. Chadwick Matlin, “Obama Gets dressed,” Slate, February 25, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/content/slate/blogs/trailhead/2008/02/25/obama_gets_
dressed.html.
Notes to Pages 82–86  |  
36. The original photograph was taken on August 27, 2006, in Wajir by an 
AP photographer. See Id #06082709658 on apimages.com.
37. david Plouffe’s remark was widely reprinted. See, for instance, Ewen 
MacAskill, “Obama Camp Claims Smear Over turban Photograph,” Guard-
ian, February 25, 2008.
38. Jerome Corsi, “‘Muslim’ Photo Raises Obama Connection Questions,” 
World Net Daily, February 25, 2008, http://www.wnd.com/2008/02/57363/.
39. Corsi, Obama Nation, 92–95; Amran, “Propagandists.” 
40. dorothy Rabinowitz, “The Alien in the White House,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, June 9, 2010.
41. John Lonsdale, “Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Re-
making Kenya,” Journal of African History 31, no. 3 (1990): 393–421.
42. Ibid., 393.
43. Barack H. Obama, Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inher-
itance (new York: Random House, 1995), 416–18.
44. “Barack Obama’s Grandfather ‘tortured by the British’ during Kenya’s 
Mau Mau Rebellion,” Mail Online, december 3, 2008. We are grateful to david 
William Cohen for drawing this article to our attention. See also Ben Mac-
intyre and Paul Orengoh, “Beatings and Abuse Made Barack Obama’s Grand-
father Loathe the British,” Sunday Times, december 3, 2008.
45. tim Shipman, “Barack Obama Sends Bust of Winston Churchill on Its 
Way Back to Britain,” Daily Telegraph, February 14, 2009.
46. Ibid.
47. nicholas Watt, “Special Relationship Is Over, MPs Say. now Stop Call-
ing Us America’s Poodle,” Guardian, March 28, 2010.
48. Carl G. Rosberg Jr. and John nottingham, The Myth of “Mau Mau”: 
Nationalism in Kenya (nairobi: East Africa Publishing, 1966).
49. tania Long, “British Worried by Kenya terror,” New York Times, Oc-
tober 20, 1952, 6.
50. For example, “desecrations Laid to Kenya terrorists,” New York Times, 
September 17, 1952, 5; and Alexander Campbell, “Land of Murder and Muddle: 
A Report from Kenya,” Time, March 30, 1953.
51. James Humes, “Obama Slams Churchill,” Newsmax, March 12, 2009.
52. Macmillan resigned in October 1963 as a result of the Profumo scandal, 
approximately two months before Kenya achieved independence. Alexander 
douglas-Home succeeded Macmillan.
53. david Anderson, interviewed by Justin Elliott in “Mike Hucka-
bee’s Crimes against History,” Salon, March 2, 2011, http://www.salon.
com/2011/03/03/huckabee_kenya_mau_mau/.
  |  Notes to Pages 87–89
54. dinesh d’Souza, The Roots of Obama’s Rage (Washington, dC: Regn-
ery, 2010), 34.
55. For a useful summary of some of this commentary, see Oliver Wil-
lis, “Highbrow Birtherism: Conservatives Attack Obama as an ‘African 
Colonial,’ ” Media Matters, September 13, 2010, http://mediamatters.org/re-
search/2010/09/13/highbrow-birtherism-conservatives-attack-obama/170555.
56. dinesh d’Souza, “How Obama Thinks,” Forbes, September 9, 2010, 1–5; 
and Robert Costa, “Gingrich: Obama’s ‘Kenyan, Anti-Colonial’ Worldview,” 
National Review, September 11, 2010.
57. See Adam Hochschild, “What Gingrich didn’t Learn in Congo,” New 
York Times, december 4, 2011. despite Gingrich’s graduate training in African 
history, his political views seem to trump any critical appraisal of d’Souza’s 
work. See Paul Ocobock, “Anticolonial Behavior,” Dissent, October 29, 2010.
58. d’Souza’s Roots of Obama’s Rage debuted at number four and remained 
among the top thirty hardback nonfiction books until november 28, 2010. 
See http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/. Produced with an estimated 
budget of $2.5 million, the film 2016: Obama’s America was shown at more 
than two thousand movie theaters across the United States in the fall cam-
paign season of 2012, grossing $33,349,949. See http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt2247692/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus.
59. d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 34, 198.
60. 2016: Obama’s America, directed by dinesh d’Souza and John Sullivan 
(2012; Los Angeles, CA: Lionsgate, 2012), dVd.
61. Barack H. Obama, “Problems Facing Our Socialism,” East Africa Jour-
nal 2, no. 4 (1965): 26–33.
62. d’Souza, “How Obama Thinks,” 2.
63. See d’Souza’s discussion of the four “tenets” of anticolonialism, which 
(unintentionally) underscore the predatory nature of colonial regimes. 
d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 30–32.
64. Ibid., 30–34, 69–71.
65. William R. Ochieng’, “Structural and Political Changes,” in Decoloniza-
tion and Independence in Kenya, 1940–93, ed. Bethwell A. Ogot and William R. 
Ochieng’ (London: James Currey, 1995), 83.
66. Ibid., 84.
67. david William Cohen, “Perils and Pragmatics of Critique: Reading 
Barack Obama Sr.’s 1965 Review of Kenya’s development Plan” (paper pre-
sented at the University of KwaZulu natal History and African Studies Sem-
inar, March 24, 2010), 2. See also Cohen, “Perils and Pragmatics of Critique: 
Reading Barack Obama Sr.’s 1965 Review of Kenya’s development Plan,” Afri-
can Studies 74, no. 2 (2015): 1–23.
Notes to Pages 90–92  |  
68. Obama, “Problems Facing Our Socialism.” For more on the origins 
and wide influence of the East Africa Journal during the 1960s, see Bethwell A. 
Ogot, “East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, nairobi,” Journal 
of Modern African Studies 3, no. 2 (1965): 283–85.
69. Obama, “Problems Facing Our Socialism,” 27.
70. He states only, “Obama Sr. was an economist, and in 1965 he published 
an article in the East Africa Journal called ‘Problems Facing our Socialism.’ ” 
d’Souza, “How Obama Thinks,” 3.
71. Sessional Paper no. 10, quoted in Ochieng’, “Structural and Political 
Changes,” 84.
72. d’Souza, “How Obama Thinks,” 3.
73. Ochieng’, “Structural and Political Changes,” 87–88. Swynnerton re-
ported, “The Kenya Government embarked on a major scheme of land con-
solidation in the Central Province about 1956 to gather the fragments of each 
individual farmer into a single consolidated holding and brought in legislation 
providing for freehold title to such holdings and allowing of purchase, sale, 
mortgage and their registration. This work is nearing completion in Central 
Province, covering about 1½ million acres, and is spreading to other areas of 
Kenya.” R. J. M. Swynnerton, “Agricultural Advances in Eastern Africa,” Afri-
can Affairs 61, no. 244 (1962): 204. See also Parker M. Shipton, Mortgaging the 
Ancestors: Ideologies of Attachment in Africa (new Haven, Ct: Yale University 
Press, 2009), 143–47.
74. Obama, “Problems Facing Our Socialism,” 29.
75. See also Cohen, “Perils and Pragmatics of Critique” (2015), 7–8.
76. d’Souza, “How Obama Thinks,” 3.
77. Ochieng’, “Structural and Political Changes,” 84; Obama, “Problems 
Facing Our Socialism,” 31.
78. Obama, “Problems Facing Our Socialism,” 31.
79. Ibid.
80. For instance, Julius K. nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1968); also Cohen, “Perils and Pragmatics of Cri-
tique” (2015), 10.
81. Ajuma Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga 
Odinga (London: Heinemann, 1967).
82. Obama Sr. critiqued “Sessional Paper no. 10” for its lack of specificity 
in articulating African socialism within the Kenyan context. He wrote, “One 
would have been pleased to see African Socialism defined and how Kenya fits 
into this definition, and an indication of those characteristics in which Kenya 
is unique before one can think of the applicability of this definition to Kenya.” 
Obama, “Problems Facing Our Socialism,” 27.
  |  Notes to Pages 92–97
83. d’Souza, “How Obama Thinks,” 5.
84. d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 28.
85. See Edmund d. Morel, The Black Man’s Burden: The White Man in Af-
rica from the Fifteenth Century to World War I (new York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1969. Reprint of the 1920 edition). Although d’Souza borrows Morel’s 
title, he does not cite or quote Morel’s text. d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 17.
86. Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” McClure’s 12 (1899). 
d’Souza also uses “cagey” to describe President Obama’s behavior. For ex-
ample, see d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 42.
87. d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 114.
88. Ibid., 117. On British myth-making surrounding the rebellion, see Gau-
tam Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
89. david M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya 
and the End of Empire (new York: norton, 2005); Caroline Elkins, Imperial 
Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (new York: Holt, 2005).
90. d’Souza, Roots of Obama’s Rage, 118.
91. Ibid., 187. See Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Re-
claiming the American Dream (new York: Crown, 2006), 317.
92. “Anti-Obama Author Arrested in nairobi,” Standard, October 7, 2008. 
See also Lee Glendinning, “Anti-Obama Author deported from Kenya,” 
Guardian, October 7, 2008.
93. See also Philip Ochieng, “Action on ‘Obama nation’ Writer Justified,” 
Daily Nation, november 11, 2008.
94. Anthony Karanja, “Kenyan Embassy takes Swipe at tea Party Move-
ment with Own tea Party in Washington, dC,” Jambonewspot.com, April 21, 
2010.
95. drew Zahn, “does Obama Really Hate America?” World News Daily, Sep-
tember 2, 2012, http://www.wnd.com/2012/09/does-obama-really-hate-america/.
96. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity Inc. (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2009).
Chapter 5: The Politics of Celebration
1. Walter Gor, interview, Lela, Kenya, April 13, 2004.
2. Ibid.
3. For a full transcript of Obama’s address, see “transcript: Illinois Senate 
Candidate Barack Obama,” .
4. Monica davey, “As Quickly as Overnight, a democratic Star Is 
Born,” New York Times, March 18, 2004.
Notes to Pages 97–101  |  
5. Alex Johnson, “Heinz Kerry Hails America; Obama Offers ‘a Brighter 
day,’” July 28, 2004, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5537294/ns/politics/t/heinz- 
kerry-hails-americaobama-offers-brighter-day/#.U0vV9PldXzg; and Chris-
topher Buckley, “A Show Called Hope,” New York Times, August 1, 2004, http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/08/01/opinion/a-show-called-hope.html.
6. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity Inc. (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2009), 24.
7. An idea commonly expressed as a question and an aspiration by Luo 
in Kenya and the diaspora. See “Could US Elect a Luo before Kenya?” BBC, 
January 3, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7170089.stm.
8. “Cutting Edge,” Daily Nation, October 9, 2004; tom Oladipo, “Ken-
yan Beer Stirs Obamamania,” BBC news, February 21, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7251273.stm; Isaiah Andebe, “‘Obama’ Offers Serious Chal-
lenge to Informal Brews,” Daily Nation, March 12, 2005; and “The Senator 
Story,” https://www.eabl.com/downloads/The-Senator-Story.pdf.
9. Charles Onyango-Obbo, “We’re All Made from the Same Genes,” Daily 
Nation, november 4, 2004.
10. Rob Crilly, “A World Away, Kenyan Village Rallies for Favorite U.S. 
Son,” USA Today, October 14, 2004, 15A.
11. Ibid.
12. “Moi Congratulates Bush as Kenyans Fete Obama,” Standard, novem-
ber 4, 2004.
13. John Oywa, “Village’s Great Expectations after the Obama Poll Victory,” 
Daily Nation, november 7, 2004.
14. Kevin J. Kelley, “Joy as Obama Romps Home,” Daily Nation, november 
4, 2004.
15. Oywa, “Village’s Great Expectations.”
16. Kelley, “Joy as Obama Romps Home.”
17. Oywa, “Village’s Great Expectations.”
18. Kelley, “Joy as Obama Romps Home.”
19. Patrick nzioka, “‘I’ll Help If I Can,’ Says Obama,” Daily Nation, novem-
ber 25, 2004.
20. Barack Obama, “An Honest Government and a Hopeful Future,” Uni-
versity of nairobi, August 28, 2006, http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/uploads/J3/
Ch/J3ChJw8qmXwd19ok8rg8lg/Obama-speech.pdf.
21. Macharia Gaitho and Julie Gichuru, “Obama: I Speak What Is true and 
Say It Best,” Daily Nation, September 1, 2006.
22. Bob Hercules and Keith Walker, Senator Obama Goes to Africa (2006; 
new York: First Run Features), dVd.
  |  Notes to Pages 101–104
23. Bahati Amaya, “don’t Expect any Goodies from Obama,” Standard, 
June 6, 2006.
24. Lesa B. Morrison, “The nature of decline: distinguishing Myth from 
Reality in the Case of the Luo of Kenya,” Journal of Modern African Studies 45, 
no. 1 (2007): 136.
25. James Howard Smith, “Snake-driven development: Culture, na-
ture and Religious Conflict in neoliberal Kenya,” Ethnography 7, no. 4 
(2006): 430.
26. nicholas Kristof, “Obama’s Kenyan Roots,” New York Times, February 
24, 2008; Maina Waruru, “Why Are We Wary of an Obama Victory?” March 
28, 2008, http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/16948.





31. daniel Ambunya, “Obama-Bashing Letter Writer Had His Facts Up-
side down,” Daily Nation, September 2, 2008.
32. Peter Atsiaya, “Kisumu town Holds Mock US Voting Exercise,” Stan-
dard Online, november 4, 2008.
33. “Senator Beer Runs Out after Obama Victory,” Daily Nation, november 
8, 2008.
34. Anthony Kariuki, “In Kenya, a Holiday, Song and dance for Obama,” 
Daily Nation, november 5, 2008; “Obama Beer Unveiled,” New Vision, Febru-
ary 17, 2009, http://www.newvision.co.ug/d/8/220/671758.
35. Millicent Mwololo, “What do You Call Child,” Daily Nation, January 
27, 2009.
36. UnESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (2003). The convention defines “intangible cultural heritage” as the 
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the in-
struments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces associated therewith,” http://
www.unesco.org/culture/.
37. “Obama’s Kogelo now a Protected Area,” Daily Nation, September 
21, 2009. See also “The national Museums and Heritage Act,” in The Laws 
of Kenya (nairobi: Government Printer, 1972), chapter 216, http://www 
.kenyalaw.org.
38. They write that “heritage” is a “form of cultural production in the pres-
ent that has recourse to the past.” See derek R. Peterson, Kodzo Gavua, and 
Ciraj Rassool, eds., The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories, and 
Infrastructures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1–2.
Notes to Pages 104–106  |  
39. Lucas Barasa, “Kenya Eyes tourism Boom,” Daily Nation, november 
12, 2008; “Presidential Ancestral Home draws Americans to Kenya,” Voice 
of America, January 15, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-
2009-01-15-voa8-68763557.html.
40. Such comments were made by a number of curators and tour guides 
at the national Museums of Kenya branch in Kisumu, as well as staff at the 
Kisumu Hotel in July 2009. See also “Report: Kenyan MPs Want to Upgrade 
Airport for Obama,” US News & World Report, October 17, 2008.
41. title of a wall panel explaining Luo origins in the Kisumu Museum. 
See also Karega Munene, “Museums in Kenya: Spaces for Selecting, Ordering 
and Erasing Memories of Identity and nationhood,” African Studies 70, no. 2 
(2011): 224–45.
42. Matthew Carotenuto, “Riwruok e teko: Cultivating Identity in Colonial 
and Postcolonial Kenya,” Africa Today 53, no. 2 (2006): 61. Curators and staff at 
the Kisumu branch museum explained in July 2009 that international tourism 
had peaked with Obama’s senatorial victory in 2004 and expanded even more 
after he was elected president. For more on the Kisumu museum, see http://
www.museums.or.ke/content/blogcategory/14/20/.
43. Comaroff and Comaroff, Ethnicity Inc., 83.
44. Group interview with members of the Kisumu museum staff, July 
13, 2009. Museum and monumental depictions of Mau Mau have been con-
tested and virtually absent for most of Kenya’s independent history. See Lotte 
Hughes, “‘truth Be told’: Some Problems with Historical Revisionism in 
Kenya,’ ” African Studies 70, no. 2 (2011): 182–201; daniel Branch, “The Search 
for the Remains of dedan Kimathi: The Politics of death and Memorialization 
in Post-Colonial Kenya,” Past and Present 206, no. S5 (2010): 301–20.
45. Karin van Bemmel, “Obama Made in Kenya: Appropriating the Amer-
ican dream in Kogelo,” Africa Today 59, no. 4 (2013): 68–90; and Steve Ouma 
Akoth, “The Meanings of Obama in K’ogello: Culture, Ethno-Politics and the 
Making of Leaders in Multiparty Kenya,” Anthropology Southern Africa 33, 
nos. 3–4 (2010): 114–25.
46. dorcas Odege, Kogelo Culural development Manager, interview, 
Kisumu, July 14, 2009.
47. Speech by minister of state for national Heritage and Culture, Hon. 
William Ole ntimama, read by Stephen Mau, assistant director of Library 
Service, Kogelo Community Cultural Festival, January 20, 2010, http://www 
.nationalheritage.go.ke. See also http://www.vision2030.go.ke/.
48. national Assembly Official Report, April 14, 2010, 8, https://books.
google.com/books?id=G-2_G5nn0fQC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_
ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
  |  Notes to Pages 106–108
49. Mangoa Mosota, “Sh5m Set aside for Kogelo Museum,” Standard, no-
vember 28, 2008. Within a year, the Kenyan press reported that the official 
government estimate for the new Obama cultural center had grown from 5 
million to 112 million Kenyan shillings (KSH). See “Obama Monument to Cost 
Sh112 Million,” Daily Nation, October 31, 2009.
50. Leo Odera Omolo, “Multimillion Museum to Be Constructed in Ko-
gelo Village by Kenyan Government Following Obama’s Presidential Victory: 
The Boosting of tourism in Western Kenya,” African Press International, 




51. William Ole ntimama, untitled speech, 3.
52. Ibid., 1.
53. Mangoa Masota, “Kogelo Village Reaps Big from Grandson’s Fame,” 
Standard, January 21, 2011.
54. Philip Ochieng, “The Pride of a People: Barack Obama, the Luo,” Daily 
Nation, January 17, 2009.
55. Anonymous, interview, Kisumu, Kenya, July 15, 2009.
56. For his part, Corsi took the festival and the development of the cul-
tural center as more evidence of Obama’s Kenyan “belonging,” asserting it lent 
credence to his claim that the autochthonously “Kenyan” Obama is consti-
tutionally ineligible to be president. Jerome R. Corsi, “Intel Report: Kenyans 
Honor Obama’s ‘Birthplace,’ ” World Net Daily, May 30, 2011, http: //www.wnd.
com/?pageId=303165#ixzz1ntxG9jh1.
57. Samuel Opondo, interview, Kogelo, Kenya, July 14, 2009.
58. Ibid.
59. Female student from group interview with ten female and ten male 
form III and form IV students, Obama Kogelo Secondary School, Kogelo, 
Kenya, July 14, 2009.
60. Comaroff and Comaroff, Ethnicity Inc., 1. See also Janet McIntosh, 
“Elders and ‘Frauds’: Commodified Expertise and Politicized Authenticity 
among Mijikenda,” Africa 79, no. 1 (2009): 35–52.
61. Kit Mikayi means “rock of the first wife” in dholuo. For more on 
Kit Mikayi as a cultural and spiritual site, see Celia nyamweru, “natural 
Cultural Sites of Kenya: Changing Contexts, Changing Meanings,” Journal 
of Eastern African Studies 6, no. 2 (2012): 270–302. Also see Cynthia Hoe-
hler-Fatton, Women of Fire and Spirit: History, Faith, and Gender in Roho 
Religion in Western Kenya (new York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 135. 
And for a popular retelling of the cultural significance of the site, see Gitau 
Notes to Pages 109–111  |  
Warigi, “Mystical Rock Where Many Seek Solace,” Daily Nation, September 
12, 2007.
62. Gideon Oyugi, secretary of the Luo Council of Elders (LCE) for 
Kisumu West district, interview, Kit Mikayi, Kenya, July 15, 2009.
63. James O. Gwada, “Brief History of the Rock,” oral historical narrative 
with accompanying notes on LCE letterhead, July15, 2009. Personal collection 
of Matt Carotenuto.
64. Ibid.
65. LCE, “Report on Proposed Kit Mikayi tourist Site,” 2009.
66. H. O. Omanjo, “The Constitution of the Luo Council of Elders 21st 
Century and Beyond,” LCE, 2001.
67. Gilbert E. M. Ogutu, Ker in the 21st Century Luo Social System (Kisumu: 
Sundowner, 2001).
68. david Kazia, “An ‘Irresistible, Awful, Marvelous People’: The Portrait 
of the Luos of East Africa,” East African, July 11, 2008.
69. Ibid.
70. Morrison, “nature of decline,” 135.
71. For instance, variations of this phrase were evoked by the LCE chair-
man Riaga Ogallo in 2004 and in discussions of Garang’s 2005 death with LCE 
elder Opiyo Otondi in 2007.
72. Ogutu, Ker in the 21st Century Luo Social System. For a closer look at 
how Christianity influences notions of ethnogenesis, see Adrian Hastings, The 
Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); and derek R. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism 
and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c. 1935–1972 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
73. For the colonial-era files of the Luo Language Committee, see Kenya 
national Archives—nairobi (hereafter KnA), dC/KSM 1/10/60, “Cultural 
Languages and dialect,” 1930–1954; and KnA, PC/nZA 3/6/129, “Vernacular 
Education,” 1944–1949. For a discussion of a similar body created to deal with 
the Gikuyu and Luhya vernaculars in Kenya, see derek R. Peterson, Creative 
Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial 
Kenya (Portsmouth, nH: Heinemann, 2004), 118–22; and Julie MacArthur, 
“The Making and Unmaking of African Languages: Oral Communities and 
Competitive Linguistic Work in Western Kenya,” Journal of African History 53, 
no. 2 (2012): 151–72.
74. KnA, PC/nZA 3/6/129, Ohanga, “Report on the Linguistic Relation-
ships of the Luo,” July 25, 1946.
75. Ramogi, April 15, 1949. Readers praised the work of the LLC in the 
1940s, with a number of editorials asking for its rules to be published in the 
  |  Notes to Pages 112–115
paper so that they could learn the language properly. One 1949 article called 
for unity in the “nilotic areas” rising out of the Luo Language Committee and 
recommended that Ramogi should evolve into a common paper “to enable 
people in Uganda and Sudan to read news of common interest.”
76. This view was consistently expressed during more than thirty inter-
views with LCE officials and supporters in 2004.
77. John Oywa, “dr. Kiir: newest Luo Elder Rose from Rebel Ranks,” Stan-
dard, May 6, 2009.
78. Emeka-Mayaka Gekara,“Raila’s new Strategy for Power,” Daily Nation, 
May 30, 2010; and Jervasio Okot and Larco Lomayat,“Kenyan Luo Elders Ar-
rived in Juba, Capital City of South Sudan,” Nile Buffalo Gazette, May 17, 2009, 
http://www.nilebuffalo.com/news_detail.php?txt_id=254.
79. Ali Mazrui, “In a nilotic Embrace: From Obote to Obama,” Monitor, 
november 8, 2008.
80. Kazia, “Irresistible, Awful, Marvelous People.”
81. david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, “Ayany, Malo, and 
Ogot: Historians in Search of a Luo nation,” Cahiers d’études africaines 27, nos. 
107–8 (1987): 274.
82. Ibid., 274–75. See also Ben G. Blount, “Agreeing to Agree on Geneal-
ogy: A Luo Sociology of Knowledge,” in Sociocultural Dimensions of Language 
Use, ed. Mary Sanches and Ben G. Blount (new York: Academic Press, 1975), 
117–35.
83. See East African Educational Publisher’s popular series Makers of Ken-
ya’s History for a number of titles that walk a fine line between popular history 
and political hagiography.
84. Lila Luce, Barack Obama: Yes, We Can! (nairobi: Sasa Sema, 2009), 79. 
For more examples of local children’s literature, see Philo Ikonya, The Kenyan 
Boy Who Became President of America (nairobi: Media Horizons network, 
2008); and Phyllis Andrews, Who Am I? The Story of Barack Obama (nairobi: 
East African Educational Publishers, 2010).
85. Peter Firstbrook, The Obamas: The Untold Story of an African Family 
(new York: Crown, 2010).
86. Excerpts from Sally H. Jacobs, The Other Barack: The Bold and Reckless 
Life of President Obama’s Father (new York: Public Affairs, 2011), were pub-
lished in one of Kenya’s leading newspapers. See, for instance, “How Obama 
Father’s dream Was Ruined by nairobi’s Happy Hour and Ethnicity,” Daily 
Nation, July 30, 2011.
 
Notes to Pages 116–120  |  
Chapter 6: Political Violence and History at the Ballot Box
1. President Uhuru Kenyatta, speaking at the celebration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Kenyan independence, december 12, 2013. Available at http://
jamhurimagazine.com/index.php/kenya-president/4534-president-uhuru- 
kenyatta-speech-kenya-50th-independence-day-celebration.html.
2. John Kamau, “Fifty Years On, Uhuru Confronts the Same Mountains 
His Father Faced,” Daily Nation, May 21, 2014.
3. As daniel Branch argues, due to the widespread anticolonial violence 
of Mau Mau and the targeted political violence of the early postcolonial era, 
Kenya in the 1960s should be seen as both a postconflict and postcolonial 
state. Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil 
War, and Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 180.
4. Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya Speeches, 1963–
1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 8.
5. Karuti Kanyinga, “The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, 
Ethnicity and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya,” Journal of Contem-
porary African Studies 27, no. 3 (2009): 325–44.
6. For a nuanced discussion of Kalenjin history and politics, see Gabrielle 
Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2011).
7. Majimbo is the Swahili word for “states” or “region.” david M. Ander-
son, “‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’: nationalism and the Party Politics of 
decolonization in Kenya, 1955–64,” Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 
3 (2005): 547–64. Anderson notes that majimboism was initially advocated 
by the opposition to the Kenya African national Union (KAnU) in the early 
1960s and again in the early 2000s. See also Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History 
Since Independence (London: tauris, 2012), 482–83.
8. Anderson, “Yours in Struggle,” 564.
9. Republic of Kenya, “Record of Evidence taken before the Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry into tribal Clashes in Kenya,” July 20, 1998. Hereaf-
ter cited as Akiwumi Commission. Cited in Human Rights Watch, “Violence 
as a Political tool in Kenya,” 2002, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya/
Kenya0502-04.htm.
10. Akiwumi Commission, 49, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re-
lated_material/Akiwumi%20Report.pdf.
11. dave Opiyo, “Moi Incited Ethnic Cleansing in Rift Valley, Says Wit-
ness,” Daily Nation, February 18, 2014, http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Moi-
incited-ethnic-cleansing-in-Rift-Valley-says-witness/-/1950946/2212268/-/
format/xhtml/-/10aca2bz/-/index.html.
12. Akiwumi Commission, 91.
  |  Notes to Pages 120–125
13. Ibid., 50.
14. Binaifer nowrojee, Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in 
Kenya (new York: Human Rights Watch, 1993).
15. Claims to indigeneity are contested in Kenya. For instance, in the Rift, 
Okiek communities have often challenged Maasai or Kalenjin claims of indi-
geneity, while the politics of decolonization encouraged coastal communities 
to attempt to reclaim their political and territorial autonomy. See Gabrielle 
Lynch, “Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice: The African Commis-
sion on Human and People’s Rights and the Endorois,” African Affairs 111, no. 
442 (2012): 24–45; and Jeremy Prestholdt, “Politics of the Soil: Separatism, Au-
tochthony, and decolonization at the Kenyan Coast,” Journal of African His-
tory 55, no. 2 (2014): 249–70.
16. International Federation for Human Rights and Kenya Human Rights 
Commission, Massive Internal Displacement in Kenya Due to Politically Insti-
gated Ethnic Clashes: Absence of Political and Humanitarian Responses, nos. 
471–72 (2007), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Kenya_engnB.pdf.
17. daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (new 
Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 2011), 221–22.
18. Lynch, I Say to You, 35.
19. Hornsby, Kenya, 555.
20. nyayo House is now, ironically, home to Kenya’s department of Im-
migration Services. See Kenya national Commission on Human Rights, “The 
dark days Unforgotten—the Nyayo torture Chambers,” http://www.knchr.
org/Thedarkdaysunforgotten.aspx. Also see Branch, Kenya, 167.
21. Branch, Kenya, 209–12. FORd-Kenya was Odinga’s party. Asili means 
“original” in Swahili.
22. Hornsby, Kenya, 529.
23. Gilbert E. M. Ogutu, Ker Jaramogi Is Dead, Who Shall Lead My Peo-
ple? Reflections on Past Present, and Future Luo Thought and Practice (Kisumu: 
Palwa Research, 1994).
24. Hornsby, Kenya, 592.
25. Branch, Kenya, 227–28, 246–47.
26. Raila Amolo Odinga, Raila Odinga: The Flame of Freedom (nairobi: 
Mountain top, 2013).
27. “Victory Is not Enough,” Africa Confidential 44, no. 7 (April 4, 2003): 5, 
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/226/Victory_is_not_
enough.
28. Branch, Kenya, 240.
29. For footage of Raila’s speech at the national Rainbow Coalition 
(nARC) rally on October 14, 2002, at Uhuru Park, see https://www.you-
Notes to Pages 125–127  |  
tube.com/watch?v=my_PLdbnCic. Harambee was the name given to Ken-
yatta’s national self-development project that was the precursor to Moi’s 
nyayo.
30. Hear Gidi Gidi Maji Maji perform “Unbwogable” at http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=kt5orKxAGwc. See also Joyce nyairo and James Ogude, 
“Popular Music, Popular Politics: Unbwogable and the Idioms of Freedom in 
Kenyan Popular Music,” African Affairs 104, no. 415 (2005): 225–49.
31. See the Kenya Broadcasting Company (KBC) coverage of the swearing- 
in at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zP2VPzgguC8.
32. “President Kibaki’s Speech to the nation on His Inauguration as Ken-
ya’s 3rd President,” december 30, 2002, http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/
speeches/kibaki/2002301201.htm.
33. Kenya ranked 129th out of 146 nations, Finland being the least corrupt 
and Haiti and Bangladesh tied for being the most corrupt. See the 2004 Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index, http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2004. In 1998, Kenya ranked 74th out of the 85 countries 
for which there was sufficient data available to rank. See the 1998 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_
indices/cpi/previous_cpi/1998.
34. See Michela Wrong’s detailed analysis of the scandal. Wrong, It’s Our 
Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower (new York: Harper, 2009).
35. Branch, Kenya, 255.
36. Jeevan Vasagar, “Kenyan President Faces Rebellion on Sleaze,” Guard-
ian, February 23, 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/24/
kenya.jeevanvasagar.
37. Lucas Barasa, “United Stand in Vote against 2005 Constitution Gave 
Birth to Orange,” DailyNationMobile, February 26, 2014, http://mobile.nation.
co.ke/news/Orange-democratic-Movement/-/1950946/2223566/-/format/
xhtml/-/rppvte/-/index.html.
38. Branch, Kenya, 259.
39. Hornsby, Kenya, 755.
40. daniel Branch, “At the Polling Station in Kibera,” London Review of 
Books 30, no. 2 (January 28, 2008), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n02/daniel- 
branch/at-the-polling-station-in-kibera.
41. For a breakdown of seats, see Makau Mutua, Kenya’s Quest for Democ-
racy: Taming Leviathan (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2008), 245.
42. Branch, Kenya, 270.
43. Hornsby, Kenya, 759.
44. “Kenya: Violence Erupts as Kibaki Sworn In,” Citizen, december 31, 
2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200712310859.html.
  |  Notes to Pages 128–130
45. david Mugoyoni, “Kenya: Raila also declared President,” Daily Nation, 
december 31, 2007. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200712310012.html.
46. Human Rights Watch, “The Immediate and Underlying Causes and 
Consequences of Flawed democracy in Kenya,” United States Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, February 7, 2008, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/02/06/hearing-immediate-and-underlying- 
causes-and-consequences-flawed-democracy-kenya.
47. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post 
Election Violence (nairobi: Government Printer, 2008), 173–74. Hereafter cited 
as “Waki Commission.” Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/15A00F569813F4d549257607001F459d-Full_Report.pdf.
48. Commonwealth Secretariat, Kenya General Election, Report of the 
Commonwealth Observer Group, december 27, 2007, 6, http://secretariat.
thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/35144/174418/report_of_the_com-
monwealth_observer_group_for_the.htm.
49. For detailed accounts of the postelection violence, see the special issue 
“Election Fever: Kenya’s Crisis,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 2 
(2008); Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence 
and Kenya’s Crises of Governance” (new York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), 
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/kenya0308webwcover.pdf; Jerome 
Lafargue, ed., The General Elections in Kenya, 2007 (dar es Salaam: Mkuki 
na nyota, 2009); and Peter Kagwanja and Roger Southall, eds., Special Issue: 
“Kenya’s Uncertain democracy: The Electoral Crisis of 2008,” Journal of Con-
temporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (2009).
50. Akiwumi Commission, 2.
51. Ibid., 11. Madoadoa is a derisive vernacular term for “foreigner” literally 
meaning “spots.” terms like this have been used in election rhetoric to speak 
of “outsiders,” along with other words such as viroboto (fleas). See Republic of 
Kenya, Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 2 (nai-
robi: truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 2013), 506. This six-vol-
ume report is available for download at http://www.tjrckenya.org/.
52. Waki Commission, 54.
53. Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets,” 43–52.
54. Michael Chege, “Kenya: Back from the Brink?” Journal of Democracy 
19, no. 4 (2008): 125–39.
55. “Key Points: Kenya’s Power-Sharing deal,” BBC News, February 28, 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7269476.stm.
56. Jeffrey Gettleman, “disputed Vote Plunges Kenya into Bloodshed,” 
New York Times, december 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/
world/africa/31kenya.html?pagewanted=all.
Notes to Pages 130–135  |  
57. “Could Kenya Become Rwanda?” BBC, January 30, 2008, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7217462.stm.
58. Thilo Thielke, “Chaos in Africa: tribal Massacres Echo Rwandan Geno-
cide,” Spiegel Online International, January 2, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/world/chaos-in-kenya-tribal-massacres-echo-rwandan-genocide- 
a-526129.html.
59. For a depiction of the violence devoid of historical context, see the 
photographic essay “Kenyan tribes Wage a War with Bows and Arrows,” Time, 
March 18, 2008. Subtext included language describing the violence as part of 
“codified age-old traditions,” and so on. Available at http://www.time.com/
time/photogallery/0,29307,1722198,00.html.
60. Kimani njogu, ed., Healing the Wound: Personal Narratives about the 
2007 Post-Election Violence in Kenya (nairobi: twaweza, 2009), 274.
61. Ibid., 289.
62. “Odinga Says Obama Is His Cousin,” BBC, January 8, 2008, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7176683.stm.
63. Jerome R. Corsi, Obama Nation: Leftist Politics and the Cult of Person-
ality (new York: Threshold, 2008), 103–4.
64. Ibid.
65. For well-substantiated analyses of the electoral controversy and its 
historical underpinnings, see Thomas P. Wolf, “‘Poll Poison’? Politicians and 
Polling in the 2007 Kenya Election,” Journal of Contemporary African Stud-
ies 27, no. 3 (2009): 279–304; daniel Branch, nicholas Cheeseman, and Leigh 
Gardner, eds., Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950 (Berlin: LIt, 
2010); david Anderson, “Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order 
in Kenya,” African Affairs 101, no. 405 (2002): 531–55.




70. Barack Obama interviewed by Capital FM Kenya, January 29, 2008. tran-
script available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/45744/print.
71. Waki Commission, 5–9; Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets”; 
and Susanne d. Mueller, “Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): 
Politics, the Election and the Law,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 1 
(2014): 25–42.
72. Waki Commission, 472.
73. david William Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, Risks of Knowledge: 
Investigations into the Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 
1990 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 43–45.
  |  Notes to Pages 135–137
74. “don’t Be Vague, Let’s Go to the Hague,” Africa Confidential, december 
17, 2010, http://www.africa-confidential.com/article preview/id/3783/don’t_
be_vague%2c_let’s_go_to_the_Hague.
75. The original six were: Mohammed Hussein Ali (Commissioner of Po-
lice); Henry Kiprono Kosgey (Chairman of the Orange democratic Move-
ment—OdM); Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Head of the Public Service and 
Secretary to the Cabinet); Joseph Sang (Head of Operations at Kalenjin- 
language radio station Kass FM); William Samoei Ruto (member of Parlia-
ment for Eldoret north); and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (member of Parliament 
for Gatundu South). See the ICC’s website: http://www.icc-cpi.int/.
76. Barack Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the International 
Criminal Court Announcement,” december 15, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2010/12/15/statement-president-obama-international- 
criminal-court-announcement. The United States is not a signatory to the 
Rome Statute (1998) that established the ICC.
77. Oliver Mathenge, “Kenya: ‘Yes’ Wins with Over 6 Million Votes,” Daily 
Nation, August 5, 2010.
78. For more on Kenya’s truth Commission, see Lydiah Kemunto Bosire 
and Gabrielle Lynch, “Kenya’s Search for truth and Justice: The Role of Civil 
Society,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 2 (2014): 256–76.
79. See the CORd website: http://www.cordkenya.org/.
80. Gabrielle Lynch, “Electing the ‘Alliance of the Accused’: The Success of 
the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 
8, no. 1 (2014): 93–114.
81. Republic of Kenya, “national Assembly Official Report,” december 22, 
2010, 69.
82. Kenya-based IPSOS Public Affairs noted a drop in overall Kenyan ap-
proval of the ICC process from a height of 68 percent in October 2010 to 56 
percent by July 2011. during the same period, support for the ICC dropped 
from 73 percent to 36 percent in Kenyatta’s Central Province stronghold and 
from 61 percent to 37 percent in Ruto’s Rift Valley. See Synovate Research, 
“Countdown for ICC support declines,” August 11, 2011, http://www.ipsos.
co.ke/.
83. Barack Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the International 
Criminal Court Announcement,” december 15, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2010/12/15/statement-president-obama-international- 
criminal-court-announcement.
84. Barack Obama, “President Obama’s Message to the People of Kenya,” 
February 5, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/05/president-obamas- 
message-people-kenya.
Notes to Pages 137–140  |  
85. Grant t. Harris, Special Assistant to the President and Senior direc-
tor for African Affairs, “President Obama’s Message to the People of Kenya,” 
February 5, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/05/president- 
obamas-message-people-kenya.
86. Kevin Kelley, “‘Choices Have Consequences,’ US tells Kenyan Voters,” 
Daily Nation, February 7, 2013.
87. Jason Straziuso and tom Odula,  “Kenya’s tribal ‘O’ Factor: Obama, 
Ocampo, Odinga,” Huffington Post, April 15, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/04/18/kenya-obama-ocampo-odinga_n_849914.html. The article 
was also posted on popular blog sites like thegrio.com and on the Boston 
Globe’s public site, Boston.com.
88. Jerome Corsi, “Obama Funded Foreign Thug Who Promised Is-
lamic State,” World News Daily, October 19, 2008, http://www.wnd.
com/2008/10/78324/; Jerome Corsi, “democrat Firm Advising Obama’s Com-
munist Kenyan Pal,” World News Daily, december 19, 2011, http://www.wnd.
com/2011/12/377429/.
89. “Obama’s Kenyan Pal target of tell-All Book,” World News Daily, 
February 22, 2012, http://www.wnd.com/2012/02/obamas-kenyan-pal-target- 
of-tell-all-book/#Zq4W0xs22OVlS9kA.99. Also see Bernard namunane, 
“Miguna Sends Book on Raila to Controversial US Publisher,” Daily Nation, 
February 26, 2012; and Miguna Miguna, Peeling Back the Mask: A Quest for 
Justice in Kenya (London: Gilgamesh, 2012).
90. “Raila’s Fightback Plan amid Miguna Storm,” Daily Nation, July 14, 2012.
91. Jeffery Gettleman, “neighbors Kill neighbors as Kenyan Vote Stirs Old 
Feuds,” New York Times, February 23, 2013.
92. nima Elbagir, “Armed as Kenyan Vote nears,” Cnn, February 28, 
2014, http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/international/2013/02/28/elbagir- 
kenya-armed.cnn?iref=allsearch.
93. Michael Holman, “Foreign Reporters Armed and Ready to Attack 
Kenya,” Daily Nation, March 2, 2013.
94. Ibid.
95. Mkoma wa ngugi, “Kenya Vote: How the West Was Wrong,” Guard-
ian, March 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/12/kenya- 
elections-west-wrong.
96. For instance, Lance Kipngetich, “Politicians Should Rise above trib-
alism, Parochialism,” Standard, november 18, 2012; and Mutuma Mathiu, 
“Elections: What We Must do Right to Prevent a 2008-Style Meltdown,” Daily 
Nation, February 13, 2013.
97. nicholas Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis, “democracy 
and Its discontents: Understanding Kenya’s 2013 Elections,” Journal of Eastern 
  |  Notes to Pages 141–145
African Studies 8, no. 1 (2014): 2–24. For official vote tallies, visit the Indepen-
dent Electoral and Boundaries Commission of Kenya’s website: http://www.
iebc.or.ke/.
98. Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz, “dire Consequences or Empty 
Threats? Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and democracy in Kenya,” Jour-
nal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 1 (2014): 43–62; and Mueller, “Kenya and 
the International Criminal Court.” 
Chapter 7: Obama for Africa or Africa for Obama?
1. Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs Kalonzo Musyoka, “na-
tional Assembly Official Report,” January 20, 2009, during a debate in Parlia-
ment on a motion to congratulate the people of the United States.
2. The popular news website allafrica.com even had a special section de-
voted to the 2008 US elections, compiling articles and viewpoints from media 
sources across the continent. See also Robert E. Washington, “Obama and Af-
rica,” Research in Race and Ethnic Relations 16 (2010): 3–26.
3. In 2008 allafrica.com posted 1,816 articles evoking Obama from dozens 
of African newspapers and media outlets across the continent and throughout 
the diaspora. In the month of november alone, 726 articles were posted.
4. Kilemi Mwiria, “The Freshness of Obama Candidacy Can Also Be Rep-
licated in Kenya,” Standard, August 30, 2008.
5. Sam n. Fonkem, “Snapshot—Had Barack Obama Been Born Cameroo-
nian,” Post (Buea), August 29, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200809010109.
html.
6. Alfredo t. Hengari, “Obama’s triumph Provides a Moral Lesson about 
democracy,” Namibian (Windhoek), July 11, 2008, http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/200807110730.html; and Boco Edet, “nigeria: The Obama Phenomenon,” 
Daily Trust (Abuja), July 29, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200807290235.
html.
7. tendai Biti, MdC Secretary-General, “World Leaders Congratulate 
Obama,” november 5, 2008, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/11/05/
world-leaders-congratulate-obama/.
8. Kihura nkuba, “Uganda: Great Black Men Who dominated the World,” 
New Vision, January 3, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200901050104.html.
9. Washington, “Obama and Africa,” 5; W. Hassan Marsh, “Africa: Obama 
‘Reframes the Black Question,’ ” June 27, 2008, http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/200806271195.html?viewall=1.
10. Achille Mbembe, “Obama and the Continent of Africa,” Pamba-
zuka News, August 11, 2008, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/com-
ment/50075.
Notes to Pages 145–147  |  
11. Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs, July 1, 
2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62636/barack-obama/renewing- 
american-leadership.
12. Witney W. Schneidman, “Africa: Obama’s Three Objectives for Con-
tinent,” September 29, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200809291346.html.
13. References to Africa were confined mainly to a discussion of peace-
keeping operations in darfur, with Obama evoking Kenya during the first 
presidential debate in relation to immigration and educational opportunity. 
For full transcripts and video, see http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/presi-
dent/debates/presidential-debates.html.
14. nicolas Van de Walle, “US Policy towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and 
the Obama Administration,” African Affairs 109, no. 434 (2010): 1–21; Bereket 
Habte Selassie, “Can We Expect More Than Symbolic Support? African Studies 
Review 53, no. 2 (2010): 6–11.
15. Barack Obama, “On a new Beginning,” Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, 
June 4, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- 
cairo-university-6-04-09.
16. For more on the activities of civil rights luminaries such as W. E. B. 
dubois, Richard Wright, and Malcom X in Ghana, see Kevin K. Gaines, Amer-
ican Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: 
University of north Carolina Press, 2006).
17. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament,” 
July 11, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- 
ghanaian-parliament.html.
18. donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War 
Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson, nC: McFarland, 2007), 33–38; and 
Mashudu G. Ramuhala, “Continuity or Change in U.S. Foreign Policy in Af-
rica,” in National Security under the Obama Administration, ed. Bahram M. 
Rajaee and Mark J. Miller (new York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 143–59.
19. Farouk Chothia, “What does Gaddafi’s death Mean for Africa?” BBC 
Africa, October 21, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15392189.
20. Kepher Otieno, “Gaddafi Gift Sparks Row in Council of Elders,” Stan-
dard, March 14, 2010; “Kenya Elders Crown Gaddafi ‘King of Africa,’ ” K24tV, 
January 4, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Qw_0AUhjhc.
21. denver Kisting, “Africa Expects Better: Obama disappoints Af-
rica in First term,” Namibian, november 8, 2012, http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/201211080257.html.
22. Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Africa: Beware of Obama’s Second term,” Af-
rican Studies Review 56, no. 2 (2013): 179–83; Paul tiyambie Zeleza,“Obama’s 
Africa Policy: The Limits of Symbolic Power,” African Studies Review 56, no. 2 
  |  Notes to Pages 147–150
(2013): 165–78; Jeremy Prestholdt, “Kenya, the United States, and Counterter-
rorism,” Africa Today 57, no. 4 (2011): 2–27.
23. Geoffrey York, “Africans Pleased with Obama Victory, but Less Enthu-
siastic Than in 2008,” Globe and Mail, november 7, 2012.
24. david Makali, “Kenya: Obama Has Earned World’s Admiration,” Star, 
november 9, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201211100141.html; Mboneko 
Munyaga, “Africa: Obama Victory—time for Enhanced African-American 
ties,” Tanzanian Daily News, november 9, 2012, http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/201211100388.html?viewall=1.
25. Cintia taylor, “Africa: Kenyan Photographer Reflects on Obamamania 
’08,” Radio netherlands Worldwide, november 7, 2012, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201211071181.html.
26. Murithi Mutiga, “The View from nairobi,” New York Times, november 
5, 2012.
27. Ibid.
28. “America’s Global Image Remains More Positive Than China’s” 
(Washington, dC: Pew Research Center, 2013), http://www.pewglobal.org/
files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Global-Attitudes-Project-Balance-of-Power- 
Report-FInAL-July-18-2013.pdf.
29. data for 2012 from “Africa,” Office of the United States trade Represen-
tative, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa.
30. Official coverage of “2013 Africa trip: June 27–July 2,” available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/africa-trip-2013.
31. “Obama Speaks Out on Review Process,” Daily Nation, June 4, 2010, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/Kenya-Referendum/Obama-speaks-out-on-review-
process/-/926046/932356/-/6wcut2z/-/index.html; Rachael nakitare and 
Barack Obama, Washington, dC, United States, June 1, 2010, http://vimeo.
com/12268122.
32. Kevin J. Kelley, “Obama Could Visit Kenya Soon,” Daily Nation, January 
25, 2013, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Obama-could-visit-Kenya- 
soon/-/1064/1675512/-/orka5yz/-/index.html.
33. “Obama Snub May Be Linked to ICC, but It Has Consequences for 
Kenya,” Daily Nation, May 22, 2013.
34. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Young African 
Leaders Initiative town Hall,” Johannesburg, South Africa, June 28, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/29/remarks-president- 
obama-young-african-leaders-initiative-town-hall.
35. Simon ndonga, “Kenya not Bothered by Obama’s Snub—Ruto,” Cap-
ital FM (nairobi), June 30, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201307020002.
html. See also Kwamchetsi Makokha, “Obama Refusal to Visit Kenya 
Notes to Pages 150–154  |  
Will Have Consequences,” Daily Nation, June 28, 2013, http://www.nation 
.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Obama-refusal-to-visit-Kenya-will-have-consequences 
/-/440808/1898286/-/ax3nrwz/-/index.html.
36. Francis Otieno, interview, Kisumu, Kenya, May 27, 2013.
37. Joel Lawi, “Kenya: Mixed Feelings over Obama’s Kenya Snub,” Tan-
zanian Daily News, June 28, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201306280108.
html.
38. “Strange Reversal in Kogelo,” East African, January 23, 2009; Patrick 
Mayoyo, “Kogelo Big Attraction for Land Buyers and Business Owners,” Daily 
Nation, november 17, 2008.
39. Karin van Bemmel, “Obama Made in Kenya: Appropriating the Amer-
ican dream in Kogelo,” Africa Today 59, no. 4 (2013): 81–85.
40. Manager of Kogelo Village Resort, Kogelo, Kenya, May 28, 2013. The 
Obama family has disputed Rajula’s claims of familial ties. See Eric Oloo, 
“Obama Kin disown Ex-Councillor,” Star, January 24, 2013, http://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2013/01/24/obama-kin-disown-ex-councillor_c729753.
41. Harold Ayodo, “The American Face of nyangoma Kogelo,” Standard, 
July 7, 2011; and Ayodo, “Real Estate Spurs Kisumu’s tourism Growth,” Stan-
dard, May 31, 2012.
42. Manager of Kogelo Village Resort, May 28, 2013.
43. Samuel Opondo, interview, Kogelo, Kenya, July 14, 2009. See also 
Corporate Council on Africa, “Barack Obama Secondary School in Kenya to 
Receive $35,000 in Proceeds from January 20 Africa-themed Inaugural Ball 
in Washington,” January 28, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200901280724.
html.
44. According to Kenya’s electoral and boundaries commission in charge 
of the 2013 election, Malik Obama received 2,816 out of the 281,663 votes cast. 
Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission, “Summary of Results for 
Governor. March 3, 2013 General Election,” 5, http://www.iebc.or.ke/.
45. In January 2009, Kogelo found its way onto Google Maps. See “Map-
ping Barack Obama’s hometown of Kogelo,” http://google-africa.blogspot.
com/2009/01/mapping-barack-obamas-hometown-of.html.
46. Communications Commission of Kenya, “Quarterly Sector Statistics 
Report Second Quarter of the Financial Year 2013/14 (Oct–dec),” http://www.
cck.go.ke/resc/downloads/Sector_Statistics_Report_Q2_201314.pdf.
47. See Melissa tully and Brian Ekdale, “Sites of Playful Engagement: twit-
ter Hashtags as Spaces of Leisure and development in Kenya,” Information 
Technologies and International Development 10, no. 3 (2014): 67–82.
48. Republic of Kenya, “draft diaspora Policy of Kenya” (nairobi: Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/draft 
  |  Notes to Pages 155–158
diasporaPolicyof Kenya.pdf. Central Bank of Kenya, “diaspora Remittances,” 
https://www.centralbank.go/ke/index.php.
49. data acquired via topsy.com in April 2014. topsy was purchased by 
Apple in 2015 and no longer exists.
50. “Last name Politics Light Up twitter,” Al Jazeera, April 24, 2014, 
http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201404241950-0023671; Aggrey Mutambo, 
“Kalonzo Musyoka ‘Ethnic Slur’ draws Fury,” Daily Nation, April 24, 2014, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kalonzo-Musyoka-Cord-Press-Con-
ference/-/1064/2292484/-/138c1yk/-/index.html.
51. See Vincent Agoya, “Moses Kuria Charged with Hate Speech,” Daily 
Nation, June 26, 2014; Agoya, “Outrage as Moses Kuria Makes Another Hate 
Remark,” Daily Nation, January 13, 2015.
52. Michelle Osborn, “Fuelling the Flames: Rumour and Politics in Kib-
era,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 2 (2008): 315–27; Maurice n. 
Amutabi, “Media Boom in Kenya and Celebrity Galore,” Journal of African 
Cultural Studies 25, no. 1 (2013): 14–29.
53. Jaluo.com, http://blog.jaluo.com/; “Luo Union Organizations,” https://
www.facebook.com/groups/luounion/; and Shepherd Mpofu, “Social Media 
and the Politics of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe,” Ecquid Novi: African Journalism 
Studies 34, no. 1 (2013): 115–22.
54. Comments chiding the US president as “O’Mau Mau” appeared in a 
number of articles far removed from any foreign policy debates linked to Kenya. 
See, for instance, the comments attached to the following article: Brian Joon-
deph, “new Regulations Force doctors to Choose between Expensive Medicine 
and More Visits,” daily Caller, July 11, 2014, http://dailycaller.com/2014/07/11/
new-regulations-force-doctors-to-choose-between-expensive-medicine- 
and-more-visits/2/.
Epilogue: Tuko Pamoja: We Are Together
The words in the epilogue title were spoken by Auma Obama as she in-
troduced her brother Barack Obama before his speech at Kasarani Stadium in 
nairobi on July 26, 2015. The speech is available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=tPQWG0w7VjY.
1. Rawlings Otini, “President Obama to Visit nairobi in July,” Daily Nation, 
March 30, 2015.
2. Matthew Carotenuto, “terrorism and Violence in Kenya: Balancing a 
Global vs Local View,” African Studies Association Blog, April 3, 2015, http://
www.africanstudiesassociation.org/blog/128-april-2015/528-terrorism-and-
violence-in-kenya-balancing-a-global-vs-local-view; and “How to Make 
Sense of the #GarissaAttack in Kenya (You May Want to Switch Off television 
Notes to Pages 158–160  |  
news),” Africa Is a Country, April 4, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/04/
how-to-make-sense-of-the-garissaattack-in-kenya/.
3. Edward-Isaac dovere, “Obama’s Most dangerous trip Yet,” Politico, July 25, 
2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/obama-kenya-visit-security-120586.
4. Barbara Starr, “Obama’s trip Raises Security Concerns,” Cnn.Com, 
July 23, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/22/politics/obama-kenya-visit-
al-shabaab-threat/.
5. See Erin Burnett OutFront, Cnn, July 23, 2015, https://archive.org/de-
tails/CnnW_20150722_230000_Erin_Burnett_OutFront.
6. dovere, “Obama’s Most dangerous trip Yet.”
7. Ishaan Tharoor, “Kenyans Ridicule Cnn Report Calling Their Country 
a terror Hotbed,” Washington Post, July 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/23/kenyans-ridicule-cnn-report-calling-
their-country-a-terror-hotbed/.
8. nandwa dan, twitter post, July 26, 2015, 10:12 a.m., https://twitter.com/
dan_nayo.
9. Irua Mwongera, twitter post, August 30, 2015, 1:38 p.m., https://twitter.
com/IruraMwongera.
10. Mkuu_wa_Itifaki, twitter post, July 27, 2015, 11:53 p.m., https://twitter.
com/pheloval.
11. Creatives Ambassadors, twitter post, August 31, 2015, 3:12 a.m., https://
twitter.com/davidmuriithi.
12. Shamit Patel, twitter post, September 2, 2015, 12:17 p.m., https://twitter.
com/just_sham_it.
13. Stellar Murumba, “Kenya Promotion deal with Cnn Still Suspended de-
spite Apology,” Business Daily, August 16, 2015, http://www.businessdailyafrica 
.com/Corporate-news/no-advertising-deal-with-Cnn-despite-apology--
KtB-boss-says/-/539550/2834914/-/c254iaz/-/index.html.
14. “Kenya Is a Hotbed of Vibrant Culture, Says Uhuru,” July 25, 2015. 
Available at http://www.kbc.co.ke/kenya-is-a-hotbed-of-vibrant-culture-says-
uhuru/.
15. Murithi Mutiga, “Cnn Executive Flies to Kenya to Apologise for ‘Hot-
bed of terror’ Claim,” Guardian, August 14, 2015, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/aug/14/cnn-kenya-apologise-obama.
16. Robert I. Rotberg, “Going to Kenya Is a dumb Idea, Mr. President,” 
Politico, May 7, 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/going-
to-kenya-is-a-dumb-idea-mr-president-117737.
17. Ibid.
18. Siddartha Mitter, twitter post, May 8, 2015, 1:33 p.m., https://twitter.
com/siddhmi/status/596775058988761088.
  |  Notes to Pages 160–162
19. Robert, twitter post, May 8, 2015, 7:47 a.m., https://twitter.com/Robert_ 
Lunalo/status/596687967579721728.
20. dikembe disembe, “President Obama’s Coming to Kenya Is Indeed 
a dumb Idea,” Kenya Today, May 9, 2015, http://www.kenya-today.com/ 
opinion/dikembe-president-obama-coming-to-kenya-is-indeed-dumb-idea.
21. Ibid.
22. Jamal Axmad-Guudle, “Obama Come to Kenya, Rotberg take a Hike,” 
Sahan Journal, May 10, 2015, http://sahanjournal.com/obama-come-kenya-
rotberg-take-hike/#.VfG1C87_ZkE.
23. Bret Baier, Facebook post, July 24, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/Bret-
BaierSR/photos/a.141818502540709.41221.141513472571212/848672905188595/.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. Also, “How Kenyans Invaded Facebook to troll Fox news,” Jambo 
Newspot, July 26, 2015, http://www.jambonewspot.com/how-kenyans-on-
facebook-invaded-fox-news-troll-question-on-obamas-visit-to-kenya/.
26. Peter Baker, “Kenya trip takes Obama Back to a Complex Part of 
Himself,” New York Times, July 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/
world/africa/africa-trip-takes-obama-back-to-a-complex-part-of-himself.
html?_r=0.
27. “Sununu Uses Obama’s Kenya trip to Restart Birther talk,” Fox news 
Radio, March 30, 2015, http://radio.foxnews.com/2015/03/30/sununu-uses-
obamas-kenya-trip-to-restart-birther-talk/.
28. Elizabeth Chuck, “President Barack Obama Makes Birth Certificate 
Joke on Kenya trip,” nBCnews.com, July 25, 2015.
29. Barack Obama. “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Kenya,” 
Office of the Press Secretary, July 26, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/07/26/remarks-president-obama-kenyan-people.
30. Scott Eric Kaufman, “‘What does That Mean?’ Birthers Confused by 
Obama’s Masterful trolling of Them in Kenya,” Salon, July 26, 2015, http://
www.salon.com/2015/07/26/what_does_that_mean_birthers_confused_by_
obamas_masterful_trolling_of_them_in_kenya/.
31. Jennifer Agiesta,“Misperceptions Persist about Obama’s Faith, but Aren’t 
So Widespread,” Cnn, September 14, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/13/
politics/barack-obama-religion-christian-misperceptions/index.html.
32. david M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, “Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab 
and Its Enemies in Eastern Africa,” African Affairs  114, no. 454 (2015): 1–27. 
Also see Paul d. Williams,  Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in 
Africa, council special report no. 73 (Washington, dC: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2015).
Notes to Pages 162–164  |  
33. “Kenya among the Fastest Growing Economies in Africa,” World Bank, 
March 5, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/03/05/
kenya-among-the-fastest-growing-economies-in-africa.
34. Uhuru Kenyatta, “Choose Kenya,” http://www.choosekenya.go.ke/.
35. See Safaricom, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/about-us.
36. “Safaricom Awarded Kasarani naming Rights,” Daily Nation Online, no-
vember 29, 2013, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Safaricom-Kasarani-Stadium- 
naming-Rights/-/1056/2092920/-/itjdqr/-/index.html.
37. Marc Santora, “Obama to Push U.S. trade in Kenya as China’s Role 
Grows,” New York Times, July 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/
world/africa/obama-trip-to-kenya-offers-rare-chance-to-shore-up-economic- 
ties.html?_r=0.
38. Map Kibera, “Map Kibera Project—Maps and Statistics,” http://
mapkiberaproject.yolasite.com/maps-and-statistics.php. Kibera is a central 
location in the netflix Original Series Sense8.
39. UndP, “Human development Indicators: Kenya,” http://hdr.undp.org/
en/countries/profiles/KEn.
40. Robert M. Maxon, “Social and Cultural Changes,” in Decolonization 
and Independence in Kenya, ed. Bethwell A. Ogot and Robert Ochieng’ (Lon-
don: James Currey, 1995), 115.
41. John Githongo, “Kenya: Insecurity, the ‘War Against terror’ Jubilee 
Version,” Star, April 19, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201404210264.html.
42. Isma’il KushKush, “Kenya’s Wide net against terror Sweeps Up Refugees,” 
April 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/world/africa/kenyas- 
answer-to-terrorism-sweeping-roundups-of-somalis.html.
43. Abdi Latif Ega, “What It Is Like to Be Somali in Kenya,” Africa Is a 
Country, April 9, 2014, http://africasacountry.com/2014/04/whats-it-like-to-
be-somali-in-kenya/. And Abraham Leno, “Kenya Must Respect the Human 
Rights of Somali Refugees,” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2015, http://www.aljazeera 
.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/kenya-respect-human-rights-somali-refu-
gees-150605082231426.html.
44. Isma’il Kushkush, “Kenya Envisions a Border Wall That Keeps 
Shabab Violence Out,” New York Times, April 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/04/22/world/africa/kenya-plans-to-build-a-border-wall-that-
keeps-shabab-violence-out.html?_r=0.
45. Matthew Carotenuto and Katherine Luongo, “Where the Kenyan Her-
itage of Barack Obama Is an Asset,” Politico, July 21, 2015, http://www.politico 
.com/magazine/story/2015/07/where-obamas-heritage-is-an-advantage- 
120422.
  |  Notes to Pages 164–167
46. See, for instance, Adam taylor, “Kenyan Lawmakers Say Obama 
Shouldn’t Be Allowed to talk about Gay Rights during His Visit,” Washing-
ton Post, July 6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2015/07/06/kenyan-lawmakers-say-obama-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-talk-
about-gay-rights-during-his-visit/.
47. Jacopo Prisco, “Obamamania Sweeps Kenya as Resourceful Businesses 
Cash in on His Visit,” Cnn.com, July 24, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/23/
africa/kenya-visit-barack-obama/.
48. Anita Chepkoech, “Brisk Business Ahead of Obama Arrival in Kenya,” 
Business Daily, July 6, 2015, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Brisk-business- 
ahead-of-Obama-arrival-in-Kenya/-/1248928/2777492/-/gc4ytp/-/index.html.
49. “Kenyan Governor Kidero denies Grass Removed after Obama,” BBC.
com, July 30, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33719845.
50. Evans Kidero, twitter post, July 21, 2015, 5:36 a.m., https://twitter.com/
KideroEvans/status/623471623790727168.
51. Joy Chelagat, “These Are the Funniest tweets about ‘Kidero’s Grass,’ ” 
Citizen Digital, July 21, 2015, http://citizentv.co.ke/lifestyle/these-are-the- 
funniest-tweets-about-kideros-grass-95593/.
52. “KOts Burn Kidero’s Grass into Ashes under the Hashtag #Kidero-
Grass,” HekaHeka.com, July 21, 2015, http://www.hekaheka.com/kot-burn-
kideros-grass-into-ashes-under-the-hashtag-kiderograss/.
53. Moses Odhiambo, “Siaya draws Sh52m Budget to Welcome Barack 
Obama,” Daily Nation, July 16, 2015, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Siaya-
County-draws-Sh52m-budget-to-welcome-Barack-Obama/-/1056/2791460/-/
view/printVersion/-/p2th71z/-/index.html.
54. Sarah Wheaton, “Obama Faces Gay Rights Challenge in Kenya,” 
Politico, July 23, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/your-obama-
seen-as-promoting-lgbt-rights-in-anti-gay-kenya-120511.
55. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Ken-
yatta of Kenya in a Press Conference,” Kenyan State House, July 25, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/25/remarks-president- 
obama-and-president-kenyatta-kenya-press-conference.
56. Amanda Stone, “President Obama travels to Kenya and Ethiopia,” 
Whitehouse Blog, July 26, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/07/26/
president-obama-travels-kenya-and-ethiopia.
57. Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Kenya.” 
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Murithi Mutiga, “Obama’s Strong Words for Kenya Are Welcome. 
But It’s too Little, too Late,” Guardian, July 28, 2015, http://www.theguardian 
.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/28/obama-kenya-us-africa.
Notes to Page 168  |  
61. Boniface Mwangi, quoted in david Smith, “Obama Faces Political 
Minefield during Kenyan ‘Homecoming,’ ” Guardian, July 23, 2015, http://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/23/obama-kenya-visit-political-minefield.
62. Barack Obama, “Press Conference by the President,” White House East 
Room, July 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/15/
press-conference-president.
63. Michael d. Shear and Gardiner Harris, “With High-Profile Help, 
Obama Plots Life after Presidency,” New York Times, August 16, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/with-high-profile-help-obama-
plots-life-after-presidency.html.
64. Margaret talev, david Malingha doya, and Mike dorning, “Obama 
Says Kenya Visit Is down Payment on Post-Presidential Era,” Bloomberg Pol-
itics, July 25, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-07-25/
obama-says-kenya-visit-is-down-payment-on-post-presidential-era.





bwana  Man/Mr./Sir—often used in colonial times as a title for 
white settlers to reinforce racial hierarchies
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dala  Luo homestead
dholuo Luo language
futa Cloth wrap
githaka Kikuyu system of land tenure
gweng’  Collection of lineages bound by marriage or defensive 
alliances
harambee Fund-raisers
Jaluo/Joluo Luo person/people; nilotic Kavirondo 
Jonam /Joka-nyanam People of lakes and rivers
kabaka Luganda term meaning “king”
kanzu Long robe
Kavirondo  Colonial term used to refer to the Winam Gulf of Lake 
Victoria as well as to the Joluo (nilotic Kavirondo) and 
Abaluhya (Bantu Kavirondo) populations of its shores
ker “defender of norms and values”/ Luo Union president 
keyo One’s extended patrilineage
kipande Colonial identity card for Africans
Kisumu ndogo Little Kisumu; urban Luo neighborhood
kofia Cap
maduka Small kiosk shops
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majimboism  The strategy of dividing Kenya into provinces with equal 
political power
mama Mrs.—implies motherhood/respect 
mashambani Kiswahili term commonly used to refer to rural areas
matatu Common public transport vehicle used in East Africa
mzee Wise old man (a term of respect)
nyumba House 
oganda Multiclan territorial conglomerates (also called piny)
panga Machete
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